CONTENTS

TRANSLATION 7

Leonardo Polo
On the Origin of Man: Hominization and Humanization 9

ARTICLES 27

J. I. Falgueras Salinas & I. Falgueras Sorauren
Man as Dualizing Being.
The Remote Anthropological Basis of Economic Activity (II) 29

Marga Vega
Habitual Knowledge of God 55

Ana Isabel Moscoso
The Knowledge of Being 71

Blanca Castilla de Cortázar
Coexistence and Family Character of the Person 103

Elda Millán Ghisleri & Consuelo Martínez Priego
Beyond Aim, Competency, and Habit:
A Brief Critical Analysis of the Purposes of Education
from the Perspective of Leonardo Polo's Anthropology 133

CONFERENCES & NOTES 165

Gustavo González Couture
An Introduction to Polo and Llano's Anthropology of Leading 167

REVIEWS & NEWS 185

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS 195
Angel Luis González, Professor of Metaphysics at the University of Navarra, died suddenly but peacefully this last April 16, 2016. He was one of the principal promoters of the research and publications of Leonardo Polo's thought. Until his passing he was Editor-in-Chief on the Board of the Complete Works of Leonardo Polo and of Studia Poliana, the philosophical Journal on Polo's thought published yearly since 1999 by the University of Navarra. In a conference after receiving an Honorary Doctorate by the Panamerican University (Mexico), he said that Polo was the "university professor that I principally admired." He dedicated a good part of his life transmitting a passionate spirit for the truth in the university and fostered an unlimited search for truth. This issue is dedicated to his memory. May he rest in peace.
TRANSLATION
On the Origin of Man: Hominization and Humanization

Leonardo Polo

Translated by: Roderrick Esclanda Leonardo Polo & Alberto I Vargas
Institute of Philosophy CISA (Querétaro, Mexico)
resclanda@leonardopoloinstitute.org albertovargas@gmail.com

Translation of an article published in 1994 in the Journal Medicina y persona of the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Navarra. First published as the last section of the chapter “Doctrina Social de la Iglesia” in the collective work Estudios sobre la encíclica ‘Centesimus Annus’ in 1992.

ABSTRACT: In this article, Leonardo Polo considers certain conclusions regarding the origin of man. The process of hominization that leads to homo sapiens cannot simply be equated with the process of adaptation that characterizes the evolution of other animals because it entails using tools by which man adapts his surroundings to himself and thereby reduces the need for man to adapt to his environment. Polo also distinguishes the process of hominization (which involves the somatic dimension of man) from the process of humanization (which involves the psychological-cultural dimension of man and an understanding of the person as being above the species).

KEYWORDS: Leonardo Polo, Evolution, Hominization, Humanization, Origin of Man.
This paper is an attempt, on the part of a philosopher, to understand certain conclusions (which are certainly valid) concerning the origin of man as presented by biologists. If it succeeds in bringing to light the original constitution of the individual and of the relationships that he maintains with his species—without leaving aside any relevant factor—, then perhaps an additional basis, of a theoretical-scientific nature, is furnished that supports from below the elevated plane in which the social doctrine of the Church lays out the requirements that arise from the dignity of the human creature, as well as the difficulties that the comprehension of personal being as a nucleus of social organization runs into.

Here I understand history to be a type of temporality that began with original sin and was preceded by another type of time that it replaces. What biologists usually call evolution happens in this other type of time. Evolution is the constitutive process of living species. The biologist distinguishes species by virtue of the impossibility of a genetic cross: a species is a group of inter-fertile living beings.

It seems that the emergence of a new species usually takes place through geographic isolation. Biologists recognize the existence of three principal laws in this type of evolution: diversification, adaptation, and selection. Three notions that are closely related with each other.

If a new form of life appears and if it is successful, then it frequently diversifies according to the ecological niches that it expands into (this is usually called radiation). The group that expands into different climatic environments adapts, something which implies diversification if the niches are different. Over time, those that live in one ecological niche and those that live in another cease being inter-fertile: accumulated mutations end up preventing crossbreeding between individuals of different groups\(^1\). In the genetic line that leads to man these laws fail. When it comes to hominization, the specification and determination of characteristics do not appear to have taken place in the way described. First of all, in the first bipedal fossil discovered: *australopithecus* (appeared 4 million years ago). It is sufficiently clear that there is barely any radiation; that it did not specialize, because it lived

---

\(^1\) Selection means that the genotypes that are most suitable to the niche are the ones that survive, and this has to do with the determination of genetic traits. Selection and adaptation reinforce genetic incommunicability; they are, therefore, specifiers. In general terms, the approach is clear, even though there are serious problems (so-called potential evolution) that are not yet solved.

JOURNAL OF POLIAN STUDIES 3 (2016) 9-23
ISSN: 2375-7329
in the same ecological niches for 3 million years. Subsequent species follow a continuous evolutionary line from the morphological point of view: from *homo habilis* (2.5 to 1.6 million years ago) to *homo sapiens*, passing through *erectus* (1.6 million to 150,000 years ago, when *sapiens* appears). From *homo habilis* to ourselves a slow specialization and growth of the brain is observed, which coincides in time with the ever more sophisticated production of stone tools.

The process of humanization is not that of hominization. Hominization refers to what is somatic, humanization to what is psychological-cultural.

First of all, two characteristics of *sapiens* appear neither in *habilis*, nor in *erectus*: first, technological progress and second, a reflexive idea by virtue of which he practices burials and exercises medicine.

There is no problem with accepting these three speciations, which is equivalent to saying that *homo sapiens* is the final step from the perspective of hominization. But if we accept geographic isolation (accumulation and selection of mutations by means of adaptation to the environment) as the only kind of speciation, then the somatic organization of *sapiens* would proceed from that of the previous ones following this evolutionary modality: beings from the same branch start acquiring greater brain capacity (which is usually called free neurons) through mutation and determination and, by virtue of this, begin learning, first slowly and then more quickly. However, this does not yet explain humanization, which is evident in the aforementioned characteristics, but rather leads to the reduction of humanization to hominization².

It is characteristic of *habilis*, of *erectus*, and of *sapiens* that corporeal change is located in the brain; or what amounts to the same, in these three biological types adaptation becomes increasingly less important: instead of adaptation to the environment, increase in brain size appears, which makes the despecialization of the rest of the body

---

² Nevertheless, we now know with certainty that the adaptive process is not the only mode of speciation. It has been proven that for there to be inter-fertility it is not enough to have the same genetic makeup. Because if the chromosomes are organized in a different way, even though the genetic makeup is the same, there is no common descendant. That is, not only are there mutations of genes, but also mutations of chromosomes; structural variations also produce speciation. Perhaps this second evolutionary modality might be better suited for understanding the hominization that culminates in *homo sapiens*, and better for distinguishing humanization from hominization. Furthermore, it better agrees with the monogenetic thesis.
possible. And this means that the relationship of adaptation to the environment is inverted. For this reason, as I was saying, the three laws of adaptive evolution do not come into play in *homo*, because, strictly speaking, the genus *homo* adapts the surroundings to itself, and not the other way around: it does not adapt to the environment. This is possible because of his creative capacity for instruments. The two things are closely linked.

From the evolutionary point of view it involves a being in which the number of free neurons has increased, and the spontaneous unfolding of instinct has decreased, and at the same time its body has become non-specific, it has been potentialized. The hand is not the result of an evolutionary process that moves forward; it is not a determination, but rather an indetermination; but the hand is instrumental, and with it *homo* takes advantage of something that already appears in *autralopithecus*, that is, being bipedal.

The human organism is predisposed to making, and it can therefore be said that what unites us with *erectus* and with *habilis* is that they are *homo faber*, and so are we: *homo sapiens* is also *faber*. This is not a more or less plausible or rhetorical explanation, but rather something that helps us understand what it is in human morphology that is irreducible to all other morphologies: *homo* becomes a species in a very peculiar way, through modifications concerning increase in brain size; to this same extent there is no morphological adaptation to the environment.

If man did not work, he would have to adapt, but his evolutionary path is no longer by adaptation. For this reason, he is not biologically competitive\(^3\).

It can, therefore, be concluded that man is the end point of evolution with regard to everything that concerns hominization. Although not even this, because evolution is not homogeneous from the moment that evolutionary strategy changes character; this change of character

---

\(^3\) Most likely, the explanation for why *homo habilis* and *homo erectus* became extinct is precisely that the chances in the brain and their manufacturing ability were not enough to compete with adaptation: the strategy of modifying the surroundings through acting on them competed with the strategy of adaptation, and the latter won. On the other hand, it is clear that *homo sapiens* did not become extinct for this reason; he can become extinct for the opposite reason: by making his surroundings uninhabitable. Man thus has no niche, but rather ecological problems, which is something completely different.
needs explanation. How is it possible that in all the major “phyla” evolution works through adaptation and in man’s case it is the other way around? It would be necessary to study other evolutionary modalities other than genetic mutation (I mentioned the organization of genes in the chromosomes), because with this, one cannot understand the appearance of the human body, which is evolutionarily antithetical to other living beings: it is not only different, but contrary. For some authors, an unbridgeable gap opens up between what is biological and what is human-cultural. It is not exactly like this. In addition to certain aspects of culture that have to be added to those I have already pointed out, the productive activity of man would not be viable if he were not faber. For this reason, it is mistaken to set the biological against the technical. Man is made for working, because if he does not work, he becomes extinct, because in him evolution has not followed any type of adaptive strategy.

Now another question arises, and it is this: hominization, that is, evolution’s focus on brain development, suggests a continuity between homo habilis and homo sapiens. But another dimension of homo sapiens is thereby omitted: simply, intellectual knowledge, which is an obvious characteristic in him.

The key to the question at hand lies in identifying specifically human (not hominid) manifestations. Now, this consists, foremost, in thought. Now, thought is a dimension of life of such density that it constitutes an exception to the evolutionary approach, an inexplicable anomaly, an irreducible novelty: if there is intelligence, then intelligence is of each human being. Therefore, humanization is different from hominization, because the latter is specific and the former is not. Undoubtedly, human specification (as we have already seen) is quite a remarkable vital process, because it is not an adaptation to the environment, but rather a de-adaptation. But the appearance of intelligence entails a biologically unsuspected change: the superiority of the individual over the species. The human individual is neither generic nor specific, but rather person: there is no intelligence of the species, there is no collective intelligence; the intelligence is characterized simply by being proper of each one. Man is a “meta-specific” being: his action does not exactly depend on the biological capacity of his species, but rather on that which is peculiar to each one. For this reason, it is not enough to say that he is faber, because being sapiens elevates man above the potentialities of the biological species. Intelligence is not a product of evolution.
ON THE ORIGIN OF MAN: HOMINIZATION AND HUMANIZATION

The manufacturing capacities of *habilis*, and even of many *sapiens*, are specific and are exercised through the hands, etc. But intelligence is meta-specific and evolution as a theory is not relevant in this regard.

The dominion of intelligence over action means meta-specification. If man is *sapiens*, then he is a person, and this is seen in the artistic dimension of what he does. When he does not work exclusively on the basis of utility, art appears (utility is a biological value that corresponds to making, in accordance with the proposed interpretation concerning human specification insofar as distinct from adaptation). Now, before the appearance of *sapiens*, one does not find any instrument with the purpose of artistic manifestation⁴.

According to its relationship to practice, intelligence is described as a capacity to open up a pause between motivation and action, a pause that is used in planning. By suspending action and by facing something ideal, the living being thinks. One thing is the intra-species aptitude to cobble together a tool in the process of doing so, and another, is planning a tool; in the first case it is a question of natural potentiality (in particular, the imagination). Intelligence entails despecialization from the point of view of the natural tendencies, because it is itself the suspension of every natural tendency and subordinates the tending to knowing.

The goal of evolution is the species (all tigers, for example, behave so that the species not be extinguished). *Habilis* also functions in favor of the species, when acting with technical strategies, since if these strategies fail, the species disappears. But when *sapiens* arises, it can no longer be said that the individual is finalized by the species, because the individual is the only one capable of thinking (the species does not think). Who thinks? I, you, he: the semantics of I, you, he, is obvious (it is absurd to say, *ça pense*).

This, however, gives rise to a large number of problems (fundamental problems that have to do with man's way of being). The relationship of man with the universe is not homeostatic, because he is “super-skillful”, an astounding technocrat. For this reason, the relationship between technology and the universe is problematic: the ecological problem, for example, makes it clear that success is not guaranteed, and that it is necessary to refer technical activity to the fundamental questions.

⁴ The idea of the soul as it is often depicted (as a double, a ghost, etc.) is linked to survival, and this survival is also connected to the individual: there is no soul of the species. The soul is of each one, and for this reason each one is buried.
Furthermore, since we are technical beings and also thinkers, the relationship between the individual and the species is no less problematic (something that does not happen with any animal). The being that is superior to her species is called person. Therefore, the relationship of the human individual with the human species is an authentic problem that can only be dealt with personally (this justifies, for now, the philosophy of culture and ethics).

Man is a critical being. This critical character is his greatness. Every human being is referred to the species, to what dwells within him; but he is not completely finalized by the species, because he is person. In sum, the description of man that is obtained from the preceding observations is this: man is the being that does not exhaust his species.\(^5\)

Now, in order to gauge to what extent historical time contains the problem indicated, it is enough to recall slavery. Slavery is the product of some cultures for which only a few were sapiens, and the others, habilis. Bad solution to the problem of the relationship of the person with the species. Is it not a current problem to achieve the recognition of any human being as sapiens without isolating him from his work activities, and to consider each one in his entire mode of being? Another question is to what extent the sciences can contribute to solving the problem.

The sciences, which have been disconnected from philosophy since Galileo, contain a good deal of knowledge about man, but if they are left by themselves, they become dehumanized: they lose their proper meaning, which depends entirely on their connection with the meaning of human existence. It is, for this reason, necessary to uphold the ideal of interdisciplinarity.

---

\(^5\) Thomas Aquinas holds that angels are personal beings that exhaust their species. The proposed description of man makes it possible to understand him as a living being whose hierarchical level is intermediate between that of the animal and that of the angelic creature. Hence it follows that the problematic of the angel refers only to the relationship with its Creator: that of man, in contrast, adds to this relationship the problem of the relationship with his fellow men. For this reason, the primary norm of human life is to love God above all things and to love one's neighbor as oneself (this "oneself" is a clear allusion to personal being).

---

\(^6\) This does not imply that the interpretation of history as the succession of relationships of domination is correct; rather, what has been said frames these observations within a better grounded understanding. Moreover, discrimination takes place more frequently without domination, in the form of marginalization and indifference: contempt, in the end.
ON THE ORIGIN OF MAN: HOMINIZATION AND HUMANIZATION

It is not just that the sensible, emotive human world has a right to be recognized, nor simply that what is technical is subject to ethics. There is something else: the task of relating scientific findings to the fundamental questions belongs to interdisciplinarity. I have proposed an example of this: biology studies evolution, but the state of the question needs to be clarified: biology cannot do so, because there is something in sapiens that, at the very least, does not come from evolution.

It is necessary to widen the area of interests, because otherwise science becomes de-logified in the deepest sense; an isolated, specialized science lacks logos, because its insertion in the human being—who is its author—becomes impossible. And when the isolated science seeks to rule over man, it disrupts and disintegrates him. If this is not taken into account, the distinction of sapiens from habilis is interpreted as a division that is internal to the species itself, which inevitably leads to discriminating against a part of the members of humanity, who, as mere habilis, are treated without regard to their dignity as persons.

I insist. Man poses a problem. And he poses it because there is a real distinction between his personal being and his essence (something which has been known since Thomas Aquinas): the intelligent one is each one, and the species is not a subject. Because it is man who makes the sciences, he cannot be directed by them; if he attempts this, he is reduced to homo habilis, and he constructs a merely objective knowledge that is rooted in a false hypostasis, to which his pre-eminence gives way. 7

To summarize. From the somatic point of view, homo sapiens is preceded by two specific levels, which are homo habilis and homo erectus (perhaps also by a variant of this called archaic homo sapiens). According to the data that we have, the tools used by homo habilis can be explained by an increase in brain capacity, which makes an improvement of the imagination possible. Although it seems that habilis carried out secondary techniques (making tools with tools), all that is needed for this is imaginative association and a certain use of conditional reasoning (which can also be seen in primates) without the need for intellectual abstraction.

---

7 Understanding the relationships of domination from the political point of view is to some extent superficial when compared with the intense domination of science over man—that is, over homo sapiens itself who develops it—and which contradicts his personal condition insofar as he entrusts the guidance of his life to science. This is submitting oneself to a falsely polarized determination, as I have stated.
In man, second level technology is of a different kind. First of all, it has to do with the development of language. Two levels of language are, in turn, usually considered: to the first level belong the emission of meaningful signs of a specific type (emitted in accordance with some learning within the species). The closest apes to man seem to use a number of signs linked to giving notice of the proximity of danger, of prey, etc. This mode of expression is understood and learned by others, but it is not language in the strict sense. Aristotle calls it \textit{diálektos}.

The second level language, the one that we speak (the \textit{logos}) carries with it a meaning such that it makes possible the almost complete modification of some previous behavior. When heard, the messages transmitted through human language trigger new behaviors; not stereotyped behaviors, but rather ones endowed with novelty precisely by virtue of the significative value of the message. Thus the “structure” of the order appears, that is, the double reference of commanding and obeying, etc. Of course, certain ways of directing would be more proper of a \textit{homo habilis}; for example, when it is assumed that once the order is given, it is fulfilled without any response (which means that the emitter of the order does not return to them, modifying it, in accordance with the information inherent to the manner of fulfilling it). The unilateral order fails to take advantage of human language: it is non-reflexive (it does not reach the level of conscience). When one seeks to exercise an authoritative order, a level of language formally equivalent to \textit{dialektos} is used.

The manager who adopts a unilateral attitude considers his subordinates on a functional level that is inferior to what is proper to \textit{homo sapiens}. And we almost always function below our capabilities, which depend on the use of dialogue. Logic arises as the art of dialogue. Dialogue is not the same as communication. Yes, it can be said that \textit{homo habilis} is \textit{communicans}; but human language serves not only for speaking so that others might know, but for men to add contrary arguments to an argument. For this, it is necessary to establish rules. Language is used in argument (in a second level usage). In dialogue the knowledge of each one is intertwined in such a way that what is said by one is the assumption of what the other says.

Of course, the appearance of second level language cannot be explained from the first level, because first order language is the language of the species, and, in contrast, the second level language is inter-subjective, which requires conscience. Only thus is its raison d’être found. The person’s standing out over the somatic development of its species
is decisive. Second level technology and second level language are correlative.

An action that arises from knowledge and a knowledge that suspends action can only be human. For the animal, knowing is embedded in its natural dynamic, it is nothing more than a phase of its behavior. But rational knowledge is not a phase, but rather a suspension of conduct. By virtue of this suspension a new behavior arises. If we unite the possibility of an instrument of instruments with the appearance of a second order language, then it can be concluded that there is something non-evolutionary in *homo sapiens* that corresponds to a different origin (ultimately, creation). Even without delving into ontological questions, the break in the passage from the species to the individual is intense and clear. Both second level language as well as planning are proper of a being that maintains intersubjective relationships. And intersubjective relationships are more than specific. It can be said that the animal behaves and man has conduct: conduct brings with it a reflexive condition. Freedom is not a characteristic of the species either, but rather of each human being.

*Homo sapiens* invents projects and makes decisions. Man decides because he is a being capable of distancing the end through his project and, therefore, of dealing with means. Aristotle argues that man is the only being for whom the notion of means has a formal value. The one who strictly speaking captures this notion is man: the animal uses means, but does not realize that they are means. Capturing the notion of means implies the capacity of knowing the end. Man is a being capable of committing himself, of fulfilling his word, because the project belongs to each one.

If man is “despecialized”, if he does not have to adapt to the environment, then he creates a world. As Heidegger says, man is a being in the world, man has world, not just habitat or environment. The foregoing is obvious: what can you find in a city? Roads, traffic lights, houses, electric lighting, etc. Man has replaced nature. In any case, man must adapt to a world made by himself. Being a citizen is characteristic of *homo sapiens*. A city is a plexus of means. A human instrument is a referring to another. The hammer refers to the nail: the being of the hammer is in the reference to another instrument. Therefore, the world is composed of medial references: the hammer is for nailing, the nail for assembling, and by assembling one makes a table, which is useful for having something to put things on and for having them within
reach, etc. The very being of the instrument is constituted in the reference, just like language is constituted as such in dialogue. The instrumental world, inasmuch as it is a complex of references, is possible because man has mind. This is the true human meaning of second level technology (a car has about 4,500 pieces, all of them connected). Thus, the hammer is a second level instrument not only because it was made by another instrument, but because it is exclusively an instrument for another instrument. Without a plexus – if some things did not refer to others – the economy would be impossible: the economics of a city requires interconnection. No one buys something that cannot be related to another that is already possessed; it is useless. Without machines, why oil? From the plexus, interest for trade opens up, and then a system of allocation is made possible. Selling and buying are due to man constructing plexuses.

Starting from the idea of the human world, several themes can still be discovered. In the first place, it is a non-stable world, because, strictly speaking, what man makes are not things, but references, which, in turn, do not exist if they are not imbued with actions. The human world is active. That is why the word “utensil” is fitting: the utensil is in the use; the hammer is in the hammering, or rather the act of the hammer is inseparable from its use. Now, this active character presents dangers. No animal acts against its species; its behavior is finally by it. In contrast, the human individual constructs a world without this world being reduced to what his biological specificity is capable of. However, the preeminence of individuals over the species is often impeded precisely by the world that has been constituted. It is for this reason that the organization of this world matters so much: man is often times trapped by it. The man trapped by the world is the one who fulfills roles, functions, in the plexus: the one who is satisfied with what has already been invented and brings about nothing new. In any case, the human world exists only if it is activated; and the activation is carried out by human action: if human action pulls back from it, if separates from the plexus, then the world ceases to be. Man has to exercise his action with respect to the plexus in order to give it existence. But if man considers himself only from this point of view, he gets trapped. Thus, the first thing that the organization of the human world

---

8 According, the market is not primary, but rather the organization of the deepest condition of the being-among-themselves of human products.
has to ensure is that the individual keep his personal freedom with respect to the world, in such a way that he can apply it anew.

In this perspective, evolution is replaced by history. Man is a historical being because the human world is subject to change. History (not evolution) consists of these changes.

The significance of history, its meaning—destiny, or whatever it might be called—is the strengthening of the dignity of the person. Evolution is nothing more than a preparation for the appearance of the spiritual being. Through its somatic despecialization, the spiritual being produces culture. The battle is now no longer waged in the competition with other species, since this problem has already been resolved: no lion can hold its own against a machine gun. Nevertheless, man can succumb to degradation of self, if the plexus that he has built reduces him to the condition of a mere homo faber. Much is said about hunger in the world, but countries in which people can get their fill can fall into an omission that is as grave as that which hunger brings with it: the lack of understanding the world in which one lives. It is true that in other epochs man found himself better integrated in his world (or at least it is supposed that he was); also, nationalisms harbor nostalgia for a smaller and more harmonious world. Nevertheless, this does not answer the question, since what has to be organized is precisely the world in which we live, with the immense breadth and complication that we have conferred upon it, and which offers possibilities that were unattainable by cultures of other epochs.

Unless man's destiny is the catastrophe due to the increasing and ungovernable complexity of his world (and this possibility is open), it is clear that other possibilities are also opening up today. Throughout history, humanity has endured great calamities (the plague in the 14th century, for example); today one perceives the risk of a spectacular de-humanization. Nevertheless, the positive path also clearly points out the way.

We thus arrive at another of one of the great dimensions of the human being: social organization. The construction of medial plexuses is accompanied by the organization of institutions. The first of these is the family. The only animal with family is homo sapiens. The family means the following: in the first place, a lasting bond, one that is not reduced to mating, in which the man is established from the outset as provider and the woman as direct caregiver of the children. In the sec-
ond place, and related with premature birth—which is a properly human characteristic (every man is systematic)—the family also means education of the children. The newborn is not viable without protection that has to be prolonged for many years. Without generation, the species becomes extinct; but human generation gives rise to an institution. *Homo habilis* surely had the practice of sharing food in common. In contrast, *sapiens* turns to privatization. And privatization is not an ascription to the individual, but rather, first of all, to the institution of the family. It goes without saying that the peculiar human sexual activity is not like that of animals, and gives rise to personal amorous relationships whose consistent scope is monogamy. Likewise, except on festive occasions when meals are celebrated in common, eating behavior takes place at home.

As I said, all this contains a remarkable meaning for premature human birth. The embryogenesis of other species manifests a greater urgency; in man it requires more time and, also, in order for him to be viable, it is not enough for him to simply be born: a further coordination of his free neurons that lasts for about 25 years is need, and is obtained through increased learning. The incorporation of new generations through education is the condition without which a positive vector in the history of humanity is in one way or another closed. The human being has many potentialities through which it passes without pausing: he is, so to speak, much more actualizable than what is really actualized. In short, educating consists in activating possibilities.

I will conclude these general observations by laying down some theses:

1) Man is a personal, intelligent, free being, who inaugurates historical temporality, which is something that replaces the time of biological evolution.

2) Evolution is made up of processes of speciation of various kinds. In history, different human worlds, institutions, and modes of production that can appropriately be called cultures arise.

3) Cultures are determined by the problem of the relationship of the personal human being with her species; they are nothing but different ways of addressing this problem, which, although they have not been able to completely resolve it, have contributed values that call for a more attentive discernment.
4) Although thought is proper to each one, universality is also characteristic of him. This allows each person to relate with others, and thus gives the species a social status. More than specific, man is social.

5) The problem mentioned in the third thesis is described like this: the human person is not finalized by her species, but neither does she exhaust it. Since the human species is eminently potential, the unfolding and the actualization of these potentialities belongs to personal initiative. The fruit of this effort over historical time are the different cultural values.

6) The failure to solve the aforementioned problem happens when human persons are reduced to the condition of mere individuals of the species, with the consequent relationships of illegitimate domination. This domination undermines the dignity of the personal being, and inhibits her ability to contribute. Slavery, castes, marginalization (especially, that of women), the ideology that interprets man as Gattungs-wesen, and the one that advocates the success of the isolated individual, as well as the present day forms of cultural and economic racism, are clear manifestations of this error, which leads history into dead ends.

7) The way out is contained in the resolute defense of personal dignity, in the openness of dialogue in which this dignity is reflected, and in the construction of an international order that establishes respect for different cultural values and promotes the development of all men. This universal development is, above all, of a moral nature and fosters the recognition of human authorship in the realm of work.

8) The opportunities that our times offer for moving toward the future, following this path, are abundant and must not be wasted. As I pointed out elsewhere, support must be given not only to the family, but also to business and to the university in their task of organizing this more human world.

9) The animating task of the Church is indispensable for this, since, as a society, she establishes the strongest of interpersonal bonds: the so-called “communion of saints”. For this reason, the social doctrine of the Church is not only warranted, but is also necessary so that man does not lose sight of his dignity.
¿Qué puede hacer el filósofo para contribuir con su propio trabajo a la interdisciplinariedad? Quien se dedica a la filosofía debe tratar de ampliarla, o de ir más allá, continuándola.

What can the philosopher do to contribute with his own work to interdisciplinarity? Whoever devotes oneself to philosophy must seek to expand it, or to go further, continuing it.

*Persona y libertad*

*Person and Freedom*
ARTICLES
Man as Dualizing Being.
The Remote Anthropological Basis of Economic Activity
(Part II: Essential Dualizations and Conclusions)

J. Ignacio Falgueras Salinas
University of Malaga (Spain)
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
jifalgueras@uma.es

Ignacio Falgueras Sorauren
University of Malaga (Spain)
Department of Economic Theory and History
ifs@uma.es

Translated by:
David González Ginocchio
International University of La Rioja (Spain)
dgginocchio@gmail.com

ABSTRACT: This investigation intends to point out the remote anthropological presuppositions of economic activity (the theme of Economics). In the first part we held that the ultimate basis for this activity is man’s condition as a ‘dualizing being,’ and we laid out his radical dualizations. In this second part we will study the operative dualizations, which derive from the former, whose normal form -we name ‘the productive dualization’. In our conclusion, economic activity shall start to take shape in a remote sense through the essential dualization of man, and shall be mainly grounded on the historical state of human being.

KEYWORDS: Transcendental Anthropology, Leonardo Polo, Dualizing Being, Dualizations, Productive Operation, Economic Activity, Economics.
4. OPERATIVE, ESSENTIAL, OR MANIFESTATIVE, DUALIZATIONS

We say some dualizations are operative, essential, or manifestative, when they are given in man, in a free and autonomous way, through the vinculation ‘essence of man—essence of the world’. While the vinculation itself is necessary, it does not eliminate freedom—it merely offers it a proper field of action, as we have argued previously (in part I). While each of these dualizations is in itself also dual, their dependence on freedom means their number is not fixed (but undefined), nor do they form a closed-up system (but rather an open, free one), as we previously commented in the section dealing with the notion of dualization. The task of co-essentializing with the essence of the world is carried out with them, but mediated by the ‘body-soul’ dualization. Insofar as the essence of the world associates to physical causes, and the soul associates immaterial operations, co-essentialization places in contact poles, which have different ontological range, and have the form of increasing and decreasing dualizations.

Created personal being manifests itself in their essence. The being of the universe does not manifest itself in its essence: it merely becomes fruitful unfolding in it. It is something proper to the human person to manifest themselves, for only the person, insofar as they are free, has intimacy and destination. And yet, as the personal being of man is existentially vinculated to the being of the universe, its essential manifestation must associate the essence of the universe to itself. Towards this end, the human person has been endowed with and immediate vinculation to a body. That is to say, the essence of man is dualized, and has been immediately endowed as ‘soul-body’. Let us go a little deeper into this notion.

Since the person makes the life of the body theirs, the latter is reinforced in such a way that the person themselves takes inspiration from it. This is done to the point that the person accommodates the intellect and the will into the body as spiritual passive potencies. This inspiration is the soul, whose activity takes corporal life as a guideline. The

---

1 We call ‘operations’ those activities that follow or manifest the human-being, while being themselves in a lower hierarchical-ontological plane.
2 Falgueras Salinas and Falgueras Sorauren (2015b, 38s).
3 Polo (2003, 15). Even though the ‘body-soul’ vinculation is given by the Creator. He neither gives it to us as a ‘fact’ nor as a mechanic pre-determination, but as a proper,
union of body and soul is sustained in the passive potentiality with which the soul embraces and enfolds the body, associating it to its own manifestation. This passive potentiality is totally malleable, has no previous form, and is characteristically infinite, unlike natural or physical potencies. And yet it is passive, for it requires other factors to move it so it can be efficacious as a potency, while natural potencies, being united to efficient causality, deploy by themselves. As the soul abases itself to this passive potentiality, it becomes compatible with the body’s potentiality without giving up its own immaterial condition.

Consequently, by means of the ‘body-soul’ vinculation, no person’s acts or operations, from the highest to the lowest, insofar as they manifest the human person, can be executed without somehow associating the body. Still, as the body is inscribed in the world as part of it, associating it to oneself implies a certain influence on the essence of the world, for, even if the soul frees the body from the hegemonic rule of the final cause of the cosmos, it must maintain and deploy the body’s intra-cosmic life. That is why, in the first part of this study, we claimed the ‘soul-body’ vinculation inchoated the relation between the essence of man and the essence of the world.

Hence, the given, ad extra, immediate, soul-body dualization is the starting point for all other essential, operative dualizations. In fact, being the medium of the dualization ‘essence of man – essence of the world’, it is necessary to look into the given body-soul vinculation to see how the subsequent processes of essential dualizations derive from it. We must warn, however, that our aim is not to consider all of them—

open activity, coherent with personal freedom. That is why we describe it as an inspiration.

4 Polo (2003, 87).
5 Natural potencies deploy by themselves, by being associated to the efficient cause, while passive potencies are independent from physical causes, and need to be activated; cf. Polo (2003, 116).
6 The body belongs to the essence of human beings, which manifests the being of the person. The being of the person is not corporeal, but the human body is. On the other hand, personal: it belongs to, and also is a manifestation of, the human person. While the soul (essence) makes the body its own, all its actions and operations are accompanied by it, even if in a merely subordinate, and, in extreme cases, peripheral way. Even in a mystical rapt, the body be it levitated, affected by beatitude or just being there without interfering, accompanies the soul and the person, which keep it alive.
7 Falgueras Salinas and Falgueras Sorauren (2015b, 44).
8 S. Piá dedicates some pages (pp. 205-210) to the dualization of the essence of man with the essence of the universe, highlighting its dependence on personal dualizations,
namely, all dualizations towards what is inferior, towards others like oneself, towards the supreme—but focus only on the necessary building to settle the remote basis of economic activity.

In the historical situation of human beings, the body-soul dualization may result in three possible operation combinations: 1) proper, exclusive operations of the soul that the body, being inferior, accompanies only extrinsically and potentially; 2) exclusive potentialities of the body that the soul only sustains vitally; 3) conjoin operations in which sometimes the spiritual and sometimes the corporeal outweighs the other, but which integrate mixed results. We will detail these combinations presently.

a) Proper and exclusive operations of the soul

These are all acts that are carried out without any organic support and integrate as poles of a dualization that belongs to the soul, and which we may call ‘I’ or habit of synderesis. The ‘I’ also dualizes: on the one hand, as the inferior pole, with the person’s being, and in the other hand, as the superior pole, with the body and the essence of the world. This last dualization is the one that initiates and deploys the person’s essential

which he attends in a primary fashion. The transcendental dualizations of the human person do not belong to the essence but to man’s being, and thus we do not deal with them here. However, even they must have some corporeal correlative, not in order to exist, but for them to be humanly deplorable: the corporeal correlative is not required for them to be-also with the being of the universe (and with God). But only to allow the human person to manifest in its essence. The person’s activity is overabundant with regard to the soul, and the soul’s with regard to the body, but insofar as we are vinculated to it, while the body lives, it is “not missing” in transcendental activities, and it “collaborates” in the essential ones in many ways.

10 All combinations related in the following are possible to the spirit’s and the soul’s timelessness: my soul thinks ‘presenting the object (out of the time dimension), while glucose maintains (within time) my brain active, and my hand writes (successively) what I am thinking (in actuality). The formal synchronizations that the human body obtains (e.g. the imaginary projection of the future or the inversion of time {science fiction}) would be impossible without the timeless guidance of thought. But when we sleep, it is the soul the one that maintains the continuity of knowledge and human life, thanks to the intellectual and volitional potencies. Cf. Polo (2003, 76ss).
11 This does not entail that they cannot have the body or worldliness as their themes, but it does exclude them from having it as their base.
manifestation, its first member of the dualization synderesis (I) – spiritual potencies (intelligence and will), or soul-body union, which we have already discussed.

Synderesis unfolds in knowing and willing. How do they dualize? The essential knowing, or ‘see-I’, is an illuminating act; the ‘will-I’ is a conveying act. ‘See-I’ lays the initiative that arouses the mental presence, as well as the rest of the operations and habits of the intellect.13 Meanwhile, the purely passive voluntary potency precedes its act, and thus must be ‘awoken’ by the illumination of ‘see-I’. Once it has been awakened, though, willing constitutes itself as an act that operates according to its own nature, which is endowing or conveying. What it gives is a tendency—now in actuality—towards the transcendental good, and, in the sense that it doesn’t already possess it, it can grow by raising the intensity of its tendency (“wanting – wanting more”). Each of these poles (‘see-I’ and ‘will-I’) is a priority, but in different senses: one is initiating and illuminating, but directs its attention downwards, the other is purely passive, but endowing and rising, directing its tendency upwards (ultimate end). That is why both, in their distinction, help each other. Essential knowledge (‘see-I’) is an act that becomes finding (downwards) according to the mental limit (objectivity). The ‘will-I’ curves upwards, i.e. towards an intensified willing, and insofar as it corresponds to themes, to the intensity of what is willed (supreme good), thus never being satisfied with what the intellect finds. That is why the will leads the intellect to know more, to intensify itself as knowledge. On the other hand, the intellect (practical reason) directs the will in its tendency towards the supreme end, showing it, among other things, the superior ends within reach. There is therefore a dualization of the essential acts of man, within which the priorities are different.14

---

13 The ‘see-I’ illuminates sensible species, fruit of imagination, memory and cogitative faculty: these species, when illuminated and turned into speciei impressae, activate the intelectual faculty, thus giving birth to the mental presence of objects, i.e. to objective conscience (first mental operation with regard to the imagination), and also the abstraction or temporal articulation (first operation with regard to memory and the cogitative faculty), along with their respective habits. As the intellectual faculty does not wear out in these operations, the ‘see-I’ makes way for new operations that deal with the abstract object (reason, reflection), etc. Cf. Polo (2003, 70-79).

14 The obsession for unicity blurs, since the Middle Ages, the question of the priority of intellect and will. If we admit different senses of priority, the discussion disappears. We have here a problem that is akin to the famous question of the chicken and the egg; cf. Falgueras Salinas (2010, 82-92).
MAN AS DUALIZING BEING

As we’ve said before, essential knowledge opens downward as a faculty (the intellect) to take in sense data given by the imagination, memory, and cogitative faculties, which it vinculates and elevates with its mental presence. Willing, after being “awoken” by essential knowing, opens its voluntary faculty, allowing the corporal appetites (irascible, concupiscible), and governing them through moral habits (virtues and vices) in its search for the supreme good. Thus, both essential volitions and knowledge deal with the essence of the world, through the information that we obtain about it with our body.

Naturally, the operations of intellect and will are spiritual. It is possible, for example, that a demonstration remains unfinished due to a corporal indisposition (sleep, tiredness, etc.), but this indisposition can never be part of (not even negatively) of demonstrating. The same may be said in the opposite sense: a good corporal disposition may yield the intent to demonstrate something easier, but it will never be a positive part of a demonstration. In the same vein, a deliberation to do take this or that course of action could be influenced by our corporal possibilities and tendencies, but doing it (or not) will always depend on our free will, just as the moral habit of operating virtuous or viciously will not just depend on the body, but directly on our will, in which it is settled. Therefore, not only are essential knowing and willing independent from the body in their own acts, but even their inferior poles, the intellectual and willing potencies, even if they become potencies to take in corporeal life and sensitivity (imagination, memory, cogitative faculty, appetites) and inspiring them, remain spiritual.\textsuperscript{15}

In line with the above, the acts of the intellect and the will are exclusive to the soul, with no mixture of corporality, but, because of the body-soul vinculation, don’t happen without being accompanied by it, so that if the body wasn’t concomitant to them, they would mostly remain impeded. Spiritual acts and operations give way to purely spiritual effects, which can be accompanied or not by mental-corporeal feelings. Regarding the will, the normal corporeal accompaniment takes the form of obedience, but also an invitation to follow its own

\textsuperscript{15} Something demonstrated can belong to physics, chemistry, geometry, etc., but the demonstration itself is an act of the intellect. The same can be said of volition: I can wish to eat, but willing is not being hungry, but free self-determination. Thus we can also fast or declare ourselves in a hunger strike. Demonstrative activity and virtue can have physical objects (e.g. demonstrating physical properties) and corporal actions (eating, fasting, etc.) as their objects, but they are themselves spiritual acts.
inclinations\textsuperscript{16}. The bodily accompaniment of the intellect, however, consists in the majority of cases in amplifying its own potentiality so that it does not obstruct the latter’s activity. For example, the correct operation of the innards does not directly influence the intellect, but if they functioned incorrectly or not at all, it would make the intellect’s operation more difficult, if not completely impeded (sooner or later). In a similar way, even if the brain\textsuperscript{17} accompanies thought more closely, so that it always provides an image to what is thought, the image is never the same as what is thought. Animals also have images; still, they do not think. We can think about images, but in that case we ’hyper-formalize’ them, i.e. arrested in time,\textsuperscript{18} while they themselves are temporal. That is why we cannot think about non-representational, for example the chiliagon (a polygon with a thousand sides).\textsuperscript{19} Thinking of an image that cannot be represented is the simplest proof that (corporeal) images are not (spiritual) thoughts.

\textit{b) Corporeal potentialities that the soul merely upholds}

Due to the dotational soul-body vinculation, the human soul must assume dominion over the common functions of animal live bodies. Traditionally, these functions have been called vegetative and sensitive souls, and were known to be taken up by the human soul (in a similar way as animals incorporate vegetative functions), for, otherwise, human beings would lack vital unity. It is obviously unnecessary for there to be three souls in humans (spiritual, sensitive and vegetative), provided that the superior (intellectual-willing) can take up the functions

\textsuperscript{16}In the example of the note above, hunger would be an incitement to eat, while fasting or delaying food (if we do have food) are wholly dependent on the free will.

\textsuperscript{17}In its material functioning, the brain is effective and accompanies the intellect, but the chemical substances it secretes or the physical energies it employs are not what is understood. nor do they even bi-univocally correspond to what is understood: rather, they correspond only to an organic (material) functioning that does not impede the animic exercise of understanding. But the brain also functions formally, and this functionality is vinculated to imagination, memory and cogitative faculty; \textit{cf.} Polo (1985/2016, 35-44).

\textsuperscript{18}We must distinguish the forms that co-cause along with matter (hyle-morphic), the cerebral formalization which is an inhibition of stimuli (morpho-telic co-causality) and the abstract formalization introduced by the mental presence which is (i) the notion of circumference and (ii) the articulation of time through the present, as we shall see below. Over these we also have logical formalizations.

\textsuperscript{19}This is the example given by Descartes (318). Non-Euclidean geometries confirm it, with even greater consequences.
of the others, reinforcing and governing their functions. Even if we
don’t usually talk about organic ‘souls’ nowadays, if life only had or-
organic-vegetative and sensitive functions, and it lacked a spiritual soul,
it would be impossible to explain the human body’s concrete conduct,
for almost everything we do as human persons goes above our mere
organic condition.\(^ {20}\) As the body is taken in by the soul, corporeal in-
formation rebounds in it in the form of sensible knowledge, tendencies
and emotions, which it must control and order. But functions like cel-
lular reproduction, instinctive motions (i.e. the iris, equilibrium, peri-
staltic and antiperistaltical motions, etc.), digestion, blood circulation,
bone formation, the immunological system, etc., do not require to be
attended by a direct action of the spirit, only upheld by it in its auton-
omous regime. Certainly, while being a comma, losing consciousness,
and even in deep sleep, intellectual and willing operations remain in
suspend, but the spiritual potencies remain united to the body,\(^ {21}\) and
through them the willing-intellectual soul maintains the rest of the vi-
tal bodily functions. This means that whatever the situation of a living
human body, its soul is always active, even if the former may allow or
impede its manifestation as such.

c) Joint body-soul operations

These are operations in which both soul and body actively inter-
vene. Even if these joint operations are not the highest for the soul (for
they belong to the human essence), they are the most properly human,
insofar as they manifest more clearly our condition as dualizing be-
ings.\(^ {22}\) In some of them the soul clearly overpoises the body, as in the
case of speech, invention, politics, art, science, religion, etc. For exam-
ple, in the production of speech we require abstract objects (that artic- 
ulate time), besides having the locative habit, on the part of the soul,
and the capacity to emit sounds or write physical signs, on the side of
the body. When inventing devices, knowledge is needed, as well as im-
aginative support (the soul’s action), but we also need to rely on the
physical properties of appropriate materials, fabricating prototypes,

---

\(^{20}\) Flying on a plane, speaking on the phone, watching a football game at home that is
taking place on the other side of the world, visiting a museum, lecturing, living in
space, or simply speaking, are not activities that are required by the organism as such,
and they do not have a properly organic sense.

\(^{21}\) Polo (2003, 77).

\(^{22}\) This is the case in our actual situation or state of trial.
etc. (activities of the body). In general, these are all actions that, foremost, cannot be programmed: rather, they depend on inspiration (freedom), on faith (rational or supra-rational), and even on possessed knowledge and willing. All of this belongs primarily to the soul and the spirit.

Still, the body overpoises the soul in other joint actions, in the sense that their goal is the satisfaction of certain necessities like feeding, rest, cleanliness, protection, defense, etc.\textsuperscript{23} Distinctive of these actions is the fact that not only can be programmed, they actually must be programmed to win time and efficacy, for the most part of our lifetime is consumed by them, both in individual and social sense.

In these joint operations, sometimes the body’s own potentialities can interfere with those of the soul, and vice versa. In general, the body, as is well known, can interfere with the soul’s operations, even if it governed by it: distractions, lack of concentration, aphasias, dyslexias, cerebral dysfunctions, or general body dysfunctions, can alter or even impede the exercise and expression of regular activities that are proper to the intellect and the will, without completely annulling them. Certain corporeal endowments may even favor the deployment of some activities of the soul more over others.\textsuperscript{24} On the other hand, certain problems of the soul (perplexities, displeasures, decision-making, vices, etc.) may disturb the development of the body’s natural operations, generating functional disorders, in the same way as the will to live and the power of suggestion may help to sustain life and cure sicknesses.

At any rate, all of these conjoint activities of the body and the soul are settled, at first, over a dual harmonic integration between them, which makes them models of human action in general. That is why this

\textsuperscript{23} The necessities we speak of here are corporeal or derive from bodily functions. But it is obvious that their satisfaction requires the intervention of the soul. For example, merely organic tasks like dressing, eating, etc., are carried out in a cultural way (gastronomy, fashion, etc.), which is indifferent for the organism, because they at the same time satisfy and go beyond it. Cf. Millán Puelles (11-12, v 28ss). Even he who desperately seeks a disorderly corporeal satisfaction for the sake of itself (drues, dishonest pleasures, etc.) seeks it to satisfy the infinite thirst for happiness of his soul, thus ending always unsatisfied and disappointed, asking from the body something it cannot give.

\textsuperscript{24} Thomas Aquinas: “Manifestum est enim auod quanto corvus est melius dispositum. tanto meliorem sortitur animam... Unde cum etiam in hominibus auidam habeant corpus melius dispositum, sortiuntur animam majoris virtutis in intelligendo” (Summa Theologicae 1, 85, 7 c). This passage must be understood as being valid only for the viator man, and the “sortiri” (the result of luck) as a mixed consequence of creation, original sin, our progenitors’ life, and divine Providence.
integration can be considered the primitive and “canon” form of con-joint body-soul activity. To describe it, we can say that it is what we can call, in a very broad sense, “productive activity”, namely as both the introduction of an idea (thought) in physical time, and the ordering of physical time according to an idea. In fact, in order to introduce an idea into physical time, four steps are required: two are proper to the soul, and two to the body. First, we must have an idea, or a union of abstracts with a practical orientation; this is formed by the intellect. We must then want to introduce it in time, which depends on the wil, which, according to the idea, must rule over the corporeal faculties to put it in motion. The first organic faculty that must be subjected (to the idea) is the imagination, being the faculty that, even when the idea is not yet effective, can initiate and develop a formal scheme according to the before-after sequence, i.e. breaking it down in a formal-temporal process. Finally, the will puts the locomotive faculties in action that they execute, in a practical way, the formal-imaginative scheme that threshes the idea, introducing it effectively into physical time. In the whole conjoint operation of production we can clearly appreciate a soul-body dualization, in which the soul is dually manifest as intellect and will, and the body (guided by the soul) gradually intervenes as imagination-locomotion. Given that this is the dualization

25 Falgueras Salinas (2011, 241-242). What follows is a very brief summary of what we develop more fully in this work, already sketched in another two: Falgueras Salinas (1988, 82-100) v (1997, 54-61). It should be taken into account that this description of the productive activity entails an internal dualization, i.e. the 'production-product' dualization. In the latter, 'Production' designates the introduction of an idea into the physical time by the body-soul dualization, whereas 'product' designates the arrangement of the physical time according to the idea. This is the way human beings 'co-essentialize' with and gain dominion over the essence of the universe.

26 Although ideas are introduced into the physical time by the operation of the Practical Reason, the essential logos (soul) has to intervene in this process by coordinating the different spiritual potencies and organic faculties that are involved in it.

27 We only mention the imagination because, as a formal movement of internal senses, it provides the temporal basis over which the temporalization of the idea takes place. Notice, however, that the other internal senses (memory and coetitative) also have to intervene, since they introduce the 'before-after' references that are required for the subsequent execution of the project.

28 In his Treatise, Say already suggested a tri-way articulation of production: “The first step towards the attainment of any specific product is the study of the laws and course of nature regarding that product (....). The next step is the application of this knowledge to an useful purpose (....) The last step is the execution of the manual labour, suggested and pointed out by the two former operations (....) These three operations are seldom performed by one and the same person” (1880/1964: 79-80). As we can see, in these steps, even while less detailed in an anthropological sense, there are
that manifests more clearly and harmonically the soul-body dualization, we will deal with it in more detail in the next and last section.

5. PRODUCTIVE DUALIZATION

In the preceding enumeration of soul-body operations, we have shown that production is the most balanced human way of integrating them, but also that such an integration is complex, for it brings together several operations both on the side of the soul and of the body. Keeping this complexity in mind, it seems convenient to dedicate a special study to describe it in a more nuanced way. We will do this in two steps, according to successive anthropological characterizations: first, in a primitive and original way; secondly, and without eliminating the former, in a second way that comes arises and alters it.

a) Original characterization of the productive dualization

In its primitive, original state, kept as the basic structure of production, we can appreciate an operative difference between body and soul. On the side of the soul, we can see a superabundance of activity, for it is the soul that initiates the order of organic faculties insofar as they are subjected to an idea, and then of the locomotive faculties according to the imaginative scheme. Besides that, however, there is an superabundance of knowledge (intellectual acts and habits) and of will (practical habits and acts) that overflows the margins of the sensitive and locomotive faculties of the human body. And to show a greater differentiation: while the human soul inhabits the universe, the human body is not only incarnated in a place and region of the universe, but also, and above all, is subjected to the varied temporal conditions of the processes of the physical world, specially biological temporality. In this sense, the productive dualization can be characterized, originally, as the dualization between a superabundant activity (in an intellectual

many coincident points with our proposal, which is, however, broader than Say’s, and it serves to describe first individual and then social production.

29 With this we are not claiming it is the highest way, but only the most integrated one, for in it we can take advantage of the body’s potentialities. In this sense can be understood that God put man in the world to work, not as a final but as a provisional goal during our state of trial. Let us note that at the time of this investigation, production and work are equivalent, if we eliminate from the latter the indication of cost or effort, and if we understand both as man’s worldly occupation.
and volitional sense) and certain corporeal restrictions. We will explain this last part.

Organic bodies are distinguished by having their own (biological) time in the middle of the physical temporalities of the surrounding inorganic processes. Biological time, being more ordered towards inorganic physical times and, therefore, capable of taking advantage of them, is also of itself physical, i.e. keeps inside the before-after distention. Moreover, its capacity to take advantage of physical processes is due to its more intense ordination, which needs them as pre-existent and organizes them according to its (formal) co- causality with its final cause.\(^{30}\) In this sense, all life of live organisms is causally pre-determined (i) by the final-formal co-causality (its informative dimension distributed across the genetic codes of living beings)\(^{31}\) and (ii) by the environment, according to which every living being is deployed in a tri-causal way.\(^{32}\) The human body also has a connatural biological time, which is different to that of inorganic and organic physical times insofar as it is proper or controlled by a living being (the human person) in a way that is compatible to the final cause, but not subordinated to it (but rather to the spirit and to freedom).\(^{33}\) The subordination to the spirit frees our body from causal necessities, i.e. leaves if specifically undetermined: it does not annul corporeality, but its exclusive subordination to a formal-final co-causality, which thus becomes only a condition of possibility for the life of man.\(^{34}\) In its productive operation, man has to take things into account, but he can also order them freely

\(^{30}\) The cause of the order of the universe is the final cause, which is the highest of causes and principle of their order, and also why the necessity that dominates the universe is only a final necessity. Within partial orders, the highest one is organic life. Cfr. Polo (1994, 229ss); Falgueras Salinas (2002, 45-54).

\(^{31}\) The formal-final co-causality has another dimension that is not only informative, namely, a dimension that organizes the formal-efficient-material tri-causality, which makes it principle or physical soul of organic life.

\(^{32}\) Cfr. Falgueras Salinas (2010, 36-37).

\(^{33}\) Polo (2003, 87): “Al no ser una causa, la libertad es superior a la causa final, por lo que orienta a las otras causas que intervienen en la constitución del cuerpo según un sentido final distinto del fisible —no ciego—, a saber, vencer el retraso temporal”.

\(^{34}\) The difference between “cause” and condition is that cause necessarily predetermine the subsequent process, while conditions allow it (or not) without predetermining it. The body is a condition of internal and external possibility for human action: internal in order for it to be human and taken in by the spirit, kept into account and respected, so that in the body natural ends are kept as mere tendencies and not unstoppable instincts; external insofar as it mediates our relation to the world, which human beings must keep and cultivate.
in his own way, so long as this order is compatible with the surrounding physical processes. As is the case with every emancipation, the one that corresponds to the human body, introduced by the spirit, is relative to that which it emancipates from, in this case, physical causalities. This does entail to deny the latter, or to become unattached to the world, but the option of having them as open possibilities to the liberty of the living (human) being. At the same time, being able to count on them entails having to count on causes, i.e. that our freedom can make use of them, but in order to live (corporeally) it must make use of them. All of this means that human beings must also count on the before-after distention, but not in a pre-determined manner, but rather in the way and order in which he chooses to arrange according to his ends, though under certain conditions. We thus have the two extremes: the human body is free of the specific causal determination proper to organic bodies, but still, it must count on causes, so that, by freely ordering them, it may live in a human way with respect to them.

For organic substances, the delay of physical processes is not a restriction or limitation, but rather a performance condition, for biological temporalities (in which nothing is timeless) take advantage of them in order to obtain relatively better synchronicity in their organization. For human beings, on the other hand, this delay, without being

---

35 The notion of emancipation or Independence cannot be absolute: nothing can be absolutely independent, but rather is always independent with regard to something (which is what the prefixes “e-“ and “in-“ refer to).

36 What we call “before-after distention” is only and indication that physical motions are temporal: cf. Falgueras Salinas (2010, 16ss.). “Before-after” points to a distention because before is an anticipation (material cause) and after a postposition (final cause) that separate between themselves and admit an indefinite number of formal and efficient intermediate steps. A delay is just what anticipation and postposition imply: for an anticipation to be given, a delay must be given, and for a delay to be give we need some anticipation, obviously. Here, however, we are calling attention to what happens between the anticipation and the postposition: i.e. over the distention whose note is that, when before and after separate themselves, temporal processes take time to unwind. Such a delay also affects organic bodies and the human body, and gives rise to the temporal restriction mentioned above.

37 Our body is organically unfinished and non-specialized, as suggested by A. Gehlen (11, 35-52, etc.).

38 The human body is one prepared for and by freedom and the intellect, and thus it serves as a mediator between the richness of the spirit and the restrictions proper to organisms and the physical universe. This preparation consists in the specific lack of determination mentioned above, which makes our body, being organic, not being intrinsically limited: it can give of itself towards freedom.
a true limitation\textsuperscript{39} is however a restriction, for its knowledge and volitions are timeless, and introducing them in time, as demanded by the body-soul vinculation, entails an order that threshes them according to the before-after cadence.

The delay involved in putting physical processes one after another, to arrange them according to the intellect and the will, is a restriction common to every human production, but it is not the only one. There is another restriction that, in a broad sense, can be described as the greater or lesser compatibility between physical processes. In the physical world, this gradual compatibility determines the peculiarities of bodies, places, and regions of the universe; within human production, however, it affects the introduction of ideas into the universe, turning them viable or not, or even more or less viable. This second kind of restriction may be called effective restriction, and it has to do with the accommodation of thought possibilities to the real properties of the surrounding physical processes. This is what we have called “taking the causes into account”. Human beings must arrange the introduction of ideas into the physical world not only in regard to the temporal before-after restriction delay (temporal restriction), but also regarding the compatibility between physical processes.\textsuperscript{40}

Therefore, we may firstly characterize the poles of this dualization as an overflowing animic abundance regarding a bodily restriction, or, in other words, we may say that the primitive\textsuperscript{41} and radical productive dualization is of an immaterial richness intrinsically vinculated with spatio-temporal and effectivity restrictions. When we say “immaterial richness” we speak about a cumulus of possibilities that open to the

\textsuperscript{39} For a limitation to exist, two elements are required: (i) a relatively positive activity, to say, an excess or surplus of initiatives, which are simultaneously constrained by (ii) a relatively negative factor, in this case a radical shortage of time—a resource that is necessary to implement those initiatives. Originally, the human being did not have this limitation.

\textsuperscript{40} Icarus is just a myth, i.e. a mere imaginative-ideal possibility, unless the soul manages to fulfill the body’s temporal and effective restrictions and demands living something for which the latter is not prepared, but an airplane pilot is. Considered at the same time, thought possibilities greatly exceed what our body’s restrictions allow. Jules Verne and science fiction, insofar as they are imaginative advancements of possibilities that cannot yet be realized, are clear examples of the “richness-restrictions” dualization we are exploring.

\textsuperscript{41} We denominate it as ‘primitive’ because it is the natural dualization, whereas what we will call the ‘secondary’ dualization derives from the original sin—which does not corrupt but only weakens human nature.
operational intellect and the will, i.e. a richness that has its roots in the person itself, as possessing an inexhaustible future, which manifests in its profusion or overabundance. On the other hand, by “bodily restriction” we mean the indispensable arrangement, both temporal and effective, of human productive activity, derived from the body.

b) Modified characterization of the original production

The primitive characterization described above, however, has been modified in both of its poles, giving birth to a new befallen situation that might be called “secondary and altered”. 42 Regarding the soul, our original knowledge has been modified by an operative limitation (objectivity), 43 so that knowledge has taken the form of abstracts. Through them we can think of ideas, 44 which collect loose notes of these abstracts and open possibilities, even if merely thought, to act. The will, having lost the preternatural habits, is set in motion, disoriented, by objectivities, by ideas, and by bodily inclinations, 45 and must therefore hardly acquire the necessary habits for its own elevation (ethics). Meanwhile, regarding the body, the befallen modification is death, a real and strict limitation of time, which adds to the already mentioned, natural restrictions of the body: now it is not just about having to arrange our actions one after another according to physical time and with a view on their effective compatibility, but, moreover, that, ending in death, human time lacks meaning, and the productive activity

42 We refer to the original sin. Keeping in mind both what was naturally created and what befell us after the punishment of sin is extremely important to understand the proper way of historical human production, which is the root of economic activity. The latter remains a sign of freedom. Cí. Millán Puelles (13).

43 The limit or mental presence is the reason why the surplus of the intellect, instead of keeping to the temporal delay of physical processes, articulates time in abstract objects in which thought stops. The detection and abandonment of mental limit is Polo’s philosophical method, his decisive contribution to philosophy.

44 We can distinguish a concept from an idea. An idea is a generalized consideration of an abstract object with regard to practice. A concept is an intellectual, non-practical return of the abstract to reality.

45 As we shall see, bodily necessities force us to dedicate urgent attention to practical matters.
must be used, trivially, in delaying its arrival.\textsuperscript{46} Still, this second characteristic does not annul immaterial richness nor bodily restriction; it only modifies them, keeping them even if in an altered way.

As these characterizations are successive, and the second one modifies the first without eliminating it, we now face a productive dualization that may be described as a “richness of ideas and volitions, with bodily restrictions and a limitation of time”. It is our historically initial productive dualization. The soul gathers all the notes of abstractions in ideas that suggest possibilities for human action and entice its will to realize them, outside of moral considerations. The body imposes, on its part, temporal and effective restrictions, but above all a final limit: death. The consequence of both of these characterizations is that the initial productive dualization, which we suggest calling “canonical”, has been affected insofar as the body and the soul are no longer vinculated in perfect harmony, but altered, so that we now must consider it only as the normal\textsuperscript{47} manifestation of the body-soul dualization.

c) Description of the “normal” deploy of the productive dualization

When ideas and temporality merge for the first time in the essence of human beings, projects\textsuperscript{48} arise, which are the way in which we preserve the overabundance of the primitive immaterial richness, once modified by objectivity and subjected to the bodily restrictions and the limitation of time. This primitive immaterial richness can thus be now called initial productive richness.

\textsuperscript{46} Before the original sin, the time of trial also finished, not in death but in a transformation of the body, so that within an eternal horizon it wasn’t separated from temporal existence: the continuity and communication between our mora-productive activity and eternal life were not broken. Death, on the other hand, obliterates the meaning of human life, turning it mantic to life in the hereafter, while forcing it to apply all its interest in avoiding it, even if it can only manage this for a short time. Only the redemption of Christ can restore full sense to human life.

\textsuperscript{47} With this terminological modification we wish to point out that the production of the historical man is not exemplary or perfect, but only normal, i.e. initially and statistically (insofar as it admits abnormal situations) shared by all.

\textsuperscript{48} Projects are imaginative temporalizations of ideas developed under the will’s command. Ideas become projects in the very instant that the will, having decided to introduce them into the physical time, sets imagination to work – as well as the other internal senses – in order to reach that goal. Although in the whole process the ‘possible purpose’ (understanding-will) comes first, from a practical point of view the implementation of the productive dualization (production-product) begins with projects.
Physical time, as a before-after sequence, is modified by man through the introduction of the “now” instant, or present, which is in-
tegrally put forth by our thought, making way for human time.\footnote{Even if physical time is not a part of the soul, the soul “makes it its own” by articu-
lating it in abstraction, which does not consist in taking anything away from reality, but rather in introducing the mental presence or limit. Cf. Polo (1994, 263): “intencio-
nalmente, la abstracción es la articulación presencial del tiempo. Ahora bien —y esta preci-
sión es decisiva—, la articulación del tiempo no pertenece al tiempo. La presencia arti-
culante es mental y, por tanto, no temporal”.} In the world there is no actual “present time”: it is the mental presence of man the one that gives birth to it, and thus articulates time, converting “be-
fore” in the past and “after” in future. Naturally, all of this happens only within human thought. But it is thanks to this articulation of time that we can connect a past with a future, opening the chain of factual possibilities, for a possibility is something future that does not yet exist, and which can be made to exist from something \textit{already} known. Factual possibility is in itself the (thought) articulation of a practical before (past) with a practical after (future), and opens the way for projects, which are its prolongations.

Projects do not merely happen for no reason: they are due to the primitive operation richness, which, even if modified in other aspects, keeps the vigor of the will’s act, suggesting human beings the notion of duty or obligation, i.e. suggesting the moral imperative that originally moves the will: “Do”.\footnote{Polo (2003, 143): “La verdad constitutiva del \textit{simpexus velle} es el libre desear de querer. La voluntad no puede oponerse a ese desear porque es su propia verdad... No se trata siquiera de un deber moral impuesto, sino del principio mismo de la mo-
ralidad: «quieres, haz el bien, porque querer es tu verdad».”} This is not yet an election, but something sim-
ilar to the Kantian categorical imperative, though understood differ-
ently.\footnote{Kant. \textit{Grundlegung}, KW, IV, 438. Unlike Kant, we do not understand this as a self-
imposed mandate, but as the proper nature of the act of willing, root of morality.} Unlike Kant, we claim the will is originally passive,\footnote{Polo (2003, 23, 113, 118-120, etc).} thus re-
quiring activation so that it may edit its own acts. If there were no over-
abundance (in freedom and intellecction), the will would not be turned 
on. As there actually is an overabundance, the passivity of the will is activated.

When the will is (i) activated and awoken, (ii) constituted in act, and (iii) imbued with the moral imperative under the guise of wanting
to introduce in time the ideas provided by the productive practical reason, then the projects begin to develop. In its nucleus, projects are possible temporal mediations of ideas, induced by the mandate of the will over the intermediate corporal faculty (imagination), and are each of them structured around a certain imaginative scheme. Abundance is also one of their notes: many projects are offered to us as possible. However, according to the bodily restriction, we can only introduce them in time one after another, and not all at once. If we had a meaningful temporality, i.e. deathless, the problem of introduction of projects would simply be a problem of adjusting them in time according to our destinal future, without added complications.

As the corporal life of human beings is limited by a fact that has befallen, namely death, the arrangement of projects in time is radically problematic: not only do we lack the time for all possible projects, now we must prioritize a certain kind of projects, namely those related to our subsistence. This is so because death is not just only that befalls us at the end of our life, but a constant threat that lies in wait at all times. Thus, in our historic condition, our subsistence becomes a problem that cannot be postponed, which claims our interest and attention in an urgent, prevailing manner.

The resulting description of this last dualization, after the previous considerations must be that of (i) a richness of projects, with (ii.a) bodily restrictions plus (ii.b) the temporal limitation, forwarded as an inversion of priorities. Naturally, the richness of our projects stems from the soul and the restrictions added to the (forwarded) limitation derives from the body, but the inversion of priorities affects both, which confirms this dualization is just a way that is historically normal, not exemplary, of the fundamental body-soul dualization.

Given the initial absence of (preternatural) habits that operationally coordinate body and soul, the first project that all human beings must actually face is that of setting into motion our own production in its most basic degree, i.e. learning to produce, which is achieved arranging physical processes inherent to our locomotive faculties (motor coordination) according to our ideas and will—either to introduce our ideas

---


54 We speak of an “imaginative scheme” insofar as it is only a formal-temporal mediation of the idea. We thus refer practical production to the Kantian 179-187; A 140-147 and later on Heideggerian (93-94: 165ss; 179ss) idea of a condition of possibility, which they attributed to the imagination with regard to human thinking and the phenomenological characterization of being, respectively, but without reducing it to just that.
and volitions into time (speech), or to organize our own productive movements (game). Being the most basic degree, this first coordinating production already has the four components of human production mentioned above: an intellect that provides ideas, the will to act, a malleable imagination and executive locomotive faculties. However, what we seek in these coordinated productions is more an internal result (the dominion over our own body and our own communication), than an external and effective one (dominion over the world). The need to learn how to produce manifests the mediatedness of the co-essentialization of the universe for, as we have seen, this co-essentialization was only endowed- and inchoatively preceded by the soul-body vinculation. The productive activity, of course, cannot stop in this coordinating learning stage: it must move into normal production, which itself has to be effective in order to accomplish the task of co-essentializing with the universe. Learning how producing grows in complexity in the fulfilment of this task will require a more thorough study of the successive productive dualizations.

6. CONCLUSION

The goal of this first step\textsuperscript{55} in our investigation was to find the fundament and sense of human activity, so that we can point, within it, the previous and real conditions from which what the economic activity, as it is commonly known, arises. When dealing with anthropological ultimacy, we have discovered, in the course of our investigation, that man is a dualizing being because it has been vinculated by its Creator, in a complex and intrinsic way, with another being, namely (i) in an immediate way with the being of the universe, and (ii) in a mediate sense with the essence of the universe, through the (immediate) body-soul vinculation. These dualizations correspond, respectively, with the (double) question of the grounding and destination of human activity, in a hierarchical way: the co-existence of personal being receives the fundamental being (the existence of the universe) and the essence of

\textsuperscript{55} Even if it was preceded by an introductory study that examined the possibility and convenience of a mutual help between philosophy and Economy (Falgueras Salinas and Falgueras Sorauren, 2015a); both parts of this investigation aim to offer a first, basic step into an investigation of the grounding and sense of economic activity.
man (soul-body) operates on the essence of the universe (the latter being the real deployment of fundamental being), in order to destine itself.\textsuperscript{56}

Given that the superior poles (the person and the soul-body) dualize with regard to the existence and essence of the universe (which they do, besides, \textit{within} their own activity, in an intimate or at least immanent way), then they must also dualize between themselves \textit{ad intra}. We thus find the fourth radical, nuclear dualization: the dualization of human being-essence.

In the essence of man (soul-body), given its prior and proactive character with regard to the essence of the world, we should find the guidance to order the operative or essential dualizations. Once we consider the different possible flections of the soul-body dualization, the productive dualization stands out as archetypal, for in it both the operations of the soul (ideas, volitions) as well as the potentialities of the body (imagination – locomotive faculties), collaborate harmonically. In its primitive or canonic form, this productive dualization combines the richness of projects, which comes from the operations of the soul, with restrictions of time and effectiveness deriving from the body.

However, this dualization has undergone a modification that adds to these restrictions a strict \textit{temporal limitation} (death), which determines that, historically, human beings have had to attend in an urgent and constant way different projects for their subsistence. For this reason, philosophers frequently only point out to human biological needs\textsuperscript{57} when they seek the basis of economic activity, which sometimes have been confused with an ontological limitation. However, if the limitation from which economic activity arises were truly ontological,\textsuperscript{58} then it would be unsurmountable to human beings, which would

\textsuperscript{56} Our activity, therefore, would have no grounding if it took in its being the being of the universe (fundament) and integrated the essence of the world that deploys it in its operations.

\textsuperscript{57} Consequently, we do not disagree with them, we merely extend the foundation, making way for destination, and suggest a method or approach that does not exclude the findings of others, but tries to make them more coherent.

\textsuperscript{58} The very notion of limitation or ontological insufficiency is problematic: if a being lacked something to be, it simply would not be at all. It is one thing to be limited in one’s own being (which, as we have just said, is not possible) and another to be limited operationally. Creatures cannot give themselves their being with their operations, nor (in the case of human persons) give themselves the plenitude of their being, but this is
render any essential growth (including economic activity) impossible. On the other hand, biological necessities take their urgent meaning only after receiving death as punishment, and during the trial time of our lives, not forever. What is implicit in biological necessities is that, unlike other kinds of necessities, they are affected by the urgency of satisfying them by applying human activity primarily to them. This urgency introduces, in the last instance, the peculiar necessity and mode of economic activity, as we will try to show in a future investigation.

In this sense, and to conclude the present paper, we suggest that, from all remote anthropological bases, the one that is closest to economic activity is what we have called “productive dualization” – in which body and soul work conjointly and in harmony regarding the essence of the universe – but in its historically normal form, insofar as it is obligated to attend firstly and constantly (but not exclusively) to biological necessities. In this way, we can roughly circumscribe the thematic field in which human productive activity will deploy, and which constitutes the ultimate subject-matter of the economic science, i.e. the human productive activity in a broad sense, insofar as it is threatened by death.

If we admit the former, we can understand just how absurd it would be to place economic activity both in God, and in the physical universe – or even in animals. What Plato said about eros and philosophy may also be said regarding the human economic activity, namely, that it is born of poros and penia, of abundance and indigence. Insofar as it is born of indigence (restrictions plus limitations), it may not be attributed to God; insofar as it is born of abundance (projects), it cannot belong to animals. We cannot also speak of any indigence regarding

_____________________________________
not an ontological limitation it is rather a positive dependency on God. Being dependent on God is not the same as being limited in being, rather the contrary: being (creature) and able to being in plenitude. Creatures do not lack being, even if they do not give it to themselves, nor is (personal) plenitude unattainable for them, even if they do not give it to themselves.

59 Besides biological necessity, there are many others: metaphysical, logical, moral... each of them with differentiating tones.

60 Even if this is not the place to get into this, a philosopher as great as Leibniz thought of placing in God a principle of economy (maximum yield, minimum expense) as a way of approaching the perfection of God’s creative operation (Cl. De rerum originatione radicali, 303 y 304; Théodicée, 236).

the universe; properly, it lacks nothing. Only a being that combines both indigence and abundance can develop an “economic” activity. To conjoin both poles without internal contradiction, we must understand them as dualized, that is to say, so that the pole of abundance is superior to that of indigence, that it associates it to itself, elevating it without wholly eliminating it. If we understood indigence as the dominant pole, then abundance would be suffocated. Instead, we can have both, but only if abundance is such that it reappears even within indigence. Only the human person, a being essentially vinculated by his body to the temporality of the universe, is in their own respect, on one hand, rich in resources (insofar as it has more than enough projects, ideas and volitions), but also, on the other hand, indigent, insofar as they has to count on physical restrictions while also being subjected to a historical-temporal limitation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


---- Crisis y renovación de la Metafísica, Málaga, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Málaga, 1997.


---

62 In order for there to be a fault we should either have a demand for more (an impossible thing since it is not a person) or it should be badly done (impossible, for in that case it wouldn’t “work”, if we may use this expression). The entire universe is abundant and a surplus as an analysis of its being, in virtue of its dependency on the creative Identity.


Kant, I., Kritik der reinen Vernunft, in Kant’s Werke, Akademie Textausgabe, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1968, Band III and IV.

----Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in Kant’s Werke, Akademie Textausgabe, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1968, Band IV.

Leibniz, G. W., De rerum originatione radicali, in Die Philosophische Schriften von G.W. Leibniz, hrsg. von I. C. Gerhardt, Berlin, 1875-1890, VII.

----Essais de Théodicée, in Die Philosophische Schriften von G.W. Leibniz, hrsg. von I. C. Gerhardt, Berlin, 1875-1890, VI.


----Curso de teoría del conocimiento, Tomo IV, Primera parte, Pamplona, Eunsa, 1994.


----Antropología trascendental, Tomo II, La esencia de la persona humana, Pamplona, Eunsa, 2003.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, S. Thomae Opera Omnia, curante Roberto Busa, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1980, II.
Habitual Knowledge of God

Marga Vega
University of Berkeley (CA)
Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology
mvega@dspt.edu

ABSTRACT: This paper explores Polo’s proposal of an anthropological access to God’s existence in addition to the traditional metaphysical Five Ways. More specifically, it focuses on the role of intellectual habits, in particular the habit of wisdom and the habit of the personal intellect, in acquiring knowledge of God as creator of the person. Habitual knowledge according to Polo is possible because the agent intellect illuminates intelligible contents, may that be the phantasm, the operations of the intellectual faculty, or any other actualization and perfection of the intellect. Through that illumination, the agent intellect communicates freedom to the human nature rendering the former open to unrestricted growth. The anthropological path to God is dependent on the habit of wisdom by which we come to know ourselves, not just in our nature and faculties, but in the source of what makes our nature capable of unrestricted growth and freedom, namely, our personal act of being. It is when we know our personal act of being that we also glance at the Creator of our freedom, not just as a cause of it, but as the kind of Co-existence that bring us into co-existence.

KEYWORDS: Intellectual Habits, God, Knowledge, Agent Personal Intellect, Wisdom, Co-existence.
As it is the case with many other philosophical findings, we owe to Aristotle the notion of habit, both, of the intellectual and moral types. Thomas Aquinas followed Aristotle in his understanding of the intellectual and moral habits: “For, as Aristotle proves in Ethics II, “from like acts, like habits are formed, which in turn give rise to like acts.” Leonardo Polo has continued this Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of the habit, bringing new developments that bear important consequences for the philosophical thought. The goal of this paper is to present Polo’s notion of intellectual habitus to the question of how we acquire knowledge of the existence of God.

First, since the emphasis here is on the habit as a cognitive capacity that provides access to God’s existence, it is necessary to make explicit Polo’s contributions to the understanding of intellectual habits. Presenting the structure of habits, and their connection with the operations, the faculty, and the agent intellect, is crucial in order to show how Polo understands the habit as what makes possible the freedom and unrestricted growth that stem from the agent intellect as the personal act of being.

Secondly, the habit makes possible knowledge of God’s existence both in a metaphysical and anthropological sense. Again, Polo receives the Thomistic tradition of the Five Ways but reinforces the validity of these proofs by making explicit the epistemological propaedeutic that the habit of the first principles provides. He also shows that this metaphysical access to God is not the only philosophical access to God’s existence but that an anthropological one is also available, this time, provided inchoately by the habit of wisdom and fulfilled by the habit of the personal intellect. However, Polo’s proposal demands closer scrutiny to ascertain whether he is engaging in an ontological argument for God’s existence, that he would clearly reject, and furthermore, whether his anthropological path to God’s existence is really reducible to a metaphysical one. These are the questions that I will be addressing in the following pages.

---

1 Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, Bk. VI chp. 5, 6, 7 y 8 (BK 1140a 22-1144 a 30). Cfr.
2 T. AQUINAS, Summa Contra Gentes II, c. 73, n. 22.
3 In Polo’s theory of knowledge, habits have an important role in correcting the problems of Modern epistemology as well as placing the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition in dialogue with Contemporary philosophy.
1. WHAT ARE INTELLECTUAL HABITS AND WHAT DO THEY DO?

Intentional knowledge, also called objective or—following the Thomistic tradition—operative knowledge, is cognition of mind independent realities and it is intrinsically limited. The limitation of the knowledge of the operation comes fundamentally from the fact that the operation is only able to access some aspects of reality. This limitation is due to at least two main factors: 1. The operation is the act of a faculty that, as such, is in potentiality towards certain sensible and intelligible aspects and not others; 2. As the actualization of a potency, the operation is intrinsically contingent. At the level of the senses, for example, sight receives only color, hearing only sound. At the intellectual level, the concept grasps the quiddity of a thing, but leaves behind its individualizing matter, its particularity conditions, and the real existence of the thing. On the other hand, these limitations of the operation make possible the intentional possession of mind independent realities. As Aristotle mentioned, our intellect can become—cognitively—all things, without physically transforming into any of them. We can know fire without getting burnt.

Polo notices that besides the cognition that the operation provides, we can also uncover and illuminate the condition of the operation itself and its limitations. The question is what kind of cognitive act is able to provide such knowledge. Following Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s insights, Polo proposes that it must be a superior form of cognition, namely, an intellectual habit. In accordance with the Aristotelian principle of actuality and potentiality, Polo presents different habits that proceed from illuminating different types of operations. A map of our intellectual habits derives then from what faculties we have and what operations they enact. Continuing the Medieval distinction between higher reason and lower reason that corresponded respectively, to knowledge of higher or lower realities, Polo distinguishes between reason and intellect. Different habits would ensue from these different rational and intellectual parts. The habits of the reason would follow its operations: from abstraction, the abstractive habit; from generalization, the generalizing habit; from simple apprehension, the conceptual habit; from judgment, the judging habit; and from reasoning, the habit of logical

---

4 For this reason Polo refers to this intentional, objective knowledge as the ‘limit’.  
5 Among many other references see L. Polo, Curso de teoría del conocimiento, Eunsa, Pamplona, 1985, vol. 2, 149. Also, L. Polo, Curso, cit., vol. 4/2, 396-14.  
6 Cfr. L. Polc, Curso, cit., vol. 1, 147.
axiom. However, in the habits of the intellect we find a form of knowledge that is superior to the one of reason. Polo defends that the habits of the intellect are innate because they do not require a preceding operation. These are the synderesis, the habit of the first principles and the habit of wisdom. It is the latter, wisdom, which, according to Polo, provides knowledge of the created person, and in so doing, paves the way for the habit of the personal intellect to know God. This is a point that it will be addressed later on, but first it is necessary to analyze how habits work. More specifically, what it is that we know through the habit, and how is the habit possible? The answer to the first question is that whereas objective knowledge is knowledge of extra-mental objects, habitual knowledge is knowledge of cognitive acts. Therefore, operations have extra mental reality as their object or content, whereas habits have as their content, not objects, but the operations themselves.\(^7\) This point was noted by Aquinas who explained: “The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, ‘being’ and ‘the true,’ in which the act also of understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its own act.”\(^8\)

However, Polo’s view enhances the Aristotelian-Thomistic view on the habits. The intellectual habits are characterized as cognitive acts. In other words, Polo’s particular view acknowledges a crucial cognitive dimension in addition to a predicamental characterization of the habit, that is, the habit as an ontological perfection of the faculty. In this sense, we can draw an analogy between operations and habits. The cognitive operation can be considered ontologically as an accident, that is, a quality of the faculty, and epistemically, as a formal sign, that by which we get to know mind independent realities. In the same way, the habit has a predicamental dimension, it is an accident of the faculty, but also is a cognitive act that, as such, has its own content. The content of the operations are objects, external realities. In the case of

---


\(^8\) *ST* I, q. 87, a. 3, ad 1. He continues: “But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, in this state of life, is not every being and everything true, but ‘being’ and ‘true,’ as considered in material things, as we have said above, from which it acquires knowledge of all other things.” Also in II Sent., d. 19, a. 1, a. 1, co: “(...) intellectus intelligit se; quod non contingit in aliqua virtute cujus operatio sit per organum corporale.” See as well III Sent., d. 23, a.1, a.2, ad 3.
habits, their content, except in the case of the habits of the intellect, is something mental, an operation.9

The second question posed asked how the habits are possible. Polo understands that “the habitual knowledge is due to the agent intellect.”10 The proposal is that the agent intellect not only illuminates the phantasms received from sensible knowledge, bringing to actualization the intelligible *species expressa* in the passive intellect. It also illuminates the operations of the intellect, obtaining habits. The agent intellect then provides cognition of the external world through the *species impressa*, but it also illuminates its very own intellectual activity.11 Therefore, since the agent intellect illuminates different actualities that ensue in take place the intellect, we have that, for the phantasm, the agent intellect makes possible the *species intelligible expressa* in the passive intellect, and for the operations that take place in the intellect, the agent intellect communicates its illumination to the faculty by way of habits: “The habit carries the light of the agent intellect onto the faculty without the habit being themselves ‘agent intellects’.”12 In the case of the illumination of phantasms provided by the sensibility, there is an increase of knowledge of the external material reality: we know more things. But in the case of the illumination of the operation, what is achieved is a growth of the intellectual capacity itself: we exert higher

---

9 This proposal would seem to depart from Aquinas’ understanding of the habit as something purely ontological. However, some scholars have presented a reading of Aquinas’ *reditio* that coheres with the notion of the habit. Aquinas’ *reditio* would be taken as a reflectance on the operation itself, not in the way Modern Philosophy understood reflection, but in a similar way as the habit works. “That, then, is the supreme and perfect grade of life which is in the intellect, for the intellect reflects upon itself and the intellect can understand itself.” *Summa Contra Gentes* IV, c. 11, n.5. As I.I. Murillo notes, what impedes the sensitive faculties to know their own operations is that they act through a material organ, but that is not the case with the intellect making possible the *reditio* (cfr. I.I. Murillo, *Operación, hábito y reflexión. El conocimiento como clave antropológica en Tomás de Aquin*, Eunsa, Pamplona (1998), 31).

10 L. Polo, *Cursu*, cit., vol. 3, 14. As a matter of fact, Polo formulates this as an axiom for the theory of knowledge: “The axiom of the habits states that the intellect is susceptible of habits; now it is added that habits are made possible by the agent intellect. This is how the formulation of the axiom is finalized.” (ibidem).

11 “We enter the question of the intellectual habit through the *actus essendi*.” More specifically, for Polo the agent intellect coincides with the *actus essendi*: “Habitual knowledge is an illumination due to the agent intellect (which is the *actus essendi*).” L. Polo, “El conocimiento habitual de los primeros principios”, *Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico*. Eunsa, Pamplona (1991), vol. 10, 18.

acts. Turning to Aquinas again: “(...) an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower.”

The reason why we need to appeal to the agent intellect in the explanation of intellectual habits is because the habit cannot be brought about merely by the operation or by the faculty. Insofar as through habits we know the operation, habits are acts higher than the operation, and therefore, their actualization, although dependent on the existence of an operation in some cases, cannot be capacitiated by the operation. It would seem then that, since the habit is a perfection of the faculty, the habit is brought about by the faculty. However, whereas the operation depends on the faculty, the habit does not. The reason stems from the principle of actuality and potentiality and its hierarchy. The habit, being a perfection that is communicated to the faculty, cannot possibly be effectuated by the faculty itself but by a higher act. Therefore, according to Polo, habits are not brought about by the faculty but by the agent intellect. We can see this clearly if we consider that the human intellectual potency receives something only under the ratio of being intelligible. Therefore, an actualization of the intellect is susceptible of being known by the intellect. This ensues in a reditio, a habit in the intellect.

As a consequence, our intellect is capable of unrestricted growth. We can also quote Aquinas on this point: “(...) the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further.” Aquinas also states: “The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has a power of extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited by nature to certain fixed natural notions.” In reference to Aquinas again, who states that a free nature is a contradiction, Polo observes that if our nature was not able to access freedom, there would be a deterministic mechanicism in the explanation of human action. In that regard, Polo notices that we find in the intellect

---

13 STI, q. 75, a.3, ad 2.
16 STI-II, q. 18, a 10, co.
17 STI, q. 76, a.5, ad 4.
18 Cfr. L. POLC, Encíclica Solicitude Rei Socialis. Aedos. Madrid. 1990. 115. For Polo, the difference between human nature and human essence is that the first is necessary,
the transcendental freedom that we do not find in nature. The infinite capacity for growth characterizes the freedom of our intellect. Freedom, as understood here by Polo, is not the mere free will to choose between A or B. Freedom is placed, not in a metaphysical realm as a property of certain voluntary acts, and at the level of causality and effect, but in an anthropological arena. Transcendental freedom is not only related to actions, it is the constitutive feature of the person. Freedom is the unlimited openness of the intellect and the will that characterizes personhood.

The question then is, what is at the root of this infinite capacity for growth that opens the intellect to freedom? Given that a free nature is a contradiction, according to Polo this freedom of our intellect is only possible if the human nature is receiving something that allows for that unrestricted growth. Polo believes that that instance is the act of being. But the possibility of unrestricted intrinsic perfection that is at the root of freedom, requires the work of the habits. In that regard, Polo states that “intellectual habits open the intellect to freedom.” As Aristotle and Aquinas presented, habit entails freedom, not just as under determination to opposites, but also as sovereignty of the act. Through habits the person can manage his nature. The habits bring nature into a ‘second nature’, granting then freedom to nature because habits allow for growth, for going beyond. The habits are the way the act of being of the person, and the freedom that characterizes the personal act of being, is communicated to the nature.

whereas the second has freedom. Human nature is necessary because it lacks habits that bring and connect the personal act of being to the nature.

19 This growth is understood as the infinite operativity of the intellect that Aquinas also acknowledges. Aquinas argues: “But the part of the soul which does not use a physical organ in its activity does not remain limited, but is in a sense infinite, in so far as it is immaterial.” De Veritate, q. 15, a. 2.


24 Ibídem.


26 Cfr. L. POLO, Curso, cit., vol. 4/2, 12.
HABITUAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

However, the habit is also the cognitive stance that allows us to know about this unrestricted possibility for growth. It has been noted that the agent intellect is a light that illuminates any actuality and determination of the intellect. Polo notices that not all the illuminations by the agent intellect are of operations, some are of habits and faculties that are not preceded by any operation; that is, some are illuminations of other real acts. In this regard, the habits of the intellect are higher than the habits at the level of reason because they know higher realities, and they are innate because they are not preceded by any operation. Through the habit of synderesis, the agent intellect knows the human faculties and their nature; through the habit of the first principles, the agent intellect knows the existence of the universe, of God as First Cause, and of the relation of causation between the universe and God. Lastly, through the habit of wisdom, the agent intellect knows the created character of the human person: “the habit of wisdom differs from the habit of the first principles because its theme is human existence itself: knowing that I exist as a created person”. For that reason, Polo states that it “connotes”, glimpses, the theme of personal knowledge. The habit of wisdom knows the personal being; then it knows co-existence and its transcendentals. In so doing, it paves the way for our access to God’s existence through the habit of personal knowledge: “There is a habit of the intellect, the habit of wisdom, which relates to what is above the metaphysical order. My proposal is that with this habit we get to know the human personal being as co-existing with the universe, and, ultimately, with God. Therefore, knowledge of God is sapiential as well.”

2. HABITUAL KNOWLEDGE AND KNOWLEDGE OF GOD’S EXISTENCE

The contributions brought about by the philosophical insight of the habitual knowledge are many, but here I will focus on cognition of God’s existence. When it comes to knowledge of God, we may wonder how the way our mind works may facilitate or impede our access to an Absolute being. Objective knowledge of God does not seem possible as God is not an object that is given directly to our sensible experience,

---

27 L. POLO, Antropología, cit., vol. 1, 166.
29 L. POLO, Curso, cit., vol. 4/2, p. 47.
and no operation of the mind, being limited, would be able to apprehend God’s infinite nature. Our idea of God not only does not capture God’s essence, it also falls too short to reach God’s existence. However, the mental limit, that is, the operation, is illuminated and surpassed by habitual knowledge. Moreover, some intellectual habits are innate to the intellect. Does this represent any vantage point for our cognitive access to God? There are at least two possible ways in which habitual knowledge may proceed in knowing God, according to Polo.30

One is a metaphysical access to God, the one that Aquinas provided with the Five Ways. The Five Ways all arrive, under different perspectives (as First Mover, First Cause, First Necessary Being, and First in Perfection and Order) to God as Origin and Principle.31 The key of Aquinas’ proofs is that they do not arrive to God’s existence as the truth of the proposition “God exists,”32 but as the mind-independent, extra-mental, existence of God.33

In order to know God’s existence as something that He possesses, existentia ut exercita, we need experience of the existence. If our experience was limited to sense experience, accessing God’s existence would be problematic. However besides sense experience, we also have intellectual experience of reality by which we can grasp the first principles of reality. In doing so, the intellect can understand the notions of cause and effect and the impossibility of an infinite regress in a subordinated order of causes. Although we do not experience God’s existence with our senses directly, we experience the created things and infer from there the existence of a First Cause. This is the knowledge that the habit of the first principles provide: being caused by God as the foundation of the universe. The habits are then the foundation for intellectual experience.

But the understanding of being as foundation of the universe, does not capture a different radical existence, the one of the person, and one characteristic trait: its co-existence.34 Polo proposes that in order to

30 For an explanation of these different paths see F. Conesa, "El conocimiento de fe en la filosofía de Leonardo Polo," Anuario Filosófico, Pamplona, 29/2 (1996), 432.
33 Ibidem, 288.
give philosophical space to the proposals brought about by the Christian notion of the person, a broadening of the transcendental is required. To the transcendental of the metaphysics should be added the transcendental of the person: freedom, knowledge, love, co-existence.\textsuperscript{35} When it comes to the person, the notions of cause and effect that belong to metaphysics, are insufficient to describe the intimacy, co-existence and freedom of the person: “The first principle, although it is first, it is not what is highest or most inner. What is most inner is the person, and the person is not less radical than the foundation, only its primordiality is not foundational.”\textsuperscript{36} In other words: “The person transcends the universe by adding the ‘with’: adding to the existence, the co-existence.”\textsuperscript{37} Co-existence means ‘to exist with’, which Polo also refers to as to exist ‘additionally’:\textsuperscript{38} the person is besides the universe, that is, the person exists with the universe, whereas the universe simply exists. For that reason, isolation is incompatible with the notion of the person,\textsuperscript{39} and “the person, which is an intimacy, implies communication.”\textsuperscript{40}

Therefore, according to Polo, knowledge of the first principles is neither the only nor the highest knowledge we have, and consequently, knowledge of God as origin is not either the highest knowledge of God that we can obtain in the natural order. If metaphysics is the subject matter of the habit of the first principles, the person and its co-existence are the subject matter of a higher habit, the habit of wisdom. Through this path we arrive also to a God of the philosophers, but it is not a metaphysical path to God but anthropological, because it does not arrive to God as a First Principle and Cause,\textsuperscript{41} but to God as a Person.

How does this philosophical path to God’s existence proceed? As E. Moros notices in his study of the anthropological access to God, Polo does not have a single formulation, and it is more a recurrent topic in

\textsuperscript{35} See “La dualidad entre el hábito de los primeros principios y el hábito de sabiduría”, in L. Polo, Antropología, cit., vol. 1, 179-81.
\textsuperscript{36} L. Polo, Presente y futuro del hombre, cit., 174.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibidem, 183-84.
\textsuperscript{39} Cfr. L. Polo, Introducción a la filosofía, 228.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{41} Cfr. L. Polo, “El descubrimiento de Dios desde el hombre,” 11-24.
different contexts that acquires a new nuance at every turn.\footnote{See Enrique R. Moros Claramunt, "La demostración de la existencia de Dios a partir de la libertad," Anuario Filosófico 29/2 (1996), 805-14.} However, as presented by Moros, it seems that the anthropological access to God path, which is not a formal demonstration, starts from the fact of our own personhood and the freedom that characterizes it, as its first transcendent, to God as the creator of the person. The proposal by Polo is that “if the human being is radically free, then God must exist.”\footnote{L. Polo, Introducción a la filosofía, cit., 228.} However, it should be noted that because the personal act of being is transcendent and there are other anthropological, intrinsically interrelated transcendentals of the person, Polo’s anthropological access to God can be easily approached from the perspective of any of these other personal transcendentals. For example, Polo also uses the transcendentai ‘knowledge’ to access God’s personal existence: “The habit of wisdom connotes that the theme known by the personal intellect is superior to the intellect itself. In other words, the knowledge of God by the human person transcends the third dimension of the abandonment of the mental limit. Knowledge of the human person by God is required for the human person to know God, and, therefore, [this knowledge] surpasses any knowledge that the [human] person may attain of herself by herself. The demonstration of God’s existence in anthropology is expressed in this way: If God did not know the human person, it would not be possible to talk of the human intellect as co-actus. This is an implication of the real distinction: the human person cannot get to know herself by herself, because for her, knowing at the level of being equals personhood, and the human person as co-actus or co-existence is not really identity”.\footnote{L. Polo, Antropología, cit., 140.} Ultimately any consideration of God’s existence through anthropology will be rooted in the real distinction where the act of being of the person is a co-existence.

Polo’s theory of knowledge provides the basis for understanding how habitual knowledge facilitates human cognition of God (cognition frequently tramped by deficient epistemologies). More specifically, Polo defends the “methodic value of the habit of wisdom towards knowledge of the personal intellect”.\footnote{L. Polo, Antropología, cit., 167.} How does Polo traverse from freedom to God? He proposes that “only a personal being can be the creator of a personal freedom,”\footnote{E. Moros, “La demostración de la existencia de Dios a partir de la libertad”, cit., 812-813} and for that reason, if God does not
exist, we are not free: “Freedom opens up a twofold perspective: There is a personal God without whom, freedom would not exist: without God, freedom would end up in nothingness. The certain immortality of the soul, without God, would lead to a total perplexity, to a lack of destiny. Fear of freedom would ensue, even hatred: some people even would prefer not to be free, because if they glanced freedom they would not reach God, but they would just encounter a suspended freedom.”

In other words, we would encounter an unlimited capacity for growth that nonetheless has no reason for its origin; it just exists as a brute fact. But also, this growth is not going anywhere, nor it can be communicated, which precludes the very possibility for growth. Consequently, the unlimited openness that freedom is, is only possible, and can be fulfilled, if the human person co-exists with God. In Polo’s anthropological access to God, there is an affinity between our co-existence and our freedom that calls for clarification. Both are transcendental of the personal being, and, therefore, Polo moves comfortably from one transcendental to the other. Moreover, freedom and co-existence are co-implicated. Part of the anthropological access to God is that freedom involves co-existence. More specifically, freedom is for co-existing. This is how freedom and co-existence are tied up together in the anthropological access to God: unlimited growth as freedom implies co-existence if it is not to be a “suspended freedom”. The asymmetry between ontology and anthropology is at the heart of the question: “the foundation, founds, but what is founded is inferior to what gives foundation: the cause is superior to the effect (...) However, the person does not name a relation to what is inferior to it, because, if that was the case, the inner life of the person would remain secluded, concealed, to what is inferior to the person (as it would not have the capacity of receiving it). Consequently, we could ask, what is freedom for? For intersubjectivity.”

It was already mentioned that only if there are others, the co-existence can be co-existence, not mere existence. The uniqueness and co-existence that each person is, also entails that the person needs a replica, someone who is as unique as the person: “In other words, the existence of a single person does not make sense, persons are non-reducible and at the same time, they co-exist. On one side, they co-exist with the being that is not co-existence, namely, with the “principal” being.

47 L. POLO, Quién es el hombre: un espíritu en el tiempo, cit., 224-25.
48 Cfr. L. POLC, Introducción a la filosofía, cit., 229.
49 Ibidem.
But they also co-exist among them. The irreducibility of the person is not compatible with its isolation or separation. For that reason, person does not mean substance. Substances occur in separation; but what is separate does not co-exist; substances are given each one on its own; they are isolated.\(^{50}\) However, the co-existence at the level of the human persons does not reveal the origin or destination of our co-existence, or the unlimited openness of our constitutive freedom. Although Polo does not provide this argumentation, it seems plausible to appeal to the fact that our co-existence is not a brute that does not need explanation, justification. It is not self-sufficient. It does not have within itself the means to put itself into an existence that is a co-existence. This would be the case, not only from a causative ontological point of view, but mostly from the fact that a co-existence requires “another”.

At this point, we could object that from the fact that we find a tendency, propensity or attribute, in this case co-existing, it does not follow that such inclination may be satisfied. In other words, it would be possible for a co-existent to experience an “absence of others”. However, this is beside the point, since what is at stake is not the possibility of fulfillment of the co-existence but the fact that the person actually exists as a co-existence, whether it is fulfilled or not, and what makes it possible. In this regard, implicit to the anthropological access to God, there seems to be a search for sufficiency for the existence of the co-existence. The crucial point is that such requirement is not satisfied by any existent, may that be the principal being (the physical universe), or any co-existent where there is a composition of esse and essentia.\(^{51}\)

One possible reason, which Polo however does not make explicit, is that the contingency of creatural existence would make my own co-existence precarious. In other words, if my co-existence needed contingent co-existent s in order to co-exist, then not only could it be easily frustrated in its fulfillment, but most importantly, it would not even exist as co-existence. Whereas contingent co-existent s have the power to exist with others, they do not have within themselves the power to be called into co-existence. For this reason, the ultimate source and fulfillment for co-existence resides in the First Co-existent that is able

---

\(^{50}\) L. POLO, "El descubrimiento de Dios desde el hombre," cit., 19.

\(^{51}\) We should notice that Polo does not use this metaphysical terminology in his anthropological access to God, but it should not be incompatible with it, as a transcendental anthropology does not come to replace metaphysics but to bring a new theme to the philosophical scrutiny.
both, to call into co-existence, and to fulfill that co-existence.\textsuperscript{52} Even if someone happened to be the last contingent co-existent that is left, even if I am Robinson Crusoe lost in an island,\textsuperscript{53} that person would not be existing as co-existent in the first place if there was not a non-contingent Co-existence that brings that co-existence about, not just as existent (which would be the consideration of metaphysics), but as “existing with”. In other words, I co-exist, because God exists with me in the first place. This is revealed in co-existence with a personal God which makes possible all co-existence.

To summarize, without a Co-existent who calls us into co-existence, we would not be co-existent. However, we co-exist, and none of the composed co-existents can account for the constitutive character of our being as co-existents. Therefore, our co-existence is only possible because it is made co-existence in relation to God who shares as a gift his own way of existing.

Two objections seem to appear immediately. One is that Polo’s proposal would be subject to the same objections that the ontological argument faces, since it seems that from an idea of God, he reasons out or even intuits the existence of God.\textsuperscript{54} However, the difference with Polo’s anthropological path and an ontological argument is that it is knowledge as a created person which leads to knowledge of the existence of God as the Person who brings us into His co-existence. This is not knowledge of God as an idea, but it is a habitual knowledge of a real principle, that is, a knowledge of our own intrinsic personal being.

A second objection to this account would be that God seems to be understood as “cause” of our freedom, and therefore, the supposedly anthropological argument would actually be a metaphysical one that uses the perfection of having freedom, as departing point for the use of transcendental causation. However, this access to God is not a sixth way that from some created effect arrives to a first cause. The crucial point is that freedom and co-existence are not a perfection like any other that we may find in the physical universe.

\textsuperscript{52} However God’s Co-existence cannot be equated to the human person’s co-existence since our co-existence does not add anything to God. Conversely, our co-existence with God, constitute us as co-existent. See I. POLO, Antropología, cit., 200.

\textsuperscript{53} From a genetic point of view, a person needs others to develop as such, but the lack of development does not amount to an absence of co-existence. This would be the difference between not being able to develop a potential as opposed to not having one in the first place.

\textsuperscript{54} Leonardo POLG. "La persona humana como relación en el orden del origen," Studia Poliana, 14 (2012), 21-36.
The reason is that we do not depart from ourselves as ontological effects but as persons that, in receiving God’s call to co-existence, are constituted as co-existents. We could obviously explain all this from a metaphysical point of view in terms of causation. Such explanation however would render superfluous an anthropological perspective. We, as beings that are part of the physical universe, are caused. But this relation of causation only tell us about a dependence in being. It does not specify what kind of existence we possess. And in the case of the person, the existence is a co-existence. Similarly, a concave surface will have a convex outer side: however, because we can describe the facts under the concave side, it does not mean that the thing lacks a convex one to it. Therefore, reducing the access to God to a metaphysical one, does not capture the peculiar existence of the person, and its path to acquiring knowledge of God. Our dependence in being from God is a relation of causation. Our being persons is a relation of constitution that is only possible if a Personal God, sees us and loves us.

According to Polo, the existence of God as a person as the condition for unlimited openness is required. Only if God exists, we can both, understand where the root for this openness lies, and find a way to fulfill the co-existence. This is actually one single thing, just considered under two different aspects, that is, freedom means origin from God and destination to God.

Summarizing, we see how, according to Polo, the habit channels the freedom of the act of being to the nature. But also, habits help us see that the unlimited growth of freedom is only possible if the person is created in the image of a God that is personal as well. In the same way that the intellect is able to reflect towards the phantasms and understand their origin in the act of abstraction, the intellect knows its own unlimited capacity for growth and its source in the personal act of being, as made possible by God. Knowledge of the act of being as the source of unlimited growth and freedom is captured by the habit of wisdom. Not only then the habit achieves cognition of the self but also knowledge of the existence of God as a Personal Being. In other words, in knowing ourselves, we know God.
The Knowledge of Being

Ana Isabel Moscoso
University of the Hemispheres
(Ecuador)
anaisabelm@uhemisferios.edu.ec

ABSTRACT: This article explores a crucial question: does human reason know the real as it is or just the universal abstract obtained from it? To analyze this, I utilize various sources that refer to Thomas Aquinas, specifically to his distinction between conversio ad phantasmata (a mode of knowing the universal in the particular) and separatio (a way of knowing the real as real, proper to metaphysics). I then connect this to Leonardo Polo’s methodical proposal: abandonment of the thought-object’s limit. The first dimension of the abandonment is the intellect’s innate openness to being: the innate habit of the first principles, as a method that adverts the being of the universe as persistence, as non-contradiction, and the being of the Origin as persistence’s origin.

KEYWORDS: Being, Object, Abstraction, Separatio, Innate Habit, First Principles, Abandonment of the Mental Limit
What first comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being. "That which is first seized by the intellect is being." Throughout Thomas Aquinas’ work, these claims have given rise to various interpretations by commentators, scholars and followers. In short, the question that concerns us is: according to St. Thomas, do we know the specific entity, the “universal entity” as a concept, the effective existence, the act of being as the essence’s actuality or, instead, being as the entity’s first act? Aquinas’s claims have been interpreted in various ways. In order to properly understand his thought, we must look beyond the analysis of explicit texts, and search his entire thought.

I have closely examined research on this topic, conducted by J.M. Núñez Pliego, in order to synthetically respond to this question. His work is a good presentation and analysis of the question at hand. Additionally, it is a successful attempt to understand the issue from two perspectives: the meaning and scope of being, and how the intellect reaches it.

First, through the notion of being, one captures that being is and that it is something. It is a composite notion, it includes essence and being. Thus, the meaning of St. Thomas’ statement: “That which is first seized by the intellect is being.” In this case, it would capture both essence and being. Now, is this the result of an abstraction, a judgment or is it another form of knowledge? “From the notion of entity, two paths have been taken: knowing the entity as its essential notion or as

1 THOMAS AQUINAS, S. Th. I, q.11, a. 2, ad 4.
2 THOMAS AQUINAS, S. Th. I-II, q. 55, a. 4, ad 1.
3 With respect to this topic, let us refer to the knowledge of being. We know the path Rahner followed after “literally” interpret the mistranslated Thomistic text regarding what is first known: Avicenna’s famous aphorism, which Aquinas cites at the beginning of De veritate (“That which the intellect first conceives as the most obvious and in which all its conceptions are resolved is the entity”), “Rahner considered (that) human understanding is open a priori to the knowledge of the esse at its maximum amplitude. Such a perception of being recalls Heidegger’s aheimatic perceetion of being... In any case, this statement does not fit with Thomistic philosophy, despite Rahner’s intentions, because, according to Aquinas we first know ens and not being.” SARANYANA, J.I., “La antropología trascendental rahneriana” [“Transcendental rahnerian anthropology”] in Anthropological Proposals for the Twentieth Century, Vol. I, 317.
being.” This first way, knowledge of the essence, is proper to science, while knowledge of being as being is proper to metaphysics. Thus Thomas Aquinas states: “Although the subjects of the other sciences are parts of being, which is the subject of metaphysics, the other sciences are not necessarily parts of metaphysics. For each science treats of one part of being in a special way distinct from that in which metaphysics treats of being.”

This poses two questions: each sciences’ object and mode of study. In both ways, metaphysics distinguishes itself from the other sciences. Let us begin with the first question: what is science’s object? Our response: the essence, each nature’s properties. Then, what is metaphysics’ object? According to Aquinas: substance, accident, act, being. In other words, that which is present in all beings. As for the latter, in following Aristotle, Thomas makes it clear that the essence of things is captured by an intellectual operation: abstraction, the method of all sciences. But, what cognitive operation captures being?

1. CAPTURING BEING AS ACT

There are many authors who believe that capturing the act of being is a mix of profundity, even reflection, a process involving the intellectual operation called separatio.

Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between these two operations. Abstraction, he says, “distinguishes one reality from another when it understands what something is, without considering anything from any other reality, regardless of whether it is connected or separate... This distinction is properly called abstraction but only when those things,

---

6 THOMAS AQUINAS, *In I de Trin.* q. 5, a. 1, ad 6.
7 Cf. *Ibid.*, q. 5, a. 1 c.
8 Cf. NÚÑEZ PLIEG, J. M., *Abstracción y separación* [Abstraction and separation], this work includes quotes and references from various authors.
9 Without attempting a study of this topic, it is necessary to try to better understand the scope of this intellectual operation. In order to do this, I refer to two works by Carlos Llano. Both are dedicated to the “noetic bases for a non-rationalist metaphysics,” which I will promptly quote.
which can be understood independently, occur in reality simultaneously.”

He refers to the latter operation as: “the operation of the intellect joining and dividing which is properly called separation and this belongs to divine science or metaphysics.”

Thus, through separatio, the intelligence captures what is specific to every being. This is metaphysical knowledge’s proper method, not abstraction. Indeed, being as being cannot be captured by abstraction, since being is not a genus, as Aristotle made clear. ‘Being’ cannot be captured by abstracting it from concrete beings; however, essence and accidents can be considered separately, without concrete being.

The intellect reaches the notion of act, potency, substance and soul through separatio. But, does this capture the act of being as an intimate, first act of reality? Although some Thomists agree I say no. It is one thing to understand that something is, or that it is in act (in a sense), or to understand what form is for matter. It is, however, another thing to know being ut actus, in an entity, but as its radical act. In this sense, I think Núñez Pliego’s expression “to think of being as being” to refer to the topic at hand, helps us see the difference: to think of being does not mean capturing being as act, or the real as real.

We must affirm separatio as metaphysics’ method, closely linked to the analogical predication of being (and to other concepts attributable

11 Ibid., q. 5, a. 3, co 5.
12 In this same text. St. Thomas distinguishes between two modes of abstraction: “There is another through the operation by which the quiddities of things are conceived which is the abstraction of form from sensible matter, and this belongs to mathematics. And there is a third through the same operation which is the abstraction of a universal from a particular, and this belongs to physics and to all the sciences in general, because science disregards accidental features and deals with necessary matters.” THOMAS AQUINAS, In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 3, co 5.

This is the familiar theme of abstraction’s degrees: formal and total. For an explanation and analysis of Aquinas’ thought, and more or less successful interpretations within Thomism, please refer to: SELLES, J.F., Conocer y amar [To know and to love], 288-311.

Under no circumstances does Aquinas admit that properly metaphysical knowledge is reached by abstraction. Some authors have tried to assign the highest degree of abstraction to metaphysics (including Maritain), but this error produces negative consequences for metaphysics as knowledge of reality.
13 Cf. For example, In Metaph. III, No. 443.
14 Cf. The study just mentioned, by NÚÑEZ PLIEGO.
to all that is).\textsuperscript{15} However, clarifying that this metaphysical scope is proper to man is not a ‘method’ in the formal sense, but rather a natural way of knowing. In his comprehensive study on separatio, Carlos Llano states: “The judgment of existence is at the very base of man’s natural knowledge, not necessarily at metaphysics’ beginning.”\textsuperscript{16}

Capturing the entity, grasping that ‘this is,’ that ‘this is real’ is different from knowing the essence of ‘this that is real.’ As we have said, the mind can consider the essence of ‘this that is real’ separately, abstractly. But it cannot do so with the reality of ‘that which is.’ However, our question remains unresolved: in its judgment, does our intelligence capture the entity’s act of being as distinct from the essence? Or, does it capture being solely as a judicative connection, a predicate of the judgment of existence? Or, does it capture both?\textsuperscript{17}

This important issue does not come with easy answers, but with many theoretical and practical implications for philosophy. For example, if reality cannot be captured, the truth loses its validity as truth, and becomes pure logic. If philosophy does not seek the truth, its loses its raison d’être.

\textsuperscript{15}Llano’s commentary on analogy as a way of knowing is very enlightening. To those who claim that in St. Thomas being is univocal, and the difference between God and creatures is only due to composition and not essence, he states: “Such ideas do not understand St. Thomas’ fundamental bases of philosophy and theology. For him, as a follower of Aristotle, analogy is the cognitive way to which man must recur precisely in order to deal with the real world’s being. Not only with God’s being, nor only with God’s being in reference or comparison to creatures, but with the created entity’s esse.” LLANO, C., \textit{Separatio. Bases noéticas para una metafísica no racionalista [Separatio. Noetic basis for a non-rationalist metaphysics]}, Ediciones Ruz, México, 2007, 216-217.

Under Polo’s proposed distinction between the being of the universe and personal being, he considers analogy to be an insufficient method for knowing the person. In other words, it is not enough to analogically attribute metaphysical notions to the person because it is a different reality from that of the universe. Not only substantially, but transcendentally: the person is another being, distinct from the universe as being. We will discuss this matter later.

\textsuperscript{16}LLANC, C., \textit{Separatio}, 125.

\textsuperscript{17}I find LLANC’s statements, seemingly contradictory to those of St. Thomas, to be correct. On the one hand, Aquinas says: “opertet ut intelligatur aliquid esse, et postea quod sit aliquid” \textit{(In librum Boetti de Hebdomadibus Expositio, lect II. n. 30)}, and later: “omnis essentia potest intelligi sine hoc quod intelligatur de esse sux.” \textit{De ente et essentia}, IV, No. 26. “This unfortunate argument... is clearly incurred in the confusion between true being and being in act.” LLANO, C., \textit{Abstractio. Bases noéticas para una metafísica no racionalista [Abstractio. Noetic bases for a non-rationalist metaphysics]}, Ed. Ruz, México, 2005, 264.
Leonardo Polo devotes much of his work to shed light on this question. Although present from philosophy’s beginnings, it has taken on new meaning in modernity. It can be addressed with two questions: does the foundation of truth rest on being or knowing? And, is it possible to know being? Polo addresses these issues from different perspectives: analysis of the transcendentalics, and among them, truth; human knowledge, pure rationality’s limits and a proposal for a broader method to access reality.

In an interview with Juan Cruz Cruz, Leonardo Polo responds to a question regarding the relationship between his epistemological proposal of ‘abandoning the mental limit’ and the Thomistic access to the act of being: “The first thing is: I do not know the real as the act of being intentionally. This cannot be. The knowledge that the known qua known is unreal cannot be knowledge of that which, upon ceasing to be real, is not in any way. Correspondingly, I must say that unreality, strictly speaking, is intentionality: speaking only of unreality is not sufficient to abandon the limit. Intentionality counter-distinguishes itself from the real. Intentionality is the thought-object qua object, not nothing, which, strictly speaking, neither is nor is thinkable.”

The key point we must understand in order to access Polian thought is his claim that knowledge through abstraction –‘rational’ knowledge or the rational use of intelligence– is limited. This limitation is because it must ‘extract’ a certain aspect from reality and ‘fix’ it as a known-object. Hence, its limitations. Reality is not fixed; neither are the essence nor the act of being. Thus, thanks to the discovery explicated by Aquinas, when one understands that essentia and actus essendi really are distinct, one cannot claim that in order to know reality it is sufficient to know abstractively, rationally, ‘objectively,’ ‘actually.’ Human knowledge employs other methods in order to know: we must abandon the limit of purely ‘rational’ knowledge.

---

18 He adds: “I know of no thematic antecedent to this methodical proposal. In addition, some profound philosophers that I esteem very much argue that it is impossible to abandon the mental limit because, if our knowledge is limited to it, we must abide by this limit and proceed as we are able.” “Filosofar hoy” [“Philosophize today”]. Juan Cruz Cruz interviewing L. Polo, Anuario Filosófico, XXV/1 (1992) 50.

19 I use quotation marks so as not to confuse Polo’s use of ‘objectively.’ as contrary to subjectively. In this context, ‘objectively’ means and is used by Polo as ‘thought-object.’ Similarly, ‘actually’ is not opposed to ‘not now.’ nor ‘virtually’ or something similar: ‘actually’ means ‘actual act,’ fixed, not giving, but given. In this sense, neither the es-
In *Persona y libertad* [*Person and Freedom*] Polo asserts: “After establishing the real distinction\(^{20}\) one cannot claim that every act is actual. In other words, the real distinction can be known only by abandoning the limit. Thomas Aquinas affirms this when he says the real distinction can only be known by *separatio*(Cf. *In Boet. De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3.). What Aquinas refers to as *separatio* is the abandonment of actuality.”\(^{21}\) These direct, conclusive, almost abrupt statements are frequent throughout Polo’s work. In order to evaluate them we must return to implicit reasoning and to its premises. In other words, the act of being distinct from the essence is not an actual act; rational operations are acts that possess the known as a fixed object, i.e., as an actual act; therefore, the act of being cannot be known through rational operations: we must abandon that limit.

St. Thomas says that *separatio* grasps being distinctly from essence, therefore *separatio* corresponds to what Polo calls “abandonment of the mental limit.” *Separatio* is “the abandonment of the mental limit,” in other words, a mode of intellectual knowledge that goes beyond abstraction, and thus captures what is not actual act: being.

Each of these premises requires careful study, and, indeed, Polo and many other authors have studied them.\(^{22}\) After reviewing numerous publications I have chosen one that, because of its approach, provides much insight. José Ignacio Murillo’s publication researches Aquinas’ theory of knowledge.\(^{23}\) In it, Murillo seeks to understand Aquinas’ theory of knowledge within the context of the whole of his thought, rather than by analyzing select texts. I find this approach to be the most appropriate in order to delve inside an author’s mind, and moreover, if the author has not sufficiently systematized the subject, as in this case.

---

\(^{20}\) This refers to the real distinction between essence and act of being, a Thomistic doctrine that Polo continues.

\(^{21}\) *Persona y libertad* [*Person and Freedom*], Eunsa, Pamplona, 2007, 40.


\(^{23}\) MURIILLO, J. I., *Operación, hábito y reflexión* [*Operation, habit and reflection*]. *El conocimiento como clave antropológica en Tomás de Aquino*, EUNSA, Pamplona, 1998, 231. The author dedicates this work precisely to answering the question we are dealing with here: “If it is possible, how do we know the real in its real principles?” *Ibid.*, 27. He does this referring to Thomas Aquinas’ thought on knowledge, in order to detect up to what point he was able to answer this question.
Following along with his work, I will highlight what I consider to clarify the issue, according to my understanding.

First, we must keep in mind that knowledge is act, always act. Polo also explains this: “The question of supra-sensible knowledge begins with considering unity. From this point of view, intellectual and intelligible are correlative terms delimited as two connected parts, or rather as a duality that is not entirely separate. If intellecution is not an empty word, then the intelligible means that which is capable of being understood in re. But if the understood is really understood, we must point to an understanding. Therefore, the understood cannot isolate itself or be separate in any way: what is understood requires an understanding. In turn, the understanding refers to the understood according to its verbal value. If there is understanding, something is understood. Understanding does not end, is not finished, without understanding; it does not end before reaching it.”24 One either understands, or does not understand. There is no middle ground. One cannot ‘half understand’ because understanding is act: it is to ‘have’ the known, to possess it intentionally (although it does not possess it really and even less so, materially).

However, it is clear that the extra-mental reality is not intelligible in act. This reality pertains to another order, not that of intelligence (we could say there is no ‘tie’ between them). Thus, the extra-mental reality is only potentially intelligible. To be intelligible in act, the intellect must raise it to its level. In other words, the intellect gives actual intelligibility to what is potentially intelligible. “The connected duality of understanding and the understood is a maze of difficulties for a very precise reason, namely because the connection is a source of requirements that must be met at the same time, and not a unilateral way. The connection must be fulfilled. As a duality, each of the parts must focus on its fulfillment. But the fulfillment by one part does not absolve the other. Thus, the requirement is mutual and reciprocally directed: one part requires the other. Ultimately, each one must contribute its part, because something cannot be understood without understanding, and vice-versa.”25

25 Ibíu.
The known must contribute its part: to be and to let itself be known. Likewise, that which knows—the intellect—must also contribute its part. It must ‘actualize’ the known, take from reality that which cannot ‘be’ in reason. Thus, what is known as the known is not the real as it is in reality, but as it is in the knower. Upon carefully thinking about this, we will recognize that knowledge owes more to the knower than to the known. Murillo explains a similar idea: “The idea, as such, does not have to be real. However, this does not mean that it does not depend on a real act, which is the operation of understanding, because ‘the understood idea’s being is the same as its intellection’ (CG. IV, c. 11 n. 11).” He adds: “The idea is intentional and not real.”26 Indeed, its only reality is its reference to reality.

Now, to affirm that the known is only the notion in the mind and not in reality would be to step outside of realism.27 To be a realist—and this, indeed, is philosophy’s traditional approach to realism—one must sustain that we do not know concepts, but rather realities through concepts. “The concept, with its psychological or epistemological esse is not the object of metaphysical knowledge: it is only a means quo or in quo we know the object, which is the essence with its own, real esse.”28

In other words, a realist admits that we know the real entity because intentionality implies that the act knows the real. But what is real in the mind is not what is real in reality. Moreover, the known real is not the same as the real in reality; in fact, it is neither the same nor equal. As Polo says, “the truth and the entity are not the same because ‘the same’ describes each thought-object... Undoubtedly, objective knowledge is true. However, it is not true transcendentally because it would exhaust the knowledge of reality. Therefore, objective truth and the entity are not identical.”29

Aquinas graphically declares: “Action and passion do not belong to things as they exist in thought but as they exist in reality.”30 Rational

27 “This confusion between the concept of being and the conceived being, often carried out with impunity, has serious consequences for metaphysics as a whole.” LLANO, C., Abstractic, 9.
28 Ibid., 253.
30 THOMAS AQUINAS, In Boet Trin. q. 5, a. 4 ad 7.
knowledge’s realistic explanation (and the idealist explanation, even less so) does not answer our ultimate question: do we know the act of being as act or do we only know other acts of reality? Let us explore this question.\textsuperscript{31}

Through abstraction we come to know various aspects of reality that are “liberated” from their real attachment to matter, in order to make them intelligible (i.e., capable of being intellectually grasped). As we stated before, the intellect completes this task.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, the intellect knows material reality’s principles (acts or forms, substantial or accidental) through concepts.

It is important to distinguish the abstracted form (intelligible species) from the concept, as St. Thomas does. He states: “it is necessary that the intelligible species, which is the principle of intellectual operation, differ from ‘verbum cordis,’ which is formed by the intellect’s operation; although the same verb can be called form or intelligible specie, as constituted by the intellect.”\textsuperscript{33} This confusion may lead one to conclude that what we know are concepts, not references to reality,\textsuperscript{34} without acknowledging that “to comprehend is the operation by which

\textsuperscript{31}“Can we say that simultaneity is achieved once and for all? If not, must we not concede that the intelligible’s priority does not exactly correspond to the understanding which accompanies it, or that the intelligible does not appear as the entire content of unity’s criterion, proper to a previous effort of understanding?” POLO, L., “Lo intelectual y lo inteligible” [“The intellectual and the intelligible”], 2.

\textsuperscript{32}Sellés pertinently clarifies this: “Abstracting form from matter is proper to any knowledge inferior to intelligence, not only of this. Here, he refers to the corporal form. In taking form and leaving particular matter to the background, he does not dispense with the “material conditions” of matter’s properties, because —as an example— the forms in the imagination are without matter, but they do not appear without material conditions. Instead, the intellect abstracts from matter and from its conditions.” SELLES, J. F., Conocer y amar [To know and to love], 258. He cites numerous sources from the Thomist corpus.

\textsuperscript{33}THOMAS AQUINAS, Quaestiones Quodlibet. 5. 5. 2 Cor, cited by SELLES, J.F., Conocer y amar [To know and to love] 319.

\textsuperscript{34}Cf. SELLES, J. F., Conocer y amar [To know and to love]. 319. In a footnote he writes: “Most of contemporary literature omits the crucial difference between the abstract and the concept, combining them in the same object (...) The lack of distinction between them first leads to nominalism or idealism(...) For the impact of this error, see: POLC, L., Nominalismo, idealismo y realismo [Nominalism, idealism and realism]. Pamplona, EUNSA, 1996. Nominalism and idealism are two sides of the same erroneous coin. This is, namely, that if we unite the abstract and the concept, one does not know the universal ‘in re’ but knows forms that are mental, not real. Consequently, the singular reality is unknowable (nominalism), and mental forms do not pertain to the real (idealism).”
one retrieves the physical real. We can only know the real qua real by forming the concept. Only through this operation does the abstract return to the real, but knowing reality as it is does not imply knowing it as form (abstract), but rather as the form really is, i.e., as a real form and, therefore, causai, or as a formal cause which is one (unum) for the many individuals (multis) in which such a form can be found. The distribution is the material cause. The species is the principle of intellect, but the concept is what is grasped through the intellect; namely, the result of that act of intellect which refers to the abstraction confronting, it with what the species abstracts is the species.35

Thomas Aquinas explains abstraction: “we can consider the abstracted notions in two ways: in themselves, and thus without individual matter and motion. Thus, they have no more being than that which they possess in understanding. We can also consider them by comparing them to the things of which they are notions, which certainly exist with matter and motion.” He concludes: “Therefore, through the notions considered without particular matter and without motion, the mobile and material entities with extra-mental existence are known in physics.”36

Thus, the singular is known by returning to it, through comparison with the universal principles which are understood through a process of intellectual abstraction.37 Intellectual knowledge of the material singular is indirect, mediated by a “return.” Some refer to this “return” as comparison and others as reflection; however, the latter term seems inappropriate, unless it is taken to mean veritative reflection rather than intelligence’s reflection of its acts.38

35SELLÉS, J. F., Conocer y amar [To know and to love], 320.
37 It is not our attempt to explain knowledge’s entire process, as it is not necessary for this paper. We are only interested in synthetically reviewing material reality’s acts of knowledge in order to elucidate whether it is possible to, and how to capture, its act of being.
38 “When understanding is actualized by an intelligible species, the peculiar reflection that occurs paradoxically leads to knowledge of form and, therefore, knowledge of the real. Moreover, it leads to knowledge of adequation, because intelligence discovers the rei alterius form in itself and finds itself adequate to something real, distinct from itself. We can call this «veritative reflection.»" SEGUERA, C., “Verdad, juicio y reflexión según Tomás de Aquino” [Truth, judgment and reflection in Thomas Aquinas], Anuario Filosófico, XXI/1 (1988) 162.
So, can we say that we know the essence of the material? As a universal, we can certainly know it by abstraction. However, the abstracted essence is not the essence in matter: the essence in a thing is precisely the subject configured in a certain way, in order to respond to a finality. This particular materiality is known by returning from the abstract to the concrete, through the conversio ad phantasmata (we must not forget that the ‘phantasm’ is neither the sensitive thing, nor sensation, but its imagined representation, its image: it is a sign of the sensitive singular).

“Hence, Thomas Aquinas speaks of the inferior potencies as a means to advance knowledge of material reality (“Dispositio sapientium of singularibus non fit nisi per mentem by vi cogitativa, cuius is unique intentiones cognoscere” De Vet., a. 10, a. 5, ad 2).”39 But, again, the “phantasm” is not a sensitive thing, nor sensation, but rather it’s imagined representation: it is a sign of the singular sensitive.

Therefore, the singular thing is not known as it is. We can know the singular material by comparison with the abstracted form in the mind. Matter qua matter is unknowable: it is knowable with the form as concourse. That is, grasping the singular is nothing more than capturing this configured matter. Instead, we find another operation in the intelligence leading us to distinguish that what is thought is not what is real.

Murillo’s clarifies this: “comparing the universal with the singular corresponds to the real composition of form with matter.” He later states that this operation is possible “because an understanding between the two orders precedes it: the mental and real orders. We only really know matter and form as real causes by comparison with that from which the extra-mental character (previously omitted in abstraction) has been abstracted.”40

In his Curso de teoría del conocimiento [Course on the Theory of Knowledge] Polo analyzes this stage of knowledge, i.e., the return from the universal to the singular. “The concept should point out the priority which corresponds to the many. It is important to remember that those many are not the mental presence. Unum in multis is not the same as unum in praesentia. Unum in praesentia is simply the abstract.

39Murillo, J. I., Operación, hábito y reflexión [Operation, habit and reflection], 85 and note 54. A detailed study on knowing the singular can be found in chapter II (pp. 93-100).
40Murillo, J. I., Operación, hábito y reflexión [Operation, habit and reflection], 88.
When the abstract begins its return to reality, *unum in multís* is explicit as a real statute. It is important that this statute be plural as it indicates that it is not mental.” In other words, in this step the ‘fixed’ reality that imagines the concept is already ‘released.’

We should know what St. Thomas says about this because he introduced the real distinction between essence and being. After thorough research of Aquinas’ work, Murillo says: “Here we encounter a problem when following St. Thomas because he has not systematically developed a theory of knowledge... However, ... he is explicit when referring to the problem of knowing reality outside the mind: knowing that the mind’s effectivity differs from its objectivity is only possible through reflection.”

Up to here, we have indicated that the intelligence knows the essence in the universal. When it returns to the sensitivity it knows it in the singular: it understands that essence is given in these singulars, that this form is present in this matter.

However, Polo states that intelligence can do more: “It clarifies more: new con-causalities, not just the formal cause with the material (causes are only known as causes *ad invicem*). In my view—which stems from a classical thesis—judgement is the full knowledge of con-causality.”

---

41 *Curso de teoría del conocimiento [Course on the Theory of Knowledge].* Tomo IV. Eunsa, Pamplona, 2º ed., 2004. 31. For the purposes of this study it is not necessary to carefully analyze Polo’s contributions to the explanation of all rational operations. See: *Curso de teoría del conocimiento [Course on the Theory of Knowledge].* Volume IV, and his work: *El conocimiento racional de la realidad [Rational knowledge of reality]*, Cuadernos de anuario filosófico, No. 169, Pamplona, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2004.

42 Murillo, I. I., *Operación, hábito y reflexión [Operation, habit and reflection]*, 102. Again, this does not seem to be a reflection but rather a comparison. To reflect means to return to something. It would be a reflection if it returned to the act. However, when capturing the universal in the singular there is no ‘return.’

43 “Matter is the principle to which the abstract can return. Thus the *unum in presentia* can be explained as *unum in multís*, as concept. However, we must keep in mind that simultaneity is proper to thought.” Murillo, I. I., “Distinguir lo mental de lo real. El «Curso de teoría del conocimiento» de Leonardo Polo” [“Distinguishing the mental from the real. Leonardo Polo’s Course on the Theory of Knowledge”]. *Studia Poliana.* 1 (1999) 59-82. This article details Polo’s manner of continuing and completing the classic theory of knowledge. Cf. also Selleús, J. F., Conocer y amar [To know and to love], 319.

44 *Curso de teoría [Course on the Theory of Knowledge].* IV, 31.
Thomas Aquinas makes another distinction: upon capturing the form separately from matter one does not grasp movement. Thus, “the mathematician deals with things that are abstract only in thought, insofar as they come under his consideration they cannot be the principle or the end of motion. So the mathematician does not demonstrate by means of efficient and final causes. But the things the metaphysician deals with are separate, existing in reality, and these can be the principle and end of motion. So nothing prevents his demonstrating by means of efficient and final causes.”

Polo makes a similar statement: “Judgment distinguishes itself from the concept by being more explicit. We know the material cause through the concept; in turn, the material cause’s unum is the formal cause. Additionally, the extrinsic efficient cause and, in a way, the final cause are both present, although this plurality does not mean they are simultaneously present. However, only in judgment does one fully know the end’s causal value through the intrinsic efficient cause.” Thus, a new step. Not only does this mean the universal’s return to the singular (i.e., to explain the composition of the formal cause-material cause) but it also refers to capturing movement. This goes beyond hylemorphic composition. It means capturing con-causality, in other words, the four causes’ confluence: material, formal, efficient and final, which occurs in judgment. Murillo states: “the act of judging is a return to movement from that which is abstracted. To judge gives us knowledge of real causality in its own mutability.”

Judgment clarifies the real which does not allow us to know the concept. Polo refers to this as complete causality, that is, physical tetra-causality.

Here, I wish to note the progress I see in Polo’s thought. He tersely concludes the last quoted text in Curso de teoría del conocimiento [Course on the Theory of Knowledge]: “In any case, the causes are ad invicem because they are causal senses, not things.” That is, these causes are not substance, but rather essence. Thus Polo states: “To argue that knowledge of reality begins with knowing things is a mistake. We must address judgment’s long history to correct this error, which

45 THOMAS AQUINAS, In Boet, De Trin., q. 5, a. 4, ad 7.
46 Curso de teoría [Course on the Theory of Knowledge], IV, 31.
47 MURILL, J. I., Operación, hábito y reflexión [Operation, habit and reflection], 99.
48 “Judgment is the complete knowledge of con-causality.” POLC, L., Curso de teoría [Course on the Theory of Knowledge], IV, 31. Cf. also: 20, 74 and 172-173.
49 Curso de teoría [Course on the Theory of Knowledge], IV, 31.
continues to be maintained today in several versions (judgment has many different interpretations). The modern age, and much of this explains Spinoza’s unilateral stance, has augmented an error that was already present in Aristotle, namely, interpreting the distinction between subject and predicate with the assumption that the subject forms part of the substance. But, if we know con-causality through judgment, we must understand the subject-predicate connection differently.50

The intelligence does not simply discover the universal in the singular, and the thought-essence in the real essence, but it also distinguishes the thought-species from reality. It understands that thought is not real, but refers to the real. In my view, this act implies capturing the real as real. Thus, Aquinas affirms that the entity is the first thing known,51 although this does yet refer to attaining being as distinct from essence.

Moreover, judgment, which affirms or denies the adequacy of some universal to some singular, is not an operation between two abstracts. Instead, it assumes reality’s existence.52 Therefore, judgment is predication, attribution, that exposes us “to reality as it principally is: it corresponds to real principles, and does not hypostasize objectivity.”53 In this way, intelligence achieves much, but, as Murillo points out, “it does not appear that knowledge of the principles provides us with knowledge of being as distinct from essence. In judgment, the appearance of the copula is does not signal knowledge of being as distinct from essence, but rather, (as Aquinas says) from the identity according to the reality of which it is comprised.”54

Indeed, judgment declares that something exists, or that it exists in a certain way. But St. Thomas distinguishes:55 “To be’ can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject.”56 Judgment refers to the latter explanation. Elsewhere Aquinas explains: “We use being in three ways. In one way, we refer to being as the quiddity or nature of a thing. Thus, some say its definition is the

50 *Ibid.* Later in this work, we will discuss how to understand essence in Polo’s work.

51 This view coincides with that of *Murillo, J. I.*, in *Operación, hábito y reflexión [Operation, habit and reflection]*,73.

52 Cf. *Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis De anima*, l. 3, lec. 11, No. 15.


55 This is in the context of knowledge of God, though the distinction is valid.

56 *S.Th.I*, q.3, a. 4, ad 2.
statement of what being is, because its definition is the thing’s quiddity. In another way, we refer to being as the act of the essence. For example, how to live, which is to be for the living, is the act of the soul. This is not the second act, or operation, but the first act. We refer to being in a third way, as the truth of the composition in the propositions, according to which ‘is’ is called copula. In this way, being is in the understanding which unites and divides, as its complement but founded on the being of the thing, which is the act of the essence.\(^{57}\) He clearly distinguishes judicative being (predication) from being as the act of the essence. In judgment, the being that appears is the first.\(^{58}\)

While commenting on this text from the *Summa Theologica* Polo says: “The first meaning of est is actual, objective; therefore, the second meaning of est should not be. So, if we do not detect the object as our mental limit and abandon it, it would be impossible to advert or attain the act of being... Undoubtedly, we cannot know the act of being: in any other case, Aquinas’ distinction between the two meanings of est would be unsustainable. In other words, the preceding observations directly affect us capturing the act of being. Thus, it is not surprising that some Thomists ignore it and exclusively focus on objective knowledge.”\(^{59}\) Indeed, in judgment the intelligence makes the causes of the real explicit, and here we see the essence as being’s potency. Polo explains: “The judicative habit knows order as unitary, but, at the same time, manifests that it is not entirely satisfied by any con-causality, nor by all. Therefore, the last rational operation explains the foundation as distinct from con-causality, and exclusive.”\(^{60}\)

Thus, we capture essence as distinct from being, in need of grounding. Polo concludes the previously cited text: “The intellectual habit leaves reason behind and adverts the distinction between the created and the un-created, the metaphysical distinction between the first principles, which is much clearer than the distinction between the created act of being and essence.”\(^{61}\) This conclusion is surprising unless

\(^{57}\) *In I Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a 1, ad 1.

\(^{58}\) On the other hand, if the real were not captured in any intellectual operation it would not be a cognitive act. Cf. the article about this by GONZALEZ, O., “La aprehensión del acto de ser, II” [“Apprehending the act of being, II”] *Anuario filosófico*, 24 (1991) 139-151.

\(^{59}\) *Antropología trascendental* [*Transcendental Anthropology*], I, 100, note 102. Cf. *Curso de teoría* [*Course on the Theory of Knowledge*], IV, 15-22.


\(^{61}\) *Curso de teoría* [*Course on the Theory of Knowledge*], IV, 46.
one has studied Polo’s explanation of the first principles, which we will discuss later. For now, suffice it to notice that the intellect has abandoned rational use in order to go a step further: to capture being as act. That is, judgment has captured the essence as a principle in need of grounding. The rational operation reaches up to this point. It can do no more because it cannot grasp the grounding. It cannot know it as an object, as ‘fixed,’ as something ‘that is.’

Let us take a step further. Thomas Aquinas repeatedly says that truth’s grounding is in being, but he also notes that truth (and error) is in judgment, in predication.\textsuperscript{62} Intelligence can determine whether its judgment is true or not. In other words, it returns to judgment in search of the truth’s evidence. The discursive process follows judgment, searching for the most complex to the simplest evidence. In other words, this operation reduces all claims to one that is full and directly evident. Thus, the last judgment – or the first, depending on one’s perspective – declares the principle of non-contradiction, which is self-evident.

According to Aquinas, “speculative reason’s judgments proceed from natural knowledge of the first principles”,\textsuperscript{63} and elsewhere: “in any judgment the supreme judge determines the final sentence; likewise, in speculative things a proposition’s last sentence is determined by the first principles’ resolution.”\textsuperscript{64} Here, Murillo states: “we do not find explicit indications in Aquinas.”\textsuperscript{65} However, it is clear that the final judgment, which is not subject to logic, grounds all logic that does not wish to be purely formal. Judgment has this condition because it is not a common predicative judgment: it is an act of a superior habit that ‘collides with being.’

That is, the intellect “is found” with the principle of non-contradiction, it does not conclude with other evidence.\textsuperscript{66} It is the first principle

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[62]{Cf. Collado, S., El juicio veritativo en Tomás de Aquino [Veritative judgment in Thomas Aquinas], Cuadernos de Anuario filosófico, 162, Pamplona, 2003.}
\footnotetext[63]{Thomas Aquinas, S. Th. I-II, 100, 1co. Quoted by Sellés, J. F., in Conocer y amar [To know and to love], 352.}
\footnotetext[64]{Ibid., I-II, 74, 7co. Quoted by Sellés, J. F., in Conocer y amar [To know and to love]. 352, who adds: “Abundant parallel texts confirm the same thing: ‘judicium perfectum et universale (this refers to theoretical reason) haber non potest nisi per resolutionem ad primas causas,” Summa Theo., q. 57., a 2co; cf. also: Q. D. De Veritate, 15, 3co; In de anima, 1. 1. n. 6; Summa Theo., 53, 4co.}
\footnotetext[65]{Murillo, J. I., Operación, hábito y reflexión [Operation, habit and reflection], 108.}
\footnotetext[66]{Cf. La esencia del hombre [The essence of man], Eunsa, Pamplona, 2011, 152.}
\end{footnotes}
of any logical process. Does this detection correspond to one of the operations we have discussed? Is it an abstraction or a comparative judgment?

Aquinas does admit the first principles are known by an operation: “there is no science in the principles, but something greater: intellect.”\textsuperscript{67} Let us follow this indication. In order to do this, we must stop to consider that the principle of non-contradiction is not a judgment of purely logical value. It is an encounter with being as a way towards thought, and thus has logical value. To capture the first principles is to capture being.\textsuperscript{68}

We have already said that it is not a judgment, but a superior act: a habit. If we accept the results of Murillo's research, then Aquinas takes no position on the possibility of whether or not an operation can capture being.\textsuperscript{69} Polo, however, is quite explicit: “knowledge of the act of being is always transcendentally true and is therefore closely linked with transcendental intellecction; thus, it cannot be achieved through judgment or with any other operation. Such insight is borne through the habit of the first principles, which is an innate habit.”\textsuperscript{70} That is, he places this habit in the intellect as a transcendental, not in the intelligence as cognitive potency.\textsuperscript{71} This appears to coincide with St. Thomas’  indication\textsuperscript{72} that I already pointed out: intellect, not science, pertains to the principles.

\textsuperscript{67} S. Th. II-II. q. 25, a. 4, co. Quoted and commented by MURILLO, J. I., Op. cit., 110. We will see that metaphysics is not a science of the third degree of abstraction, for being and its principles are not reached by abstraction.

\textsuperscript{68} For Polo, the ‘principle of contradiction’ and the ‘principle of non-contradiction’ are not equivalent. The first pertains to a rational, logical order: one cannot predicate something and its opposite at the same time and in the same sense of the same subject. The second is real: the act of being of the physical universe. Cf. SELLES, I. F., Estudio introductorio a Polo, El conocimiento racional [An introductory study of Polo, Rational knowledge], 49, note 5.

\textsuperscript{69} Cf. MURILLO, J. I., Operación, hábito y reflexión [Operation, habit and reflection], 168.

\textsuperscript{70} Antropología [Anthropology], I, 69. I have added the emphasis in order to highlight what is fundamental.

\textsuperscript{71} We will return to this topic.

\textsuperscript{72} Polo states he has not found “other indications of knowledge superior to operational knowledge outside his notion of separatio and the existence of innate habits” in Aquinas. He also thinks “that he does not develop these indications.” Antropología [Anthropology], I, 126, note 132.
We must stress that non-contradiction is a condition of reality or, better yet, reality itself. “The habit of the first principles adverts the principal being,” states Polo. In other words, habit adverts being. Indeed, the real is it not the contradictory: outside of being, nothing. And nothing is not. Nothing only exists in thought: in reality, there is only being. “We cannot think of being as not non-being, but rather understand it as excluding the thought of non-being.”

Thus, the intellect knows the real first principle: the principle of non-contradiction. Hence, it knows being. The principle of non-contradiction is not only a logical or mental formulation. It is the founding principle of reality, the act of being, being as act. “The principle of contradiction is at the basis of thought. Can we say that it is a real principle? Can we say that it is simply a logical principle? It is neither one nor the other, exactly. Strictly speaking, we should say that it is intrinsic as an a priori condition, like an innate habit, and without it we would be unable to think. It also has logical value.”

On this point, Polo advances further than Thomas Aquinas, although in continuity with him. He explicitly explains what is implicit in Aquinas’ theory of knowledge. That is, the real first principle, the act of being, is captured by the intellect—not in an operational way—but by another act of the intellect: “the transcendental truth is characteristic of the intellectual acts with which the distinct acts of being are known; these acts are innate habits... To summarize, we must make a clear distinction: understanding objects is distinct from transcendental understanding. Thus, objective truths are not transcendental,” i.e., they do not capture being as act.

Thus far, it may appear that to know the principal being (being as first act) is solely to grasp non-contradiction. Not exactly. Philosophy refers to the ‘first principles’ and not a single first principle for a reason. Leonardo Polo concludes: “I propose the following theses: the distinction between the habit of science and habit of the first principles

73 Ibid. I, 111.
75 Ibid. 193.
76 Polo distinguishes the act of being of the universe from the personal act of being, and the divine act of being. We will discuss this topic elsewhere.
77 Antropología [Anthropology], I, 60.
corresponds to the real distinction of essence and being in non-intellectual reality, provided the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of identity can be distinguished. We will address this issue in the next section.

2. THE HABIT OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES

Determining what a habit is requires careful study, which has been conducted by many authors. Although related to the topic at hand, delving into it would distance us from our objective. However, some explanation is necessary in order to address the topic. To begin, let us note Polo’s observation: “the habit (of the first principles) is an intellectual act superior to any operation and, therefore one of the dimensions of abandoning the mental limit.”

Without delving into this, we must note that there are distinctions among the intellectual habits: some are acts that know intellectual operations (to know that I know); others are habits acquired by exercising operations (abstract or judicative habits) and are followed by other operations. But “the habit of the first principles is a peculiar habit

78 “Lo intelectual y lo inteligible” [“The intellectual and the intelligible”], Anuario Filosófico, XXV/2 (1982) 123.
80 Antropología | Anthropology]. I, 111. I have added emphasis in order to highlight what is fundamental in this text.
81 “What is the difference between an act and a habit?... The acts of understanding refer to ideas. When one thinks, one thinks of something, and ‘something’ refers to what is thought, not the real nor the act. The name thought-‘object’ does not refer to a real ‘thing,’ but that which is thought, although the thought refers or relates to the real... Instead, hábito have nothing to do with thought-objects. They do not illuminate or present ideas, but present the act of knowing, the immanent operation,” SELLES, I. F., Hábitos v virtud. II. Naturaleza de los hábitos v de la virtud | Habits and virtue II. The nature of habits and virtue]. Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico, Serie Universitaria, No. 66, Pamplona, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 1999, 48-50.
82 “It is not Aristotelian to accept acts’ intellectual potentia and nothing else, or not to admit an act other than the operation in action. Intelligence is also habits’ potencia. For now, of acquired habits. We should also add that the intellectual habits, unlike moral
with respect to the others.” I use the word ‘peculiar’ because it is in two ways: it predates intellectual operations, and is its condition of possibility.

The best way to understand the habit of the first principles is through habit’s classic definition: a stable disposition. We could say that it is the intellect’s innate openness to being. In this sense it seems clear that it is an innate, not acquired, habit. If this habit rests on the intelligence as potency, then the agent intellect requires close study, which several authors have done. Thus, let us listen to a current expert on this question regarding classical philosophy, newly highlighted by Polo: “In order to solve the problem of reason’s activation, let us refer to the classic allusion of a superior innate habit. Such is the traditional distinction between ratio and intellectus. Reason’s knowledge is proper to a progressively activated faculty. The intellect’s knowledge is proper to a natural habit that is not activated since it is not yet act. One virtues, are acquired with a single act. Modern philosophy has forgotten about the intellectual habits. In fact, references to them are rare and trivial. Because of this, modern philosophy is so objectivist and rationalism so conducive to irrationalism, and its version of logic so exclusively logical.” Polo, L., “Lo intelectual y lo inteligible” (“The intellectual and the intelligible), 20.


85 I disagree with Murillo on this point, as he believes that it is both innate and acquired.

86 Cf. for example: Cruz, J., Intelecto y razón. Las coordenadas del pensamiento clásico [Intellec t and reason. Classical thoughts’ coordinates], Pamplona, Europa, 1982; Sellés, J. F., “En torno a la distinción entre intellectus y ratio según Tomás de Aquino” (“On the distinction between intellectus and ratio according to Thomas Aquinas”), in El trabajo filosófico de hoy en el continente, Memorias del XIII Congreso Interamericano de Filosofía, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá. July 4-9, 1994, 355-360.
is on the plane of the potentialia; the other is on the plane of the intellectual. At the intellectual level, traditional philosophy usually distinguishes between the habit of the theoretical first principles and the habit of the practical first principles, also called synderesis. 87

Polo indicates: “the notion of habitual knowledge allows us to specify the relationship between the agent intellect and intellectual potency. Let me make one observation: if the habits allow for new operations, we must conclude that not all operations are abstractive. And, because knowledge of that which is not merely abstract cannot be attributed solely to possible understanding, the habits must signal the continuation of lumen intellectus. In summary, the agent intellect not only provides potency to the imprinted species but also joins it in act, according to the operation. For example, Aquinas describes the habit of the first principles as habilitas intellectus agentis.” 88 It is easier to clarify whether the habit of the first principles is a habit of intellectual potency or of the agent intellect in Polo’s thought. We see indications of this in Aquinas, but Polo’s reasoning is more explicit.

If all habits were intellectual dispositions acquired by following the exercise of operations, intelligence would be undetermined active potency ad unum. Habits are only possible—and at the same time, necessary—in ‘open’ potencies: operative habits do not fit into vegetative potencies, which carry out operations according to their nature. However, the potencies that are not determined by a single object are susceptible to habits. At the same time, their perfection as potencies rests on these habits. In a sense, thanks to habits the potencies are strengthened.

Intelligence as potency requires, and is capable of, habits. Now, these would be second acts. But, how can a second act—an accident—take a transcendental act, such as the act of being, upon itself? We must overcome this obstacle. Moreover, how can an act that is pure activity (Polo uses the term pure ‘actuosity’ to distinguish it from other meanings of activity) be captured ‘objectively’ as a thought-object in act?

Polo resolves this by focusing on the two problems together. He applies the meaning of ‘actuous act’ (characteristic of the act of being) to

88 Polc, L. “Lo intelectual y lo inteligible” [“The intellectual and the intelligible], 19-20. Also see: Antropología [Anthropology], I, 147.
a cognitive act, that is, to the habit of the first principles. By stating that the act of being is known by a habit assumes that this habit should be at the same level: at being’s level, not at the second act. Thus, “the habitual understanding of the first principles is the knowledge of being as act. Being as act is a meaning of act not found in Aristotle. Additionally, the habit of the first principles is a cognitive act whose theme is the act of being—the first from the transcendental order’s point of view. Together, this means that habit must be superior to the enérgeia because enérgeia and entelecheia are Aristotelian meanings of acts that are inferior to the act of being, which is not an Aristotelian finding.”

In short, this habit must be an act of being, or at least from the act of being.

To conclude this topic, I have attempted to show the extent to which there is a continuity in Leonardo Polo’s thought with respect to Aquinas (and his Aristotelian precedents), and the aspects that demonstrate his progress. Polo’s assessment can serve as a conclusion: “I think—he writes in Nominalismo, idealismo y realismo [Nominalism, idealism and realism]—I have quite clearly shown that the habit of the first principles can be likened to the first dimension of abandoning the limit. This satisfies me very much because I enjoy studying and referring back to the great, classical approaches. I prefer to deepen, or continue Aristotle’s thought, then the Middle Ages’ thought, or to find precedents in it, rather than to appear as an author who radically proposes a new approach.”

At the end of Nominalismo, idealismo y realismo [Nominalism, idealism and realism] Polo recapitulates: “To conclude, I will refer to a thesis held by Thomas Aquinas that says the habit of the first principles is innate. This distinguishes said habit from the other intellectual habits that are not innate, but acquired. Similarly, such habits manifest the

89 Nominalismo [Nominalism], 219.
90 Thomas Aquinas refers to the habit of the first principles as an instrument of the agent intellect; cf. Murillo, Joaquín, Operación, hábito y reflexión [Operation, habit and reflection], ed. cit., 172. He refers to several parts of the Thomistic corpus. For a discussion of this point, see Polo’s thought in: SELLÉS, J. F. “Los hábitos intelectuales según Polo” (“The intellectual habits according to Polo”), Anuario Filosófico, XXIX/2 (1996) 1017-36 and the literature he references.
91 Nominalismo [Nominalism], 173.
corresponding operation. Instead, the habit of the first principles detects the operation as the mental limit and should abandon it, thus, the habit is not followed by operations.  

Regarding the possibility of whether we can find a precedent for Polo’s ‘abandonment of the mental limit’ to better access reality in Aquinas: “Thomas Aquinas only very rarely refers to the mental limit, and he never speaks of abandoning it. He simply abandons it when necessary. In other words, he does not stop to think of habitual knowledge of the principles thematically, but rather to contemplate the soul and God (and he attributes an instrumental character to them more than once). There is no listed topic in Thomas’ works referring to knowledge of the principles, not because it does not exist but because they are an obligatory step towards wisdom. The habit of the principles thinks about science and wisdom, but not about said habit. Precisely because light allows us to see, it does not see, says Aquinas; that by which (“quo”) we know is not a topic of knowledge, but necessary in order to know or necessarily known.” Now, as I already noted, the habit of the first principles is the knowledge of all of them, not one of them. In other words, it not only adverts non-contradiction, but also the principles of identity and causality.

In Polo’s Antropología trascendental [Transcendental anthropology], he explains his approach by noting that “if, in the first dimension of abandoning the mental limit one adverts a created act of being – persistence–, then it must also advert the un-created act of being. Here, we discover the thematic coherence: the two are first principles, distinct and yet not isolated from each other. Persistence is the advertence of the created extra-mental act of being without imagining it; the un-created act of being does not imagine it when adverting it as Originating Identity.”

Thus, we must clarify the other two principles using the same perspective that helped us discover the principle of non-contradiction. In

---

92 Nominalismo [Nominalism], 260.
93 Fernández Burillo, S., “Intellectus principiorum, de Tomás de Aquino a Leonardo Polo (y vuelta)” (“Intellectus principiorum, from Thomas Aquinas to Leonardo Polo (and back)”). Anuario filosófico. XXIX/2 (1996) 513. I have respected the authors’ punctuation. Fernández Burillo narrows in on this. and I think he is right: “Polo’s texts will be unclear for Thomas Aquinas’ readers until one adverts the benefit of doing so (systematically thinking of the habitual knowledge of the principles).”
94 Antropología [Anthropology], I, 119.
Nominalismo, idealismo y realismo [Nominalism, idealism and realism] Polo clearly reviews this topic: “precisely because it is not a single first principle, but three –identity, contradiction and causality–, knowledge of being’s priority intensifies as it expands.”95 Being is first act, but we must “add a very important qualification to it: it can be first according to identity, causality, and non-contradiction. We must not confuse these.”96

I think this is one of the most enlightening aspects of Polo’s approach: first, compared to the traditional way of presenting the first principles, primarily as logical principles, Polo presents them as “real first principles.” This does not mean the classical approach understands them as purely logical principles, without grounding in reality. However, Polo goes further in stating they are primordial realities or principles of reality. In other words, they are act of being.

Secondly, Polo proposes distinguishing the following principles (logical, with grounding in reality), and distinguishing them in reality (not just in logical predication): ‘Nothing can be and not be at the same time and in the same sense’ (non-contradiction); ‘A is A; A is not non-A’ (identity); and ‘every effect has its cause,’ and similar formulations, all attributed to the entity, to everything real as real. In other words, he proposes distinguishing that being can be really first as non-contradictory, or as identical, but not both at once.

“If, in order to be first, they must twin97 then each one ceases to be first: one replaces the other, they alternate, and instead of balancing each other, each’s primacy is mutually suspended... Without a doubt, being is first. The first principles are not manifestations or aspects of being, but the intellection of being as first. Through intellection, we understand being as non-contradiction, as cause and as identity; or: we understand non-contradiction as being, causality as being and identity as being. By grasping this, one understands the first principles. However, if the first principles are first as being, we must cast aside its objective twin (we must abandon the mental limit).”98

---

95 Nominalismo [Nominalism], 226.
96 Nominalismo [Nominalism], 227.
97 Polo borrows this geological term and uses it as he explains.
98 Nominalismo [Nominalism], 269.
Upon contact with reality other than itself, the agent intellect innately adverts that its grounding is not in its knowledge, both as a beginning or first cause (a beginning that neither ceases nor is followed, a persistence in being) and as an Identical Principle, which is not cause but Origin. “The first principles are distinct as such, and therefore, with them we know distinct acts of being.”\(^{100}\) In other words, intellect innately adverts the universe’s being as a persistence, dependent on the original identity: that is, it captures being as created and, therefore, distinct from its essence.\(^{101}\)

This advertence is not the result of reason’s discursive process. We must stress that it is intellect’s active disposition to ‘advert’\(^{102}\) reality as existential dependence. If it is not adverted, Polo calls this objectivity’s intrusion. Let me explain: if we assume that the act of being of the universe (or that of singular entities, as is commonly thought) is a given fact, a fixed act, it is because I think of it as thought-object, not because it is adverted as such.

Another explanation that may be necessary in order to clarify this discursive exposition is as follows: one does not capture the act of being ‘at the end,’ after capturing the entity, abstracting forms, going from the universal to the singular, from abstract to concrete and understanding con-causality. No, it is habitual knowledge, both because it belongs to an act superior to rational operations (a habit) and because it is not a step from potentially knowing to knowing. As I understand it, if the habit of the first principles depends on the intellect ut actus, it is not potential. Thus, the act of being is always adverted. The problem is that reason hides it by abstracting, judging, comparing, deducing and by ‘objectifying.’ However, as I briefly mentioned, there is an implied capture of being in intellectual knowledge’s entire process.

---

\(^{99}\) This is how Leonardo Polo often describes the being of the universe, as being that persists.

\(^{100}\) *Curso de teoría* [Course on the Theory of Knowledge], IV/I, 65.

\(^{101}\) This appears again, and in line with his thinking is Polo’s statement that the distinction between creature and God is not the essentia-esse composition, but the created being. Cf. *Curso de teoría* [Course on the Theory of Knowledge], IV-I, 61. “That essence is really distinct from the act of being is not the reason that the act of being of the creature is not confused with the act of being of God, but vice-versa. In short, the only way to distinguish these two acts of being is to say that one is non-contradictory and the other is identical.” *Nominalismo* [Nominalism], 289.

\(^{102}\) Polo uses the term ‘to advert,’ which expresses what he means very well. To advert is not to elucidate, nor conclude, nor discover, nor understand: it is to be aware, to realize, to notice.
One problem regarding the ‘objectification’ of being is the confusion that takes place between the logical and real orders. Thus, if I can think ‘A is A,’ I transfer this thought-identity to the real and I assume that being is identical to itself. But the being of the universe (or the being of the entities, as we typically say) is not identical, even to its essence. In other words, in reality identity is not as it is in thought (just as nothing is not anything, although it can appear in thought). Thus, advertencing the act of being requires abandoning this rational limit, expanding the intellectual scope. In other words, to let it be as it is. Thus, it does not confuse non-contradictory being with identity, and advertence dependence. This does not mean we can linguistically express this advertence, which is another matter (and not always easy).

When Polo speaks of ‘twinning,’ he is referring precisely to this confusion between non-contradiction and identity. And also to the confusion of causality, both in God and in the creature. It is quite easy to distinguish non-contradiction from identity. 103 Indeed, if we advert non-contradiction as it is, that is, as a beginning (not temporal, but real) that persists (because if the beginning did not persist, it would not be real), then this persistence is not identity, but dependence. We advert the Origin as real, which is identical, distinct from the originating persistence.

It is more difficult to advert causality that is neither combined with identity nor with non-contradiction. 104 The question is as follows: when conceptualizing ‘non-contradiction,’ ‘identity,’ and ‘causality,’ we attribute being a cause to identity and being an effect to non-identity. That is, with a conceptual knowledge of cause, we tend to think of God as cause and the creature as His effect, and that this is the difference between them. But, is this correct? In a doctoral course dictated

---

103 “God does not exist as He persists. God’s act of being is not non-contradictory because it has nothing to do with the beginning; it is Un-created. The principle of non-contradiction is the intellection of the created act of being. The principle of identity is the intellection of the un-created act of being. However, if the un-created act of being is not twinned with non-contradiction, it is not with causality either. In other words, it is exclusively identity: pure principle of identity distinct from the pure principle of non-contradiction.” Nominalismo [Nominalism], 248.

104 Cf. Nominalismo [Nominalism], 248-49.
by Polo in 1990\textsuperscript{105} he clarifies the distinction between causing and producing, “to cause and to produce are not the same.”\textsuperscript{106} Potency produces as a necessary way to achieve its own perfection. Cause causes, but not because it must cause; it predates the effect which is pre-contained in it. Thus, we see that human action neither solely causes nor solely produces. If it were the former, everything would be contained therein; if it were the latter, it would be sheer necessity.

Instead, “the divine order does not produce. God neither produces nor causes, but creates \textit{ex nihilo}.”\textsuperscript{107} Therefore, God is not un-caused Cause, but originating Origin. We must understand these details in order to understand Polo’s explanation of the principle of causality as the first principle, distinct from the principles of identity and non-contradiction. “As I said, the notions of cause and effect present an inevitable paradox: if the effect is real and distinct from the cause, it must be external to it; but, at the same time, the effect’s reality must be pre-contained in the cause. And yet precisely \textit{being external to the cause means it cannot be pre-contained in it}. Therefore, the effect cannot be, as such, the cause’s effect. We can find the solution to this paradox by rethinking the approach: what is external –not external to the cause, but to the originating identity– is the cause, not the effect. Consequently, cause does not refer to the effect, but to the Origin, and in that sense it is cause in as much as it is created.”\textsuperscript{108}

We cannot attribute causing the created to God, as that would mean that the creatures are somehow contained in Him. As a first principle, cause strictly means caused cause, and not effect. Also, caused cause strictly means a radical dependence on the Origin, that is, reference to Him. Let me attempt to clarify this: what kind of cause is the being of the universe (\textit{persistence})? It cannot be a material cause, nor a formal cause, nor efficient, nor con- causality’s end. It is clearly not. It is cause on a distinct level, transcendent with respect to the universe’s essence (con- causality). However, it is clear that being is not external to es-

\textsuperscript{105} This is in the context of clarifying the extent to which man’s freedom is indeterminate and how the determinations, products, results constitute man, as Hegel, Nietzsche, Sartre and Marx propose in different ways. This course is included in the book \textit{Persona y libertad} [Person and freedom].

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Persona y libertad} [Person and freedom]:185.

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Ibìà}, 187.

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Nominalismo} [Nominalism], 251.
sence, nor is essence pre-contained in it. Thus, we cannot say that essence is the effect of being; therefore, we must not apply the notion of cause to being in the same way as in the predicamental level. A footnote on a page of Polo’s work sheds light on this issue: “The notion of effect can only be maintained at the level of predicamental causes, while con-causalities inferior to complete con-causality occur.”

The act of being of the universe is cause because in it, con-causality persists. It is clear that the extra-mental act of being depends on the Origin: it is a beginning that continues and is not followed (if something were to follow it, then it would not be). In other words, in its dependence it causes. Thus, to my understanding, Polo calls it caused cause. However, the phrase ‘caused cause’ does not seem to be the most accurate: if God is not cause, in what sense is the created act of being caused? It is more accurate to say that created being is originated cause or better yet, ‘originated ground.’ “However, this does not mean we should refer to the Origin as cause, since cause, in fact, means caused cause. The originating identity is Un-caused; it does not cause. The caused cause is not effect, but cause (nor is it the cause of an effect; it is a distinct cause from the predicamental causes, which are not caused by the caused cause, but by analytical persistence). Thus, we can only accept the principle of causality as a first principle if we avoid the notion of effect: transcendental cause is not effect.”

Therefore, the principle of transcendental causality is “one principle’s relation to another, but without twinning. They are not twinned because the principle of identity is Un-caused, and the principle of non-contradiction does not end. Thus, persistence is the act of being in as much as caused; however, that it is caused means precisely that it is causes. Cause means nothing more than caused cause, that is, the real character of persistence’s reference to God (God’s reference to persistence is not another first principle, it is God).” In short, “this dependence is the first principle of causality: not “another” creature, but

---

110 This view seems to coincide with that of Piá. He thinks it is better to refer to created being as ‘created cause.’ Cf. PIA TARAZONA, S., El hombre como ser dual [Man as a dual being], 84-98, which analyzes and critically evaluates Polo’s proposal on this topic.
111 Nominalismo [Nominalism], 251.
112 Ibí, 254. I have added italics to highlight this idea.
the real relation, first as the act of the creature with God—the force between non-contradiction and identity.”

In other words, reality is nothing other than dependence on God. Thus, when adverts reality as act, the intellect adverts the creature-Creator dependence. To put it more clearly: adverts that the real as real is not originating (which has nothing to do with whether or not it has a temporal beginning) is to advert the Origin as origin and the being of the entire universe as radically dependent on the Origin.

Here, we once again see theory of knowledge’s importance for metaphysics (and anthropology). Indeed, in adverts this we must not confuse the first principles with ideas, nor reduce them to logical formulations. “The difficulty of understanding the principle of causality as a first principle is precisely that the supposition is not abandoned with regard to the notion of cause.” The notion of cause, as a concept—with the permanence associated with being a concept—means that it causes. Instead, adverts as a real first principle, it is not ‘a thing that causes’: it is reality as dependent on its Origin.

Thus, Polo admits—with some reticence—that if we avoid ‘objectifying’ causality, and instead, ‘advert’ it as the real that persists as it depends, “we may, perhaps, even be able to say that causality is participation: participation of that which is un-participable, in other words, with respect to identity. This is the notion of caused cause. We may also observe its character as first principle: it is the first principle precisely because it is participation in the un-participable. Nothing about it is un-participable; however, to participate in it is to be first: its character of first principle. Thus, because as it is un-participable, participation does not come second to it. In other words, there is no degradation because degradation occurs when there is participation with the participable, not the un-participable; in other words, when there is something that participates. And here, we do not find anything that participates.”

This always and exclusively refers to the possibility of knowing the being of what is external to the knower, and more specifically, the material as dependence, and God as dependence’s Origin. Another issue

113 Ibid., 255.
114 Hence Polo’s persistent resistance to admit what he claims Aquinas does: admit that the relationship with God is an accident for the creature.
115 Nominalismo [Nominalism], 256.
116 Nominalismo [Nominalism], 256, note 43.
is how to know one’s own being, one’s personal existence as a unique and unrepeatable reality, distinct from all others that exist. In addressing this topic, Leonardo Polo presents epistemological approaches closely linked to his transcendental vision of the person.
Coexistence and Family Character of the Person

Blanca Castilla de Cortázar
Real Academia de Doctores (Spain)
blancascor@gmail.com

Translated by:
Luis Antonio de Larrauri

ABSTRACT: Polo’s incipient reflection on the family is explained from the notion of person as coexistence. First the filiation relation and the dual conception of the person are discussed, according to the author’s explanation. Then a possible development of the spousal relationship and of the man-woman difference, beyond what Prof. Polo said, are presented. Polo. Finally some long-standing stereotypes on the issue are mentioned, seeking to overcome them.

KEYWORDS: Coexistence, Family, Filiation, Spousal relationship, Man-woman difference, Stereotypes.
In this paper I will present the issue at hand around Leonardo Polo’s thought, whom I recognize as one of my masters. I had the opportunity to talk with him and check points many times and it is surprising how often he gave me the answers I did not find in any book! His high open-mindedness and intellectual humility made of him a respectful interlocutor who always broadened horizons. I will start with an excellent text of the author, with the title El hombre como hijo, (Man as Child), published in a volume on Metaphysics of Family, also co-authored by me.¹

The first headings of this paper are designed as a short but necessary runway where, after the initial approach, I first review the main streams regarding the man-society relationship, and then I put forward some features of co-existence, to the extent they form the basis for linking the former to the family. Third, I start from the main opinion presented by Polo in the cited article, in a field that specialists on Polo know well. Fourth, I set out that person is more than being son or daughter, explaining a theory that, in my opinion, is already present in Mr Polo, but that he did not fully develop. Someone may not agree, but, as I said, I hold that there is clear evidence of this theory in his work. And the fifth heading reads: “Beyond Polo.” I discuss there an issue not deal with by the master, and in this regard I would like to recall a brief conversation I had with him. It took place in the 90’s, when in the European and North American scene and ideology that later came to be called “gender ideology” had already reached its peak. As a first measure, this ideology questions the importance and meaning of the male-female difference, which, among other things, is crucial for the marital structure that originates a new family. In this context I told Mr Polo that I knew he was working on a dual anthropology and I suggested to him to deal with this duality, which is original, unquestionable, increasingly important, and that, if he should deal with it, next generation would be very grateful. He said that he had not thought about it, that now he had not enough time. After enumerating some of his pending works, he concluded: “You can do that.”

Since the matter was urgent, I had no other choice but trying to do it. From the basis provided by Polo I studied several authors, particularly Karol Wojtyla, who had indeed thought about the issue. As I made progress I saw that Wojtyla’s thinking could be founded on

Polo’s work, developing itself in its turn in a crescendo that reached far beyond. So I formulated my own proposal. Maybe it is not in the right track, in any case probably it is not a Polian one, because he did not say it, but I consider it Polian to some extent: I have followed in his steps and I acted as he wanted his disciples to act, thinking freely from the foundations he had laid. Therefore, the theories I am going to set out are both Polian and Wojtylian. I find myself, therefore, standing on giant shoulders’, since without them I would not have been able to formulate what I have written.

1. FAMILY CHARACTER OF THE PERSON

Leonardo Polo, following a realist approach to issues based on a descriptive method, presents a first approach to the family character of the person starting from the corporeity. Max Scheler was the one who proposed that anthropology should start from the body, since it is its visible and undeniable dimension—surpassing this way old rationalist spiritualisms—, so as to access from it to its deepest dimensions. As it is known, his proposal is to start from the life itself in order to arrive through it to the world of spirit, truly the dimension where man distinguishes himself from animals. He considers that the ultimate background of the real consists of two basic elements of cosmos: vitality and spirituality, and man takes part in both. Man is person because he takes part in the spirit, since he possesses “the center of action in which spirit appears within a finite mode of being.”\(^2\) Karol Wojtyla’s anthropology places itself also in corporeity as a starting point, in his great work on the theology of the body.\(^3\)

In this line Polo starts from the systemic character of the human body. His biped condition, which distinguishes him from animals, is correlative with having hands, spine, a face and a large brain mass with

---


\(^3\) Karol Wojtyla had already written his *Theology of the Body* before his elevation to the Chair of Peter, but he set it out throughout 139 Wednesday Audiences, between years 1979-1984. In his last English version: JOHN PAUL II. *Man and woman He Created Them. A Theology of the Body*, ed. Pauline. Boston. 2006, it was announced the discovery of an original Polish text, written before 1978.
the accompanying strong development of the nervous system. All these characteristics lead him straight to the family. With his own words: “We should not go too fast through these issues. We must become aware of the systemic character of man. Human brain cannot be understood without the hands, or the hands without the face, the shape of the skull and the spin. These are just some features, to which we should add many more: all of them make family possible, and vice versa. When we consider them in-depth, we realize that their systemic character is not just individual in nature. There are a number of linked features that make man naturally a family being, and that, without the family, hominization is not possible.”

From this premise, Polo analyzes some features of the hominization that show that “family starts with man, and man with family”; it is an anthropological evidence. The hands and the arms, for example, make it possible not just to work, but to gather food, a thing that other quadrupeds do not do. Family presents itself also as a systemic reality. Thus, the fact that it takes many years for the human being to be viable—because he is born premature from the biological point of view—, explains other aspects of the reality of the family, such as the stability of the marriage bond.

From this we can draw a first conclusion: man is a being of family nature, which leads to a second one: man is also culturally familiar, among other things because moral reasons add to biology, by reason of his systemic character. Hence, he states: “In evolution, the distinctive trait of humans is the family. But family is not a mere fact, but a correlation of factors. Without the family, history is not possible, or human traditions and classifications, or suprafamily organizational forms, or the differentiation of jobs (...), a whole range of elements that are mutually dependent. None of them has sense without the others.”

As a conclusion, he states that “the consideration of the anatomic structure of man allows us to realize that he or she is a family being. Family is a unity strong enough to be regarded as what we call an institution,” that later will originate the society, and institutions other than the family, since man is also naturally social beyond the family.

---

5 Ibidem, p. 72.
6 Cf. Ibidem, p. 73.
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem, p. 74.
This Polian starting point of the family character of the person is very relevant, considering the profound unity of human being. If, as we will see, what is most radical in man is being a person, that inner nucleus manifests itself in its more visible aspects, i.e., in its corporeal and psychic nature, which, in turn, is intrinsically cultural.

But, before proceeding, let us emphasize an unexceptionable assertion made by Polo, when distinguishing the social dimension of the family from the civil society. In his exposition what gives consistency to the social unity is the valuation and a normative ethical system, without which society disintegrates. Ethics, as well as valuation, is inherent to man. Nevertheless, “family is ethical without needing to produce a valuation system; it itself is intrinsically valuing. Valuation of the child is included in his or her mum’s love. Is that an ethical value? It is something more, also fundamental as regards ethics, but so inherent to man that it only disappears if he is denaturalized. It is only natural that a mother loves her child; there is no need for an invented valuation; the (family) valuation is the very theme of the relation,” and concludes stating that “family belongs to an ontological order; civil society is ethical.”

From this ontological level where Polo places the family we can gather several assertions on its differentiation with regards to civil society. Let us highlight the following ones: “Family is a solid enough system (...), since it is based on very strong and innate radicals. (...) Family society has enough consistency (...) It is an institution or system of human relations with enough foundation. It would be nonsense to ignore it, since a good deal of human features are inseparable from family.”\(^9\) (...) I insist, family has a \textit{priori} consistency; civil society has not.”\(^10\)

In the context of the opinion I am going to hold in this paper, it is important to distinguish between the order where family is located and that where civil society is located. The latter is constituted through val-

\(^9\) \textit{Ibidem}, p. 79.
\(^10\) Among these human features Polo places the social survival of the dead. Family is the institution where the dead man lives on. While the riddle of death as compared with that of immortality is impossible to solve on a sociological level, it is family who experiences and acknowledges that the loved ones do not just disappear. \textit{Cf. Ibidem}, p. 203.
uation and ethics, that is, through action. Civil society is based on family, that belongs to other, deeper order than that of action, to an ontological order, to the order of being—therefore, beyond the action.

2. HUMAN BEING AS A SOCIAL BEING

We learned from Aristotle that man is social by nature. Centuries later human thinking found that man is more than an individual of a species: for that reason the notion of person—discovered in the 4th century of Christian era, in the theological sphere—, was soon applied to the human being, in order to show that person is the noblest creature in Nature. Nevertheless, the winding iter of this notion is well known: the person, described as "relational subsistent" when applied to God, loses both features, subsistence and relationality, in the famous Boethian definition, as well as the analogy between the human and the divine person, which is an essential issue to develop the revealed doctrine about God’s image in the human being.

After the recovery for the person of the transcendental level—of the being—and, to some extent, of the analogy, thanks to Aquinas description of person as a “spiritual subsistent,” futile debates of late Scholasticism, looking for the “formal” constituent of the person, ended up sterilizing said notion. In fact, it faded away in favor of the notion of individual, while the term nature came to a head confronted with that of freedom. The theory of society as a covenant and modernity’s theory on politics, which fluctuates between individualism and collectivism, are based on the notion of free individual—who stands alone before the State. Polo asserts the following: “The human being is not an individual—someone undivided—but an extremely complex reality, that calls for an inquiry on his hidden aspects, that is, on the connection of his faculties, which can fit or work loose (...); the latter occurs whenever a man reduces the scope of his interests, and this reduction is unavoidable in the isolation that entails seeking to live as a mere individual,

---

12 Aquinas, I, q. 29, a. 3: “Persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota nature, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura.”
13 Cf. Aquinas, S. Th. I, q. 29, aa. 3 and 4.
14 Boethius. De duabus naturis. 3. PL 64. 1343 C: “Individual substance of rational nature” / “individua substantia rationalis naturae.”
15 Aquinas, De Pot., 9, a.4, c: Person is a “different subsistent of spiritual nature.”
who just maintains relations with others in order to exchange resources.”

After the violations of human dignity that occurred during the two world wars, in the twentieth century there was a bloom of studies looking to return to the person, in search of his radical dignity. However, more metaphysical philosophers have considered that personalists lack a solid foundation for the human experiences they describe in a phenomenological way. This is not the case of the philosopher we are talking about today. He is not the only one that has looked for and found a solid foundation for the person (in the being). We should mention here, among others, to Karol Wojtyla, and, firstly, to Xavier Zubiri. Let us say that this authors thought about the being not in an abstract or monolithic way, but as an open being, that already from Heidegger’s work started to be described as being-with. Consider, for example, Buber, Marcel, Lévinas or Zubiri. I quote by way of example a short text by Zubiri: “Now, to exist is to exist ‘with’—with things, with others, with ourselves. This ‘with’ pertains to the very being of man; it is not something added to him. In existence everything else is enfolded with this peculiar form of ‘with’."

From this point of view we obtain, beyond the old Aristotle, a first illuminating conclusion: human being is social not only by nature, which is true, but more deeply can be said that he is social for being a person, because, as Mr Polo would said once and again, a person cannot be by himself, rather he says from himself at least another one. The fact is that a person is much more than an individual. After a painstaking historical study, Zubiri finds that the Middle Ages made the best achievements regarding the person, which later were spoiled, and he sums up saying that “in this articulation between intimacy, origination

---

16 POLO, L., El hombre como hijo, p. 321.
17 As it is known, the expression comes from Heidegger. When he was working out an analysis of the “Dasein,” he was seeking to overcome the isolation where the self had been left in Western philosophy, even in the thinking of his master Husserl, in spite of the efforts of his Fifth Cartesian Meditation. The title of the IV chap. of Being and Time: Being-in-the-World as Being-with and Being a Self. He understands the “Da-sein” as “Mit-sein”. The Da-sein is always a being-with-others. Cf. Heidegger, M., (1889-1976). Sein und Zeit. Neomarius Verlag. Tübingen 1927. Eng. trans.: Ser y Tiempo, FCE. Buenos Aires 1987. cap. IV. pp. 133-142. Eng. trans. used here: Being and Time, Joan Stambaugh, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1996.
and *communication* lies the ultimate metaphysical structure of the [personal] being*. It is in these parameters, as we will see, that the radicalism of the family character of the person can be discovered.

3. PERSON AS CO-EXISTENCE.

Polo’s anthropology, that he calls transcendental, starts from the rediscovery of the Thomist distinction between essence and act of being as two different but inseparable co-principles of every being. After an expansion of ontology distinguishing “metaphysics from anthropology on a transcendental level” —that is, distinguishing between the universe’s act of being and the man’s act of being, since “the being of man is not the being that metaphysics deals with (…), which does not include freedom,” Polo applies this distinction to anthropology, arriving to the belief that the person, as something different from the human psychosomatic composition transmitted by parents, is precisely the act of being, given by God to every man, that constitutes him as a gift, even for himself.

Following this line of thinking, Leonardo Polo incorporates into a single notion –co-existence–, the two intrinsic and inseparable aspects of person included in the medieval description of person as “relational subsistence.” On the one hand, person has value by himself—in a sense an absolute value—, because he is anchored in the being or transcendental level, and, on the other hand, a relational openness is constitutive for him. These two dimensions, that have received different names (Karol Wojtyla terms them “loneliness moment” and “communion moment” in his analysis of Genesis 2), describe the dual structure of the intimacy of the human person, which culminates in Wojtyla’s development of the “unity of the two,” created not only to live with one another, but to live “for” the other, with mutual reciprocity and responsibility for each other.

These two dimensions of the person—that belong to the human act of being—we are discussing about cannot be separated, neither are they temporal moments (the same occurs with essence and act of being). They structure, we were saying, personal intimacy as co-existence, for since his very existence everybody is ontologically opened to another:

that is the meaning of the “co-..” For this reason Polo states that coexistence does not mean that first one is oneself and then he has relations with others; coexistence means that person is dialogical, not monological in character. Person is radically open to other persons and, in the end, he or she is open to a personal God. That is why intersubjectivity is original, primordial, non-deducible; no person is what he is, by himself, he is instead originally and constitutively co-existent, open and, therefore, dual. With Polo’s words: “Contrary to Plato’s thinking, dyad has transcendental value, and as such is a gain: it is superior to monon. Monism is a burden to metaphysics, and in anthropology it is necessary to control it. Only then can the transcendental anthropology begin. Coexistence implies duality. If, from the point of view of monism, the prestige of the single being is admitted, then duality appears as an imperfection. And this duality must then be derived from the monon. For Plotinus plurality is something like decompression, or dissipation, of the one.”

Leonardo Polo explains that it is not just that we are many, but that a single person is a “complete absurdity”; not a contradiction, but something impossible. “A sole person would be an absolute disgrace,” because he would have nobody to communicate with, to whom giving of himself; to whom destine himself. Indeed, “a sole person is nonsensical. Persons are irreducible; but the irreducibility of the person (…) is not isolating,” and that is why he maintains that person is ontologically co-existence. Man’s act of being is not simply to be, but TO-BE-WITH, or rather, a “being-for”—in Lévinas’ elaboration—, so that the relational openness places itself in the very same

23 POLO, L., Presente y futuro del hombre, p. 161.
personal act of BEING. Therefore, there was never, not even at the beginning of Creation, a lone person on his own. According to the current exegesis, the lonely ‘Adam of Genesis 2 is a generic. The concrete man was always, from the beginning, sexed and dual—male and female, as Genesis’ first account of creation says (Gen 1:26-27). In this line, anthropology finds that a person always requires a plurality of persons, at least another person.

Whilst Kantian lucid statement that every person is an end in himself and can never be treated as a means is true, from a relational point of view this can be completed by saying that the person, as much as he is himself an end, is not an end for himself. The end of a person is always another person, that is why a person cannot just be a sole person, there must be at least two of them.

4. FATHER, MOTHER, SON, PERSON NAMES

Going more deeply into the family character, the first Polian approach to this issue from the person is the filiation. Filiation configures personal identity, therefore, it is a feature that has a direct bearing on the person. Filiation is a type of openness that evidences a relation of origin. This points out another important difference between the notion of individual and that of person. The latter, since he says from himself a relation of origin, includes indissolubly in himself person and society, person and family. Therefore, a later voluntary covenant is not necessary to constitute society. Person is born (there is no self-generation) in a family, which is the nuclear society.

An attentive reading of Polo’s article mentioned at the beginning confirms that, when he speaks of filiation, he refers in recto to divine filiation, and this for a philosophic conviction, since if the person is a unique and unrepeatable act of being, that donation comes directly from God. With his words: “Human fatherhood is not the primary one, but God’s creative fatherhood. According to that fatherhood, the first man is fundamentally son, as can be seen in Jesus’ genealogy according to Luke, which finishes in Adam, who springs from God (Luke 3:34). Man’s fatherhood, in its highest sense, is attributable to God. This obviously implies that man is not entirely son of his parents, or not in all his dimensions. The spiritual character itself of every man does not come from his human parents but from God.”

28 POLO, L., El hombre como hijo, p. 322.
We are also children of our parents, but our personal being is not given by them: parents transmit the nature, but the human being is much more than an individual of a species: this psychosomatic nature that each one of us is, is possessed by “someone” personal, someone who must be discovered by the parents because they do not know who she or he is. Polo’s thinking in this regard is illuminating.

Now, in which sense and how are we children of our parents? Or, put another way, what exactly is human fatherhood and motherhood and what relation do father and mother have with the child’s person they begot? When a mother gives birth to a child, is she just mother of his body and his psyche? No. Even though the person does not come from her or from the father, they are parents of the person being born. And the clearest and most evident example is Mary’s divine motherhood.

That is why Polo states that “‘father,’ ‘mother,’ ‘son’ are person names (...) albeit human person is not trinitarian. Human person can be designated as dual (...). The transcendental duality is to love-to accept (...); the third member of the giving structure—the gift, love— is not a transcendental of the human person.”

A first consequence of what has been said is that father or mother are person names, because human fatherhood and motherhood, even though they are not the origin of the new person, their child, “say” a direct relation to the person of their child. In this regard let me bring up a text of John Paul’s II Letter to Families. There, based on Ef 3, 14-15, he explains that “in the light of the New Testament it is possible to discern how the primordial model of the family is to be sought in God himself, in the Trinitarian mystery of his life. “The divine 'We' is the eternal pattern of the human 'we', especially of that 'we' formed by the man and the woman created in the divine image and likeness.” Hence—he goes on—, “human fatherhood and motherhood, while remaining biologically similar to that of other living beings in nature, contain in an essential and unique way a "likeness" to God which is the basis of the family as a community of human life, as a community of persons united in love (communio personarum).”

31 Ibidem.
If I allow myself to alternate –without mixing–, some theological reflections with philosophical ones, it is because I have learned it, among others, from Mr Polo. Philosophy and Theology are two different knowledges, but Polo, who was a creative mind, was convinced that the revealed data pose the biggest challenge to human intelligence, and that in the effort to understand them Philosophy has made the most significant achievements and advances –as is the case with the notion of person, or of creation–, that later add to mankind’s wisdom heritage. These “theological” references are made with good reason, above all if we consider that we are dealing with an unexplored issue, which is only in its early stages, as is the case with the reflection on the family.

Every person, unique and unrepeatable, with an own act of being but open to other person/s, is first of all a child. There is no self-generation. This is an unquestionable fact. In any case, the first conclusion regarding the family character of the person has to do with the filiation. Filiation is a first evidence that the person cannot be by himself; he would not be a person without other persons, without at least other person. Let us say it with Polo’s words: “What is man without others? Nothing. Man is a radically family-oriented personal being. For this reason, in this order of considerations, I say that freedom is filial and is destinal. If it were not, then the idea of ontological degradation would be unavoidable: the person would find himself only with that which is inferior to himself. If he does not find that which is ‘equal’ to himself, he is not a person.”

5. HUMAN PERSON IS MORE THAN A CHILD

Now, the person is more than a child. Another unquestionable fact –because it is original, non-deducible– is that the child is man or woman (who in their maturity can be father or mother and whose love is, in any case, paternal or maternal). Certainly, the anthropology we are used to see so far considers topics in a general or asexual way, there is little or no thought about the man-woman difference. It is a forgotten fact.

---

a) The man-woman difference

For want of philosophical arguments let us turn to information from the theological field. I will refer now to two texts of the Church’s Magisterium. The first one, of 1976, states that sexual human diversity “determines the identity proper to the person,” and that “the difference of sex” “is directly ordained both for the communion of persons and for the generation of human beings.” 33 It seems therefore to indicate that being man and being woman has to do with personal intimacy and with the way of loving the others, that is to say, it has to do with the person and with interpersonal relations. In this line John Paul II continues making proposals and he goes so far as to say that sex “is in a sense, "a constituent part of the person" (not just "an attribute of the person"),” and “proves how deeply man (...), with the never to be repeated uniqueness of his person, is constituted by the body as "he" or "she." 34

Polo approaches to this issue –but he did not develop it– when he points out that the person, more than other realities, puts before the eyes the obvious fact that a person cannot be a sole person. It is narrated in the book of Genesis, with words put in the mouth of the Creator: “It is not good that man should be alone” (Gen 2:18). 35 Well then, when the Creator adds: “I will make him a helper comparable to him,” the Hebrew text literally reads: “I will make him someone as in front of him.”

Thus, if the two main dimensions of human intimacy –the personal identity and the relationality– derive from the description of the person as co-existence, it seems that being man and being woman has to do with both features, since that condition is inseparable from each one’s personal identity and, at the same time, that condition is shown in the way of having relations with others, especially in the fact of being in front of the other sex.

33 Cf. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, The Role Of Women In Modern Society And The Church, n. 5.
35 Cf. POLO, L., Planteamiento de la antropología transcendental, in FALGUERAS, I., GARCÍA, I. (Coord.), Antropología v transcendencia, Universidad de Málaga 2008, p. 29. Also in Miscelánea poliana, n. 4.
Julián Marías shows, with the metaphor of the hands, that to be man or to be woman is all about “an intrinsic mutual reference: being a man is to be related to a woman, and being a woman is to be related to a man,” so the difference between them is relational, like that of the right hand with regards to the left hand. Were there but left hands, they would not be left hands, because the condition of being left is given by the right hand. Being man and being woman means to be one in front of the other, the difference of sexes allowing that, like the hands, we can knot together as in a hug.

On several occasions I have discussed these issues with Polians, who place the difference just in the sphere of the essence. But the Magisterium, and personal experience too, lead us to the need of thinking the duality within the person. Even though he did not develop this theme—he told me he had not thought about it and that now he did not have enough time to do it—, I find in Polian thought some indications for this development.

b) Human person as dual

Let us go back to the text where Polo states that, even though “father,” “mother,” “son” are person names (...), the human person is not trinitarian. He can be designated as dual. As it can be noticed, family is a triadic reality: father, mother and child. The same happens with love. The structure of giving is also triadic: giving, accepting, gift. However, in the human being the three is not transcendent. In the first case, in man only the male and the female are original and simultaneous; they become father and mother thanks to the child, but parents do not give their child his personal character; the child comes later and he or she is, in turn, a man or a woman.

In the case of love, Polo explains clearly that giving and accepting have the same category: “accepting is not less than giving” and “giving and accepting imply the gift. This means, in the end, that the structure of giving is triune and not dual. However, since human person is dual

37 Cfr. also MARÍAS, J., La mujer en el siglo XX, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1980.
or co-existent, but in no way triune, man needs his essence to complete the gifting structure. Man can only give gifts through his essence.  

For Polo it is clear that “in transcendentual Anthropology we attain the giving and accepting duality, a giving and an accepting characteristic of the human personal co-existing. However, if gift is to be understood as transcendental, we must admit a third element, so that duality is transcended. Thus, the fact that gift is personal is above the human accepting and giving. Person openness is the mentioned duality. However, created person is not capable of communicating to his own gift a personal character. Therefore, in man the gift must be understood as an operative expression or manifestation (...) , that is, on the essence level.”

Indeed, this assertion that human person is not capable of communicating to his own gift a personal character is consistent with the previous explanation that parents only transmit the nature to the child, whereas the gift that renders the child a person is given by God.

In this regard, Polo’s remarks on giving and accepting were developed in the sense that God is the one who gives—and later accepts—to the man, and the man is the one who accepts God’s gift and later on he or she delivers it to God. Now, appropriate as this may be, Polian anthropology appears to be lacking a deeper discussion on dual transcendentality at anthropological level, that is, in the relationships between human persons.

This development is found in Karol Wojtyła’s thinking, that agrees with Polo’s initial approach and develops at the same time new aspects of it. Thus, both agree to clearly assert that giving and accepting have the same status, since, as Polo states, to accept is not less than to give. And Wojtyla teaches: “The giving and the accepting of the gift inter-penetrate, so that the giving itself becomes accepting, and the acceptance is transformed into giving.” Their approaches also agree in that person is a God’s gifting creation, since “every creature bears

---

40 Ibidem, pp. 220-221.
41 Ibidem, p. 223.
42 I have further delved into this issue in “Amor donal y transcendencia,” in Miscelánea Poliana. 56 (2017). It will be published also as «Love as donation and transcendence.» in Journal of Polian Studies; extraordinary number (2016) ISSN 2375-7329 (in press).
within it the sign of the original and fundamental gift. (…) The concept of 'giving' (…) indicates the one who gives and the one who receives the gift, and also the relationship that is established between them. (…) In the narrative of the creation of the visible world, the giving has a meaning only with regard to man (…): Creation is a gift, because man appears in it. As the "image of God," man is capable of understanding the meaning of gift in the call from nothingness to existence.”

44

c) The transcendental duality

Now, from these common premises, we discover in Wojtyla an extension of the meaning of received gift. Should we ask which is God’s gift for man, the answer would be longer. God first creates each person: that is the first gift, but another gift is additionally bestowed on man: the visible world, that has been created 'for him': “Man appears in creation as the one who received the world as a gift, and it can also be said that the world received man as a gift,” since it would not have sense without him. But there is even more, there is still another gift – indispensable for the development of a gifting anthropology, since when we analyze creation, man appears “as the one who, in the midst of the 'world,' received the other man as a gift.” Indeed, man is co-existent from the beginning, there are two from the beginning, man and woman.

John Paul II emphasizes that, in order to understand the meaning itself of the gift in the human field, we must consider that human being does not live alone, but with someone, since, for man, human relationships and communion are fundamental and constitutive. In this sense his development –not found in Polo, although it is implicit in the

46 Ibidem.
47 As already known, there are two accounts of Creation in Genesis, and in the second one Adam appears to come into existence before Eve. However, current exegesis, proposed by John Paul II. reads Genesis 2 in the light of Genesis 1:26-27. where both male and female come into existence together. So Genesis 2 is a symbolic text that should be read without contradicting the previous passage. Cf. my work: CASTILLA DE CORTÁZAR, Bl., ¿Fue creado el varón antes que la mujer? Reflexiones en torno a la Antropología de la Creación, Rialp, Madrid 2005. Also in Anales Teológicos, Edizioni Ares, Roma, vol. 6 (1992/2) 319-366.
meaning he gives to co-existence— that man receives woman from the beginning, and she receives him, clarifies much: “The communion of persons means existing in a mutual ‘for,’ in a relationship of mutual gift.”

Thus, he states several times that woman ‘is given’ to man by the Creator, and welcomed, that is to say, accepted, by him as a gift. Acceptance of the woman by the man, and the same way of accepting her—as the Creator wished, i.e., “by herself,” turn to be a first donation, so that the woman, in giving herself, “discovers” herself. When the whole dignity of the gift is ensured in this acceptance through the offer of what she is in the whole truth of her humanity, she reaches the inner depth of her person and full possession of herself.

It is undeniable that, at the beginning of Creation, God creates a man and makes him dual, male and female (Gen 1:27). John Paul II added, referring to this: “He created’ means, in this case, even more, since it means that He gave mutually one to the other. He gave to the man the femininity of that human being similar to him, He made her his help and, at the same time, gave the man to the woman. Therefore, from the very beginning the man is given by God to other. (…) Woman is given to man so that he can understand himself, and vice versa, man is given to woman with the same aim. They must confirm their humanity to each other, getting amazed at their double richness.”

On the basis that, at the beginning of Creation, God created man male and female, we could intuitively state that, when creating in the image of Himself, God, who is one in nature and Triune in persons, created a nature—the human nature—, dual in persons. This intuition is contained, moreover, in the Church’s Magisterium, it is the well-known “unity of the two” that John Paul II talked about, in the image of the “unity of the three.” Polo describes human person as dual, and

---

John Paul II adds that he is uni-dual, in the sense that there is an original and non-deducible difference with the characteristic of forming a peculiar unity. *Unity of the two*, male and female, that overcomes, as Scola explains, well-known bans of the past,\textsuperscript{52} while demanding, in addition, an expansion of the Judeo-Christian teaching on the image of God.\textsuperscript{53}

If we were to take the terms “father” and “mother” in a non-biological sense—it is also obvious that human fatherhood and motherhood are above all spiritual—, we would see they give shape to two ways of loving, as well as to two ways to look at reality or to transform it. Thus, if human person, individually considered, is always a child and this constitutes him,\textsuperscript{54} he is in addition and disjunctively a man or a woman, and this constitutes himself or herself too. Every human person is a child and never ceases to be so: he has on one side a filial way of loving. But, furthermore, man’s way of loving is paternal and woman’s way of loving is maternal. Hence the fact that the three possible ways of ternary love contract to two in the human person, where, in addition, they are dual, since man can love as son and father, and woman as daughter and mother.

This means that, beyond the higher dualities that Polo has developed and Juan García masterfully explains,\textsuperscript{55} there seems to be a new duality—the transcendental dyad—,\textsuperscript{56} more radical than the former ones, that would affect to the very nucleus of the person and would fully confirm the Polian assertion that what is transcendental in man is the difference and, specifically, the duality.\textsuperscript{57} I believe this intuition

\textsuperscript{52} He refers, for example, to SAINT AUGUSTIN, *De Trinitate*, 12, 5, 5; and to AQUINAS, *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 93, a. 6.


\textsuperscript{54} POLO, L., *El hombre como hijo*, p. 325.


\textsuperscript{56} Cf. CASTILLA DE CORTÁZAR, Bl., *En torno a la diada transcendental*, in “Anuario Filosófico” 29 (1996/2), volume about Leonardo Polo’s thought, pp. 397-414.

is crucial in Polo’s thought, it is in the background of his repeated assertion, in opposition to Plato, that the dyad is richness; although he did not develop it, it is the underlying reason of assertions such as: “I hold that the monon cannot be a transcendental of the person. The personal transcendental is the difference.”\(^{58}\) Indeed he verbally stated so at different moments, saying that, in his opinion, given the fact that in God the three is transcendental, similarly in the human being the two is transcendental. Well then, analogously, it could be said that if in God the difference is personal and there are three different persons, in the human being the most radical and dual difference would be a difference in the person.

On the occasions I raised this issue to Mr Polo, he would answer: if every person is different, what greater difference can we ask for? But this question could be replied using Hannah Arendt’s words: this amounts to a ‘plurality of unrepeatables,’ this means ‘to be many,’ but this does not explain why human person is transcendally dual, by analogy with how God is transcendentally Triune. Now, transcendental duality does not annul the unrepeatability peculiar to every person. The fact that the man-woman difference is a transcendental one and that there is a son-daughter difference (which is obvious) does not exclude that each person, when created by God as unique and unrepeatable, is in other sense different to the others. Indeed no two men or two women are the same. The ‘who’ that each of us is has no double, so it can be said without a doubt that every person is different from the others.

6. BEYOND POLO: THE MYSTERY OF SPOUSAL RELATIONSHIP

In order to arrive to the end of the family character of the person, we should remember another fact, that the family is founded on the love of a man and a woman. Marriage is not yet the family but it is its basis. At the same time, the condition of possibility for marriage to exist is that there are men and women, with a complementary way of loving.

This is the mystery of the marital relationship, which, present in the Biblical poetry and texts, is claiming for an ontological development strongly linked to the reflection on the person. Nevertheless, the marital relationship is not to be identified with the conjugal relationship,

even if it is its condition of possibility, in the same way that marriage is not the only type of complementarity between man and woman.

Let us start now an approach to a possible integration of the sexed condition with the person, in order to explain that in the human being the sex is a constituent part of the person and not just an attribute of his. The explanation can be found, above all, in the relational dimension. Every person, in order to love, is an opening of himself, but he can open himself or herself in a different and complementary way. This is what apparently occurs between man and woman.

We ask ourselves, what can the spousal character mean within an anthropological development –yet to be done–, more specifically, within a transcendental anthropology? How to go more deeply into this different openness? There is no other way than the phenomenological description that can be found in texts, especially in poetry. One poet describes as follows what is motherhood, putting in the mouth of a mother, who speaks to her son, these words:

«Don’t go. And if you go, remember that you remain within me. In me, all who go remain. And all who go on their way will find their place in me; not a fleeting stop but rather a stable place. In me lives a love stronger than loneliness (...). I am not the light of those on whom I shine; I am rather the shadow in which they repose. A mother should be shadow for her children. The father knows that he is in them: he wants to be in them, and fulfills himself in them. I, on the other hand, don’t know if I am in them; I only feel them when they are in me»59. One can see that this relation of the mother with the son extends to the relation with all the other persons, when she says: “In me, all who go remain. And all who go on their way will find their place in me; not a fleeting stop but rather a stable place.”

How can we progress in this different way of openness that man and woman have, between them and to the others? In a first approach, the two relational modalities of openness would be: the man opens to the others outwards, going out of himself, and the woman inwards, without going out of herself. In this sense, the way of procreating, although undoubtedly is not the only way of loving or the most important, shows in an expressive way what I mean. When man gives

---

himself he goes out of himself. By going out of himself he gives himself up to the woman and stays in her. Woman gives herself but without going out of herself. She is openness, but receiving in her. Her way of giving herself is different to that of man, and complementary at the same time, since she takes in the man, his love and his gift. Without the woman, man would have nowhere to go: he would be lost. Without the man, woman would not have whom to take in: she would be like an empty home. Feminine loneliness would take a peculiar turn, because ontologically she is like the embroidery canvas where interpersonal communion is woven and settles. She is the one that unites, the center around which the others meet.

Woman takes in the fruit of the contribution of both of them and keeps it until it germinates and develops. All this process, although he plays a central role too, takes place out of the man an within the woman. Later she is openness for giving birth to a being who will have life on his own. Through the woman and in the woman, the man is in the son or daughter, too. The man is in the woman and in the son or daughter, but as out of him. Woman, however, is seat, home. Woman is in the child, too, but, above all, they are in her.

Well then, if metaphysics deals with substances and anthropology declines personal pronouns, the sexed condition within the person can only be expressed through PREPOSITIONS, the grammatical elements that describe relations. The preposition FROM would correspond to man, since he leaves himself to give himself to the others. This is precisely the preposition that the liturgy and the Church’s teaching use to describe the first person of the Trinity: the Father. The preposition IN would correspond to woman, since she opens herself receiving in herself. It is the preposition that describes the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit, who is a bond between the Father and the Son.

60 We started stating that Folo did not think thoroughly on the issue and not even intended to do it, since, as he admitted, he had not enough time left. Nevertheless he raised objections to the proposals that were being made. In this sense he says: “For Blanca Castilla the Holy Spirit assimilates with the maternal function. I disagree, because I do not think it right to extend the difference between the sexes to God. It is more appropriate to hold that if the Father is generator, the Holy Spirit is elevator of the beine”: L. POLO: from his book Evistemología. creación v divinidad. Eunsa. Pamplona 2014. p. 268. note 53. Nevertheless, the authoress’ approach is not to apply the difference between the sexes to God, but just the other way around: to regard this human difference as an image of his creator, in whom the only difference is the difference
The male person could be thus described as BEING-WITH-FROM, or COEXISTENCE-FROM, and the woman as BEING-WITH-IN, or COEXISTENCE-IN. The human person would then be, disjunctively, either BEING-WITH-FROM or BEING-WITH-IN. The main difference between man and woman would lie in this, in the fact of being two types of different persons, who open themselves to each other in a mutual way, different and complementary, in the image of the relational differences of the divine persons. In this regard the human Being would be richer than the Cosmos’ Being, where the transcendental par excellence would be a unity without internal transcendental difference. This would not be the case in the human being, where the Being would transcendentally take in the difference of the TWO, and the divine BEING of the THREE.

This difference of the sexed condition based on the openness constitutive dimension that belongs to the person could be classified as two ways of being person: the feminine person and the masculine person, terminology used for the first time by Julián Mariás. And they could be philosophically classified as two anthropological transcendents. They would be disjunctive transcendentals\(^6\) that would mark a real difference—not just notional—within the personal human being, because the person can only be man or woman. The sexed difference would then be a difference in the very inside of the BEING. And taking into account that the human being is personal, it would be a difference right in the bosom of the person. Indeed, what is different to the person but is in his same level, must have the same rank, it cannot be, therefore, but other person. To state that the man-woman difference is a difference in the person amounts to fixing the difference definitively in equality. Man and woman are each a person. They have the same

\(^6\) Duns Scotus spoke of the disjunctive transcendentals, and Xavier Zubiri adopted this terminology; both philosophers use them in a different sense than the one it has here, but the terminology is very appropriate. Cf. CASTILLA DE CORTÁZAR, Bl., Noción de persona en Xavier Zubiri, Rialp, Madrid 1996, pp. 309-318 and 422-425.
category: the difference between them has the same ontological rank. Difference does not break equality.

In short, if we asked ourselves who is the woman as woman or who is the man as man, we could answer by saying that the woman is a kind of human person, who opens to the world and to the other in a peculiar way, inwards, and that special characteristic can only be described with a preposition: the preposition IN. By contrast, the man opens himself outwards, from himself towards the other, and can be described with the preposition: FROM.

In this same line of thought, an important feature of relationality is that it has no sense without the opposite referent. In the present case, either of the two—the woman or the man—is already talking from himself of the other: since to be man has no sense if there is not a woman, and to be woman has no sense if there is not a man. Each one of them, in his or her difference, is the assertion of the other, as the book of Ecclesiastes says when praising God’s works: “All things exist in pairs, one opposite the other, and he made nothing that was incomplete. One confirms the good things of the other.” (Sirach 42:24-25)

For this reason, even though each one of them has value in himself or herself, as person, since the person is ontologically relational, the force of the sexed difference lies in what John Paul II explained in the Apostolic Letter Mulieris Dignitatem—going beyond well-known negations in the past—that the “unity of the two” is the fulfillment of

---

62 To suggest that man and woman are transcendentally different can pose the doubt whether said difference would imply a hierarchy between them. Given that created real distinctions are always real, it seems it should be hold that, natively, either men are superior to women, or women to men. Certainly a hierarchical difference can be clearly seen in some metaphysical levels: substance and accidents, matter and form, potency and act, essence and act of being. But if we are to take seriously that transcendental unity cannot be monolithic, as Polo pointed out in other places, this means that there exists a difference within the transcendental order—be it created or not—and that there is no reason for the difference within that order to be hierarchical. Even though divine Persons are not created, analogically with regard to human persons we could use a similar argument: the Persons in God are not only several but different, so one should be superior to the other, which contradicts the Church’s Magisterium: nihil maius aut minus, nihil prius auto posterius. In this regard Scola states, and I agree with him, that Revelation has unveiled within God a difference that does not modify equal- ity, and only the acknowledgement of a difference like that permits to recognize the originality of the diversity of human condition. Cf. SCOLA, Ángelo, L’esperienza elementare. La vena profonda del magistero di Giovanni Paolo II’”Elementary experience. The deep vein of the magisterium of John Paul II”1, Marietti, 2003, translated into Spanish as “El hombre-muier,” in La experiencia humana elementai. La veta profunda del magisterio de Juan Pablo II, ed. Encuentro, Madrid 2005, p. 135.
God’s image in the human being. And in the year 95, with a new twist, as it were, he said that it is a “complementary relational uni-duality.” In other words, in the ontological field of personal rank, the Unity is not undifferentiated, on the contrary, without ceasing to be Unity, it takes in it the personal difference. And these differences do not hinder the unity for being relational, rather they make it possible.

The mystery of this unity is that it places both of them in a higher ontological plane than that of a sole isolated person. This is shown in the action when each of them contributes his or her specificity and places it at the service of the other. When masculinity and femininity combine their resources with a common goal, they boost each other; between the two of them they are able to achieve what they cannot make separately. Not just in the family, this happens also in art, sports, culture, work, the media, in the construction of history. Take as an expressive and enlightening example the pairs figure skating: how, apart from the synchronization doing the same exercise, if they bring their specificity into bear—he strength, she flexibility—, they are able to amaze with their achievements.

Indeed, there are just two kind of different persons in the human being, the man and the woman (each one a child, who can in turn be a father or a mother); and their fruit, the child, the three, will also be a man or a woman.\(^{63}\) Thus man is not triune transcendental but transcendentally dual\(^{64}\).

7. REFUTING LONG-STANDING STEREOTYPES

The above-mentioned approach, which regards the difference between man and woman—basis of the family character of the person—as two different ways of loving that configure two kind of different persons who confirm each other, being able to attain a uni-duality, might be mixed up with long-standing stereotypes.

Certainly, as it happens in all mythologies—behind which there is always a bit of truth—, a mix of truth and errors can be found in the archetypes of the collective unconscious, first talked about by Jung. It


\(^{64}\) These theories are more developed in CASTILLA Y CORTÁZAR. Bl., “La radicalidad de la condición sexuada,” in Acta Philosophica 25 (1916/II) 207-228.
is philosophy’s task to perform, through an appropriate rationalization, a hermeneutics as close to reality as possible, that separates the wheat from the chaff.

That is why the former approach, however seemingly dependent on old stereotypes, separates deliberately itself from some of them, once a comparison with reality disregards them as false. We could point out at least the following:

1. The first fallacy that still prevails in the collective unconscious is to consider that the difference of woman with regards to man is synonym for subordination, an issue defended by age-old androcentricity and that post-igualitarism continues to hold, with Simone de Beauvoir in the lead. That is why the so-called “gender ideology” has decided to root out the difference. However, here we affirm difference and we hold it is relational.

2. The second specter that looms over this difference is the prejudice of a supposed passivity of woman, in contrast with man, who is regarded as representative of activity. This concept has prevailed from Aristotle to Hegel, throughout Aquinas and unto Freud. Scientific evidence that refutes this assertion has not been assumed by a systematic anthropology. Well then, I hold here that femininity is another way of activity, not only as valid as masculine, but its condition of possibility.

3. Third, here I reject –as Polo did many times– the myth of the androgyne, according to which mankind, initially one, was divided as a punishment of the gods, and man and woman are now each a part of the whole. This myth has determined more than it should the interpretation of the Biblical passage of Genesis 2. Consequently, to defend the “unity of the two” according to Karol Wojtyla’s exegesis, where both man and woman are, above all, persons, and each of them possesses value in himself or herself, in a certain way independent, free and with personal responsibility, this is precisely the opposite theory. If the androgyne is “one that becomes two,” this interpretation finds that in actual fact they are “two who become one.”

4. In contrast with the theory that woman is the complement of man, here it is held that man is in his turn the complement of woman. Both are mutually complementary, since what is mutual is precisely this complementarity.

5. Finally, guided by Leonardo Polo’s big contribution to the transcendental of Unity –the necessity of its ontological expansion–, we
reject here the monolithic conception of unity. Unity cannot be monolithic, said Mr Polo once and again, and this issue is indispensable to develop anthropology, in particular the co-existence issue. This means to reject the old sophism of self-sufficiency as a model of excellence. Human fulfillment does not cloister itself in an isolated being, the height of perfection, according to Nietzsche’s theory, rather it is found in the gift of self to the loved one, whose good is sought in preference to one’s own.

8. CONCLUDING

This new vision of sexed duality is enabling anthropological advances, since those that so far saw it as an expression of the creatural contingency turn now to value it as something positive, even recognizing in it a hallmark of the absolute, in the image of God, in Whom, supreme perfection, each Person does not monopolize his nature.

If we return now to Polo’s statement in the first heading, that family belongs to an ontological order and, therefore, it belongs to a more profound order than that of action, to the order of being, then we will be in a better position to understand why the difference between man and woman, basis of the family institution, can be on the order of being too, without prejudice to the fact that this difference is present in the natural, cultural or essential dimensions of human life. Family is not about an institution being born in the level of action, even though its fulfilling entails multiple actions. Polo sees in the family a different character, more profound than that of society, because it is constitutive: he states that family is consistent a priori, before the action and the ethical ought, the latter, in his view, being the ground for the social order.

Just for the sake of comparison with other realities that Polo placed on the transcendental order –an issue now more commonly accepted, at least by those who have studied his thought in depth–, think of freedom, for example, which is constitutive of some human acts, the most important ones: free decisions. But it is not just that. Freedom is not reduced to free will, to the choice between good and evil. It is more than that. It is ability for self-determination and it is affirmation of what is good. And it is so because the received gift of person is donated for it to be the property of the person, who becomes responsible for himself. Polo asserts that “freedom must be placed on the transcendental level, (...) since to be free it is necessary not to be preceded by a
deeper or more radical entity, and, therefore, not to be grounded."\textsuperscript{65} Then, it is the person himself—who is act of being—that is free. The human act of being is constitutively free.

Something similar can be said about love. Of course, love is a human act, but it is more than that. In Polian anthropology love is an anthropological transcendental intrinsically united to the person; therefore, it belongs, beyond the level of action, to the ontological plane of being. This is how Polo puts it: "In human person to love is in the order of act of being and, therefore, it is higher than the desire-love or its sentimental version. Loving as personal transcendental is also superior to the transcendental good."\textsuperscript{66}

Now, the same can be said of the sexed condition. It is present in the body, it is present in the psyche and in all aspects of the action. Its transversality is an indication that the radicalism of its location is set not just in nature or in essence, but in the very personal being. Further, if the sexed condition is a condition for the family, and the latter is an a-priori, because it is an institution with enough foundation, the sexed condition will also be an a-priori. This would serve as a profound reason for Polo’s repeated statement that man is radically a dual being, that in man the difference is transcendental, manifested itself above all in the transcendental of love: in the ontological giving and accepting.

In short, according to Polian thought, if man is transcendently dual, it is plausible that the dual difference between man and woman—indispensable for co-existence to exist—belongs to the transcendental level; this is not so with the child, who completes the gift structure, through the essence.

And, in order to finish with Polo’s theological remark at the end of the article that serves as initial inspiration for this study, we could say that, certainly, the image and likeness of God in man assimilates, inasmuch as he or she is a child, to being image of the eternal Son.\textsuperscript{67} But, moreover, the man-woman difference (which enables fatherhood and motherhood, that are distinct from filiation) appears to need an expansion of the imago Dei as it has been developed so far in the Judeo-Christian tradition. This extension should look not only at their equality (the filiation) but also at their personal difference as man (father)

\textsuperscript{65} POLO, L., \textit{Why a Transcendental Anthropology?}, pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{66} POLO, L., \textit{Antropología trascendental I. La persona humana}, p. 221.
\textsuperscript{67} Cf. POLO, L., \textit{El hombre como hijo}, p. 327.
or woman (mother), which in turn presupposes to rethink the Trinitarian mystery, as the ecumenical question has already been demanding for a millennium now.
Beyond Aim, Competency, and Habit: a Brief Critical Analysis of the Purposes of Education from the Perspective of Leonardo Polo’s Anthropology

Elda Millán Ghisleri
Centro Universitario Villanueva
(Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España)
emillan@villanueva.edu

Consuelo Martínez Priego
Universidad Panamericana (Campus Guadalajara, México)
mcmartine@up.edu.mx

ABSTRACT: This article begins by accepting that every pedagogical proposal presupposes an anthropological view, and this carries with it the consideration of what is best for man, that is, the purpose of education. From here, this study asks if it is sufficient to consider aims, competencies, and habits as the ultimate purposes of education. Each of these purposes of education has formed relevant educational trends today. It concludes, following an analysis from the anthropological proposal of Leonardo Polo, that these ends are necessary, as partial purposes, but they achieve only the growth of human nature, not that of the person.

KEYWORDS: Education, Person, Aims, Competencies, Habits.
1. INTRODUCTION

Contemporary society needs whole persons developed in their fullness: persons capable of facing the challenges posed in the difficult situations in which we find ourselves. We frequently observe that education has not always been capable of answering to these needs. Indeed, one perceives a certain despair in educational work; education today seems to be in a state of crisis. It seems that educational models are being questioned because they have not accomplished what was expected of them. This may be due to a variety of reasons, among them, important societal changes. Women’s entry into the working world, globalization, technological advances, a bid for equality, new pedagogical methods are among these changes. All of these have certainly had positive consequences, but at the same time, they have triggered a certain disorientation and a lack of formation to help face this new reality.

For this reason, it seems crucial to make a deep analysis of the educational aims that establish the action lines of education, as well as to clarify what objectives and/or aims are moving educations in times of crisis. Indeed, what is education and what is its reason for being should become the object of clarification. To this end, one must first define the anthropological methods on which educational action is founded. It is clear that education will take on one form or another depending on one’s concept of human being, and that the aims which orient the action will differ as well.

To illustrate this point, this paper will take a brief tour of the ideas of human being which have existed throughout history and which have repercussions on current education. It will discuss the conception of education and its ends—the teleological dimension—which has been proposed in each case. Thus it seeks to make a link between philosophical anthropology understood as the framework from which we depart and theory of education.

---

Fundamental approaches to educational purposes in education today are collected and synthesized. These can be summarized in three: education based on objectives, commonly called Pedagogy of Aims; another whose main purpose refers to competencies, and finally education that seeks to develop habits.

This proposal intends to demonstrate whether these approaches cover all dimensions of human growth. Are these educational approaches adequate or sufficient in regards to the integral growth of a human being? Thus, the key point of this paper will be to analyze if there is a theory capable of covering all the educational dimensions. As a result of the analysis carried out in regards to the ends and the anthropological approaches, it seems necessary to go a step further and face the question of growth of the personal being, an aspect ignored in the three classical approaches here mentioned. To demonstrate this point, the paper departs from the contributions of Leonardo Polo in regards to the person, as they are discussed in his Antropología Trascendental.

This article will try to explain why an education based solely on aims, skills, or habits is insufficient, because these do not cover the dimensions susceptible to the growth – and thus, to the education- of the human person.

We are aware that society perceives education as being in crisis. Considering that the empirical research into the subject is abundant, as are proposals of educational intervention around aims and competencies especially, it seems pertinent to carry out a critical reconsideration of the presuppositions of these studies. It is necessary to rethink the teleological questions which underlie them. Thus, by demonstrating whether the presuppositions are sufficient- by searching for aims, competencies, or habits- this can shed light for a new way of facing the issues which can help improve educational actions and overcome this time of crisis.

2. ANTHROPOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF EDUCATIONAL ACTION

It is common to find in scientific literature research in regards to the practical dimension of education. Fewer studies, though, focus on its theoretical dimension. We can see in Spain, for example, that in the past few decades there has been a clear concern with education. Indeed, political agents seek solutions by proposing new educational
laws. However, the emphasis is being placed on academic outcomes and not so much on the true growth of the learners. Perhaps the focus needs to be amplified and grounded, since all educational practice demands theoretical underpinnings which give it sense and orientation. In the same way that theory without practice can become a utopia, an action without a motive or orientation loses its reason for being. This occurs because education does not mean carrying out many actions — though there are educational systems based on these proposals — but rather directing these actions toward a concrete and specific purpose, which we understand as the growth of the person. Without this underlying sense, all education falls short of what it intends to achieve.

Thus, it is important to clarify whether there is a clear foundation in educational actions and if it is adequate or sufficient for the person. To answer this question, in the first place, we look at the most significant anthropological paradigms — we propose six — which have had a certain influence on what today is understood as human being. A hierarchical, rather than chronological, order will be followed in the article. The instinctive being is the most basic or incomplete image of man, and the openness to transcendence is the most complete, in our view.

a) Educational models and anthropological models

Anthropological approaches which have marked the history of education are, firstly, man as an instinctive being. This viewpoint was principally developed by Freud⁴ and Jung⁵. This way of understanding man highlights the importance of instinct, and it does so in a deterministic way: instincts block all possibility of growth and seek a homeostatic situation⁶. They also consider that the human being, determined by the past, is incapable of overcoming it⁷. Everything surrounding man affects not only him, but also marks his future. This proposal definitely does not take into account human freedom; rather,

---

⁴ Everyone knows the words about instincts in this author. Cfr. FREUD, S., Cinco conferencias sobre Psicoanálisis (Clark University), FV Editions, 2015 [1910].
⁶ Cfr. POLO, L., Quien es el hombre, 115-116.
it attributes to the human being characteristics and psychic structures which determine him, impeding his growth\textsuperscript{8}.

Another group of important authors is that which includes Darwin\textsuperscript{9}, Marx and the behaviorists (Skinner\textsuperscript{10}, Watson\textsuperscript{11}, among others). All of them are part of the broad paradigm marked by materialism. The way of understanding the human being from the materialistic perspective is grounded, basically, in the idea that man is limited and determined by the physical world. In the case of Marx, he considered that the human being should be formed to serve a certain society; that this is the end of education and of his action\textsuperscript{12}. Thus, the human being is concerned with living for society, not living a full and free life. This could be called, “homeostatic collectivism”\textsuperscript{13}.

Another way of understanding man is as a defective being. Gehlen\textsuperscript{14} and Portmann\textsuperscript{15} are the main authors of this paradigm. They emphasize the biological frailty of the human being, and the possibility of cultural development. They explain that not being defined makes it possible for man to be open to the world. They conceive of more dimensions in a human being than do the instinctive or material thinkers.

\textsuperscript{8} Cfr. FIZZOTTI, E., De Freud a Frankl. Interrogantes sobre el vacío existencia, Eunsa, Pamplona, 1981.


\textsuperscript{10} "We should pay attention directly to the relationship between the behavior and its environment, forgetting presupposed intermediate mental states ... We can say, consequently, that to arrive at a scientific analysis of the behavior we do not need to try to discover what they are and what are not personalities. mental states, feelings, peculiarities of character, plans, purposes, intentions, or any other prerequisites of a problematic autonomous man". SKINNER, B. F., Más allá de la libertad y la dignidad. Fontanella, Barcelona, 1980, 24.


\textsuperscript{13} POLC, L., Curso de psicología general, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2009, 334.

\textsuperscript{14} "It can be said that man, exposed as the animal to wild nature, with his physical and instinctive congenital deficiency, would in all circumstances be unfit for life. But these deficiencies are offset by his ability to transform uncultivated nature and any natural environment, however constituted, so that it becomes useful for his life ". GEHLEN, A., Antropología Filosófica: Del encuentro y descubrimiento del hombre por sí mismo, Paidós, Barcelona, 1993, 33.

However, they agree that openness in man is a consequence of a biological deficit, and not a characteristic of human being and doing. For them, the first is a biological indetermination which demands or results in openness and human freedom. In reality, the Polian proposal posits that the person—due to his characteristic of additionally— is the former; his intimacy and liberty, and the manifestation of that reality is openness and biological indetermination. Indeed, culture is continuatio naturae, but it is possible in virtue of liberty; this is not a consequence of nature.

The fourth group is pedagogic naturalism, currently in use in contemporary classrooms, headed mainly by Rousseau and the authors of the New School (Pestalozzi and Fröbel, among others) or the Pragmatism of John Dewey. The fundamental idea which these authors all accept is that the human being is by nature good: education should be careful not to inhibit this intrinsic goodness of man. Any orientation is rejected, and there is no place for helping the human being to grow. However, man is not born virtuous; his freedom allows for alternatives. The character of additionally needs to be oriented, because the human being does not grow in isolation, but with the other. Thus, Polo states that “Ethics is linked to perfection which man must reach, because it is not given to him entirely beforehand.”

The fundamental idea behind the cybernetic conception of man—the fifth anthropological paradigm— is that the human being is capable of growing, and that everything he does affects his growth. Reitinger and Polo are just two of the authors who speak of cybernetic growth. These proposals are centered on human actions (Reitinger), or on the act of being (Polo). Polo’s cybernetic perspective studies the growth of

---

18 Cfr. POLO, L., Quién es el hombre, 170 y ss.
21 "Everythin e is perfect when coming out of the hands of the maker of all things, everything degenerates into the hands of man". Cfr. ROUSSEAU, J. J., Emilio, EDAF, Madrid, 1985, 35.
22 Cfr. POLO, L., Quién es el hombre, 115.
man’s superior powers; that is, what in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition is the development of intellectual and moral habits. Acts revert onto their own essence, making it grow. That is, when the human being develops habits, the faculties undergo a radical change: they stop being what they were to become more. This occurs thanks to the habit of synderesis.

As is known, Leonardo Polo explains that “virtue responds to a cybernetic model which could be called intrinsic cybernetics because virtue is a modification of the initial conditions themselves. (...) One can improve the *voluntas ut ratio* by learning, but there is a more radical model to perfect the will. This is, to get to the root, to perfect the initial conditions. Virtue rushes to the unleashing; it breaks spontaneity, because the *voluntas ut natura* can be improved intrinsically, improving the faculty *quaes talis*. My thesis is that only human faculties (will, understanding) are capable of this perfection.

This author, not only has a cybernetic proposal, but expands his anthropology –transcendental– in a way compatible with this approach - the cybernetic-.

Finally, we find one last way of conceiving mankind by considering his *transcendent character*. Scheler, Polo, all the narrativist authors (Ricoeur, MacIntyre and Taylor, among others) and the main exponents of humanistic psychology (Frankl principally) are found in this group. They also conceive of man, not only from his works, but from his most important characteristic: his being. Indeed, they understand the human being as having faculties of a natural order, but they situate the most radical in relation to transcendence. Some of them, such as Polo or Frankl affirm the only by conceiving of man in his

---

transcendent characteristic can the person reach existential fullness\(^{32}\). “Indeed, it seems that the ultimate sense exceeds the life that man still lives, since it has not yet reached him. Rather man walks toward it, and therefore, in a certain way, he does not yet know it completely. Thus, it is impossible that this ultimate sense is given by man himself. If nobody can gave himself the ultimate sense, it must be admitted that this is not a human invention, rather, it must be given to the human person by a reality which transcends him”\(^{33}\).

As has been seen, the different anthropological conceptions have a clear repercussion on education, because anthropology presents purposes for education, and these purposes must be ordered. If anthropology and education are linked, it is, precisely, in virtue of the finality which educational action always possesses. The anthropological model not only gives pedagogical orientation to a particular action, but also to the sense of the action, in its whole\(^{34}\).

\(b\) Education and finality

We have said that any anthropological conception necessarily bears a specific educational finality. As Tedesco states, the current educational crisis “does not come from the deficient way in which education fulfills the social objectives assigned to it, but rather, worse still, we do not know what ends it must fulfill and where to effectively orient its actions”\(^{35}\). In any case, what is obvious is the existence of a reflection on the ends education should have, or on whether education actually requires them, or if it has lost them, etc.\(^{36}\) Thus, addressing the teleological question is a key aspect of educational tasks. As in any other task of a practical nature, the premise is true that “any agent works toward an end” as Monarca has stated: “Any educational action is teleologically framed, either implicitly or explicitly. But it is necessary for


\(^{33}\) Cfr. SELLÉS, I. F., ¿*Es trascendental la antropología de Víctor Frankl?* Ápeiron Ediciones, Madrid, 2015, 226.

\(^{34}\) Alongside this, it explicates the “resources” available to the person for his growth.


\(^{36}\) Cfr. MARITAIN, J., *La educación en la encrucijada.*
said framework to assume critically and reflexively all the explicit aspects presupposed in an educational project which has been publicly contrasted and accepted”\textsuperscript{37}.

When it comes time to address the issue, we find a certain confusion surrounding the meaning of the purpose of education. Indeed, it has frequently been compared with approximate terms whose meaning is different (laws, functions of education). Thus, it is necessary to point out that the functions, together with the laws of education, are charged with establishing the direction of education\textsuperscript{38} establishing a certain framework of action. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that laws and functions must be at the service of the human being, in his fullest sense. Law/function and purpose have a subordinate relationship, because the former must be subordinate to the latter (the purpose). However, not unfrequently, educational aims, by being unclear, are subjugated to the law, proposing as the ultimate end the fulfillment of these, instead of the growth of the learner.

On the other hand, more similar to the concept of purpose, are the terms educational intentionality and sense of education. Both concepts tend to be used to refer to the intention, motive, or reason underlying educational actions, offering a pedagogical framework; that is, the subjective point of view of the educator.

Directly addressing the topic of the purposes of education, as such, through experience, we find a first difficulty. There exists a multiplicity of purposes which must be developed through educational action\textsuperscript{39}. Indeed, in any educational task, we see that what is intended to be achieved is seconded through concrete and specific actions. However, there can be no amalgam nor infinite chain of purposes. This leads us to think of the classic distinction between partial end and final end,


\textsuperscript{39} Cfr. “The human being is a unit, though with a plurality of operative instances, and thus in him there are diverse movements which respond to different ends”. POLO, L., Antropología Trascendental. Tomo II. La esencia de la persona humana, 80.
frequently used in education\textsuperscript{40}–Polo speaks of means and ends\textsuperscript{41}–. Actions which are oriented toward something which gives them meaning receive the name \textit{partial ends}: they all have a partial medial character in the fulfillment of the end. This latter receives the name \textit{final end}, and it appears at the beginning of the action, during the process (giving meaning to it) and at the end\textsuperscript{42}.

To realize this final end, small objectives are essential, necessary and important in themselves: these are the partial ends. However, it would be a mistake to think that these are the only ends of education, as sometimes occurs. Thus, it would be necessary to see in education which are the means to realize and which is the final end to which they are oriented, the principle and the sense of the process. Definitely, \textit{it is necessary to establish an adequate hierarchy of means and ends}: the notion of finality demands, in the sphere of real actions, its hierarchical consideration.

Thus, departing from what we understand as human being and his capacity for growth, we conceive the role of education, and the ends toward which it must be oriented. From the distinction act of being-essence which Polo takes from Thomas Aquinas, as well as from the Polian idea of what education is- helping to grow- as the point of view, we will analyze some of the principal pedagogical proposals of the contemporary age. These are \textit{Pedagogy of Aims, Education for Competencies}, and \textit{Education through Habits}.

3. CONTEMPORARY PROPOSALS AROUND EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES

As has been mentioned, there a three main pedagogical proposals derived from anthropological viewpoints; these are considered in the purposes of education. It is evident that each of these proposals - all of them of the twentieth century - find in the models previously presented their roots. It does not seem necessary to point out the precise correspondence. The three shall be briefly described.

\textsuperscript{41} Cfr. POLO, L., \textit{Antropología trascendental. Tomo II}. La esencia de la persona humana. 158 y ss.
a) Education by aims

Pedagogy of Aims meant a certain break with previous approaches, and changed the way of conceiving education—in which there was not so much didactic concretion-. Before the development of this educational paradigm, and perhaps in its early days, the theory of educational purposes appeared diffuse, lacking in precision and in scientificity. Teachers frequently found themselves not knowing which path to follow, or how to address concretely an objective or an end of a certain dimension. Indeed, “traditionally, the objectives of education tend to be located in the far future, particularly in regards to teachers of basic or elementary education. While these teachers recognize their role in the total process of educating good citizens who are morally responsible, cultivated, intelligent and well-informed, these ideas, nevertheless, lack significant impact on daily school work”43. Derived from these difficulties and from the social changes of the time, development of industry and of the sciences, we see the need to develop controllable and evaluable aims.

This is how diverse projects are proposed within the theoretical framework called Pedagogy of Aims. Basically, the way to proceed in education is through “concrete” objectives which allow for evaluation, nesting, and planning of teaching44. This educational proposal can be summarized in that its priority is observable outcomes and the final product of a complete process45. The purpose of education is the achievement of a measurable outcome46. This way of addressing the concept of aim introduces a key element: the purpose of education is the outcome, not so much the process, and much less, the growth. Aims describe outcomes; they are not the means to reach them. In this

45 “First, you decide where you want to go, then you formulate and administer the means to get there, and finally, you worry about verifying if you have arrived”. MAGER, R. F., Formulación operativa de objetivos didácticos, Marova, Madrid, 1982, 112.
46 “The description of the execution (the fulfillment of an activity) which the learners should be in condition to carry out before they can be considered competent. This objective describes the foreseen outcome of teaching, more than the process of teaching”. Ibí., 5.
sense, it can be said that the fundamental principle is intended to prioritize the outcome principle, characteristic of modernity. As Polo has stated: “technology, politics, art, the very progress of the human being, of each one, is also seen in terms of outcomes. Modern ethics is, in large part, consequentialist; the consequences determine the ethical value of actions. It is evident that this, too, is to fixate on outcomes.” If educational action were reduced to the achievement of certain actions, education would not be centered on helping to grow, but rather on achieving expected aims. It is clear that educational action is action” and that it is resolved in certain goals. In this sense, aims help specify what is to be done. The danger is that education ends up focusing exclusively on small outcomes and losing its reason for being; helping man to grow.

On the other hand, we cannot but recognize that for the day-to-day educational task, this system has turned out to be a very effective instrument, because it contributes clear ways to carry out educational tasks, which were perhaps not previously concrete. Aims adapt well to areas covered in the classroom: by being very specific, they allow different subjects to be addressed in all their plurality of nuances. Likewise, if aims are compared across the curriculum, it is possible to reduce overlap in different areas. This evidently contributes to the establishment of a certain hierarchy- in the sense of “before” and “after”- of these. On the other hand, this system facilitates the development of objective assessment tools, as well as feedback which allows us to see achievements and improvements for both learners and teachers. In this sense, Gagné’s theory is extremely interesting, concretely his cybernetic conception of learning as a process. It is also a system which has proved useful in other disciplines, such as those of technological nature, for example, in the development of computing programs or educational applications.

47 Cfr. POLO, L., Presente y futuro del hombre, 97 y ss.
48 Cfr. POLO, L., Lo radical y la libertad, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona, 2005, 11.
49 Cfr. ASHTON, P.; KNEEN & DAVIES, F., Los objetivos en la práctica educativa.
51 Cfr. GAGNÉ, R. M., La planificación de la enseñanza: sus principios.
Definitely, Pedagogy of Aims is an effective instrument to orient concrete actions, as well as in the development of the different skills learners develop through their formation process. However, this strength has a double edge, which has been one of the principal criticisms to the system: the disintegration of the contents and loss of unity in the curriculum project. Indeed, in the beginning, Bloom himself saw the danger. There was a fear that the taxonomy “could lead to the fragmentation and atomization of educational purposes where the various parts which constitute the final standings were essentially different from the much more complex goal that had been the starting point”53.

This means that aims may offer a broad informative repertory, but they do not guarantee the growth of a learner’s faculties nor do they allow a comprehensive growth at the essential level54. For example, memory can undergo enormous development, but the same may not be true for intelligence. This may give evidence of an educational proposal whose principal end is reduced to the transmission of knowledge. In this way, a sort of “encyclopedic formation is obtained: it is summative, without organization, such that one can hardly give the name of intellectual formation to this mere acquisition of knowledge”55. This also supposes a serious difficulty in the integration of these, since there is a certain “enslavement” of information. Furthermore, this system, used as the ultimate end of education, becomes a solitary task of the learner, a sort of self-teaching, rejecting any outside help and detracting from the essence of education: helping the learner to grow—56.

But perhaps the gravest of all is that the achievement of educational aims has become, in most cases, a real obsession with efficiency, detracting from the true sense of education: helping the learner to grow in all of his dimensions57. The strongest critique toward this system is without a doubt the restriction of formation to mere instruction; the

———

Aprendizaje de la Herencia de POO”. VII Simposio Internacional de Informática Educativa – SIIEd05, (noviembre de 2005), Leiria, Portugal.
53 Cfr. BLOOM, B. S., Taxonomía de los objetivos de la educación, 19.
56 Cfr. POLO, L., Ayudar a crecer, 41.
57 Cfr. GIMENO, J., La pedagogía por objetivos: Obsesión por la eficiencia, Morata, Madrid, 1982.
reduction of intelligence to the human beings capacity for memorization. Instruction is a fundamental dimension of the formative process, but it is only one part of it. If it should be considered identical to “education”, it would mean confusing the distinction between the partial ends and the final ends of education.

Ultimately, aims are extrinsic to the person; they are a measurable product. It is easy to prove that this paradigm is incapable of addressing the complete reality of human growth.Ormell points out: “The most important general criticism to the behaviorist approach is that it unconsciously distorts education through the wish to test and evaluate. It accepts implicitly that that which cannot be measured by standard tests is not education.”

b) Education by competencies

Much has been written about competencies; it is not our intention to carry out a detailed study on them, as this has already been done. Rather, we will make a brief analysis taking as a reference the ends of education as stated in Polian anthropology. It is known that the paradigm of competencies arises in the business context and has been addressed in various different spheres. Concretely in education, competencies are spoken of in professional formation, compulsory basic education, and higher education. Importance is immediately given not so much to academic preparation, but to skills, abilities, competency in carrying out specific tasks.

In the educational context, there have been different variables signaling two ways of assuming the model: the ones supported by pedagogies focused on results, which have only changed the terminology and others which have truly accepted the profound change proposed

58 “Needing the student to learn many things, instead of using his reflective capacity to understand the reason behind what he is learning. he takes refuge in a weak memorization of what a future exam will demand of him”. GARCÍA-HOZ, V., “Génesis del Sistema de Objetivos Fundamentales de la Educación”, 21.


by the original model. From a pedagogical perspective, of special interest is the original proposal which conceives competency as the development of skills in a procedural manner. In this case, the competency makes the learner capable. This pedagogy was a great novelty, since it brought to the previous system a framework which was, in some way, comprehensive. It placed emphasis on the development of the learner’s skills; broadening the concept of education and overcoming rote memorization.

However, totally suppressing all memorization has proven to be negative. Memorization is a fundamental operation which underpins others of an intellectual character. Nevertheless, what is positive is formative evaluation and the conception of the learner as the motor of his own learning, and not as a mere receiver of information and doer of tasks. In this sense, perhaps the most remarkable is that it attends to the fact that its acquisition is always procedural. What is intended by evaluation is to value the improvement of a competency. To this end, the competency must be broken down into concrete variables which can be observed and evaluated. In this regard, especially valuable are studies carried out in the past few years, both in elementary and in higher education, into self-regulation of learning. Concretely, of interest is the influence or the development of the will in the students’ learning, and how to address it in education. However, in practice, the evaluation of these learnings, reduces skills or competencies to simple observable and measurable results.

These pedagogies which focus only on results (as frequently occurs), end up reproducing the same problems as the systems of aims: they tend to be rigid and they hinder transferability of learning to other dimensions or spheres of the learner’s life. However, the greatest cri-

---

64 “It supposes the transition from a model focused on teaching to a model centered on student learning”. DE MIGUEL, M., Modalidades de enseñanza centradas en el desarrollo de competencias. Orientaciones para promover el cambio metodológico en el Espacio Europeo de Educación Superior, Ediciones Universidad de Oviedo, Oviedo, 2005, 11.
tique to this system conceived as a purpose of education, is that learning frequently obeys social demands. The point of view is not the development of the learner, but rather his capacity to satisfy certain demands which are considered important according to the socio-economic context. This supposes a great danger, likewise pointed out in the pedagogy of aims, that the formative ends of the learner are at the mercy of what is opportune, not what is best for him as human being, independently of what is proposed by different social agents. This implies a certain inversion: analogous to how parents are there for their children, and not vice-versa, it could be said that society is for persons.\textsuperscript{66}

Definitely, though competencies are a good educational instrument, they are insufficient as the ultimate end of education. They themselves do not address all the human dimensions susceptible to being educated, since the purpose of education has to do with growth, and competencies are a means of this growth.\textsuperscript{67} On one hand, meaning is given to objectives, because the latter are the practical concretion of the former. On the other hand, they serve as the means to reach a higher end: human growth in each and every one of its dimensions. This growth has to do with habit and virtue. We will see how this is.

c) \textit{Education and habits}

Man can and must grow in each and every one of these dimensions in order to achieve his humanization. Through freedom, the human being is the only being who does not have a closed nature. “The person adds to nature an effusive, contributing dimension. Because man is a person, he is not subject to the laws of nature; rather, he rises above them and enjoys a radical freedom.”\textsuperscript{68} This particularity allows him to increase his own nature. One- the first- of a person’s tasks is to make this nature grows in an optimal way. There, education has much to do, since it is a help, a necessary companion in this undertaking. The principal objective of education is to help the person to carry out the task of increasing his nature.\textsuperscript{69} “Human nature is not only the beginning of

\textsuperscript{66} Cfr. POLO, L., \textit{Ayudar a crecer}, 107.
\textsuperscript{68} Cfr. POLO, L., \textit{Ética: Hacia una versión moderna de los temas clásicos}, 92.
\textsuperscript{69} Cfr. POLO, L., \textit{La esencia del hombre}, 127 y ss.
his acts, but also the end. And this end receives the names of habit and virtue. Habits and virtue teleologize nature”70.

We have seen that aims as well as competencies are means which help man grow his nature. However, though it is sometimes believed that they measure growth, in reality what they are measuring are the fruits of that growth. It does not seem to us that they attend to the faculty, but rather to the process of acquisition of competencies-oriented to productive action- or the products of action, the aims. Habit does not observe the aims nor the competencies; it is strictly the increase- or decrease- of the intelligence and the will. When the human being acquires them, he experiences a profound change in his own faculty.

In this sense, it is important to explain that the growth of the sensitive faculties of a human being is limited by the organic support they are subjected to. Indeed, the growth of the external and internal senses cannot be infinite because they are all restricted by an organ. The same cannot be said of the intelligence or the will, which have no organic limitation. Indeed, both faculties are of a spiritual nature and their growth is therefore, unrestricted. Indeed, “man is a being capable of an unrestricted growth, a being which never stops growing. Certain types of growth are given up to a certain point –organic growth ends, the formation of neuron circuits does, as well. These growths are not unrestricted-, but man as such is capable of growth without reserve”71. This particular growth receives the name of habit (in the case of the intelligence) or virtue (in the case of the will)72. When the faculty does not grow –when it shrinks- we speak of a vice.

The meaning of “habit” used here is not that which is commonly used in education. In the first place, it is necessary to distinguish habit from other terms, such as custom73, way of doing74, operational ease

71 POLO, L., Quién es el hombre, 110-111.
72 Cfr. POLO, L., Antropología trascendental. Tomo II. La esencia de la persona humana, 181.
etc. These are some of the manifestations of human operability, the fruit of habit acquisition. But the habit cannot be reduced to these; it is something much deeper: it is the growth of the faculty. Numerous authors address the issue of habits, including those with clear educational repercussions. However, here we will deal briefly with Leonardo Polo’s proposal, which may have an impact on educational action. We consider as our starting point that man may grow beyond the acquisition of customs or ways of doing things.

Polo’s perspective has, as its starting point, Aristotelian studies and those of Thomas Aquinas. Concretely, he conceives of habit as the growth of higher powers. In Polo’s words, habit and virtue are a hypercybernetic model because they modify the initial conditions. This means that habits radically transform the original faculty; they update it. This supposes a net growth in the human psychic structure. Indeed, faculties not only improve, there is a change in man’s “factory settings”. Thus, the human being may achieve radical growth. This is only possible in faculties not limited by any organ—as we have mentioned. Indeed, habit and virtue are the perfection of the powers. These powers—intelligence and will—stop being as they were, they update and they allow the growth of their possibilities.

Following the classical distinction—Thomas Aquinas—habit refers to intelligence, and virtue to will. Within habits which affect intelligence, it is possible to distinguish innate habits from those acquired. Innate intellectual habits are “a natural gift which every man receives and the root of the rest of the habits man can acquire”.

There are two innate habits of special relevance to the subject we are studying: the habit of the first principles and the habit of synderesis. With respect to the acquired habits of intelligence, these are all those

---


75 Cfr. SELLÉS, J. F., “Hábitos, virtudes, costumbres y manías”.


78 Cfr. POLO, L., “La cibernética como lógica de la vida”.

intellectual habits acquired over time. The theoretical can be distinguished from the practical\(^{80}\). Virtues are “the progressive perfecting of this power (will) to want better and better, an acquired updating which is gradual, not susceptible to ending in its desire to tend toward happiness”\(^{81}\).

As to the differences existing between intellectual habits and moral virtues, what stands out on one hand, is that virtues are acquired through the repetition of acts. In intelligences, only one act is needed to develop the habit\(^{82}\). Indeed, the end of the exercise of the will is always external to it: happiness. The will never reaches a complete happiness which satisfies it; it always wants more\(^{83}\). Thus, the will is more powerful than the intelligence, and for the same reason, it requires the repetition of acts to reach it. The will has a potential dimension because it is always in a state of desire.

On the other hand, the connection between moral virtues is narrower than that existing between intellectual habits. Indeed, within intelligence there are several rational habits depending on the topic being studied (habits of wisdom, habits of science, etc.) and in each one, different, plural habits are formed. In the will, on the other hand, we can only speak with rigor of one virtue: wisdom, which consists of being capable of orienting one’s life toward true happiness. All other virtues are systemic; they are like “communicating vessels”. If one of them is developed, the others grow\(^{84}\). A similar thing occurs when one acquires a vice; it extends to the rest.

Habits are a change in the power, but not only in terms of improvement of capacity around an operation\(^ {85}\). Polo highlights this idea and distinguishes an operation carried out by a faculty from the growth of the same faculty. This is crucial for education as, ultimately, what is

\(^{80}\)“A progressive updating of the faculty of intelligence, or if one prefers, a progressive remission of the power it has, in order to know more. It has to do with the intrinsic acquired perfections which unrestrictedly improve the capacity for knowing.” SELLES, J. F., Los hábitos adquiridos, 14.

\(^{81}\)Cfr. Ibid.

\(^{82}\)Cfr. POLO, L., Antropología trascendental. Tomo II: La esencia de la persona humana, 181.

\(^{83}\)Cfr. POLO, L., Ética: Hacia una versión moderna de los temas clásicos, 137-138.

\(^{84}\)Cfr. POLO, L., Antropología trascendental. Tomo II: La esencia de la persona humana, 182.

important is the growth of faculties and not their operability. For Polo, though both are acts, the habit is superior to the operation, because it activates the faculty. The end of the habit is not the carrying out of operations, but the growth of the power. This is of great importance, because it clearly delimits the distinction from competencies—since these must be considered equal to habits. Indeed, the aim of the development of competencies is the carrying out of operations, not the perfection of the power, nor the essentialization or growth of the essence of man.

Finally, this growth of the natural dimension of the human being is fulfilled in the development of the superior capacities through habits. The more virtuous a person is, the freer he is, and his nature grows, becoming essentialized. “Virtues increase the capacity for the exercise of freedom.” Thus, the role of education is key in this undertaking: fostering in students the development of habits and virtues which perfect their intelligence and their will in such a way that they are free to make decisions and govern their lives.

Having seen this, we encounter a crucial question for education: Can the human being only be contemplated in his natural dimension? Indeed, if we conceive man from his purely natural dimension, the habit will be the most complete mode of his growth, since it allows the growth of his superior faculties. However, we understand that the human being is more than his nature and his essence; the highest is his personal being. “No matter how much man grows, no matter how much he perfects himself throughout life in the form of habits; in spite of everything, in man there will always be a distinction between essentia and esse; man will never achieve an identity. That is, no matter how great his essential growth, his being will always be above him.” Now, this “being above”, because it is not something static or closed, must also be considered. If the highest is virtue, ethics is the highest science. However, “virtue is close to the end, but it cannot be taken as the final end.” Definitely: Can education somehow affect the personal being?

---

86 Cfr. Ibíd, 114.  
88 Cfr. SELLES, J. F., Antropología para inconformes, Rialp, Madrid, 386.  
89 Cfr. POLO, L., Antropología trascendental. Tomo II. La esencia de la persona humana, 157.
4. NEW PATHS TO LINK ANTHROPOLOGY AND EDUCATION. TRANSCENDENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY

The thesis on which this study is based is that each anthropological conception corresponds to a determined idea of the purpose of education. Thus, it must be considered that if the proposal of transcendental anthropology is different enough to the ones which precede it -Leonardo Polo himself looks for historical background\(^{90}\), they do not seem to reach all the aspects which the method, the abandonment of the mental limit, offers; the educational proposal in which what stands out the most is the purpose for education, should also be different or at least different enough. Thus, what we intend to develop is a brief systematic explanation of the areas of growth which open to education from the Polian proposal, in which the real distinction “essence-act of being” plays a fundamental role.

The transcendental expansion proposed by Leonardo Polo bears the sentence that man is a personal “being”, considering that “being” is considered transcendentally -in the sense of non-predicamental-. Along with the Thomist discovery of real distinction, present also in the human being, we must talk about the personal being in every man and about the essence of man. And this in the context of other relevant differences such as the being of the cosmos and the being of the person; which are different. Likewise, in the cosmos we can speak of essence and act as being distinct. These distinctions, as is known, are achieved thanks to the abandonment of the mental limit: the essence of the human person who has four dimensions\(^{91}\).

These four dimensions or modes of abandonment of the mental limit are constituted depending on the subject area\(^{92}\). The first level of abandonment of the mental limit is carried out through the habit of first principles. Indeed, through the habit of first principles the main being (the act of being created is distinguished from the uncreated) can be observed. This first level allows us to “realize” that the cosmos is. The second level of abandonment of the mental limit achieves knowledge of the essence of the cosmos “It explicates the physical

---

\(^{90}\) Por ejemplo, cfr. Ibid, 29-49.

\(^{91}\) Cfr. Polo, L., Antropología trascendental. Tomo I. La persona humana, cit., pp. 107-117.

\(^{92}\) Cfr. POLO, L., Presente y futuro del hombre, 182 y ss.
causes as concomitant causes (...). Causes are found or sought because they are real. That is to say, thanks to this second level, we cannot only “realize” that the cosmos is, but what it is in a certain way, concretely, tetracausal.

Polo’s theory of knowledge takes on special relevance due to the following: the third dimension of abandonment of the mental limit allows us to know human coexistence, the co-being. Indeed, in third place, man can know this character of additionally that is each person. “Achieving co-being with another, co-existing, is equal to additionally, and it can be described as a future without defuturization”. Polo refers to the future as that which is to be reached. When he speaks of non-defuturization, he is designating that which has no ending, which lacks one because the person is also additionally, permanently open to growth. “According to this, the person is open intimacy: intellectual light, transcendental freedom, gift-love”.

Finally, the fourth and last dimension allows the person to access the essence of man. This is possible because that essence shows itself through the habits: indeed, through the habits, man can know and access his own essence. “From mental presence, one passes to habits; and human nature, in virtue of habits, comes to be the essence of man”. Human nature is not like that of the cosmos because it is growing, it becomes essentialized through habits. This crescent being comes about because the human essence is to dispose. Through habit, essence becomes increasingly freer because it is ever growing. Thus, through habits, man becomes the master of his nature.

This extension to transcendental level is, therefore, the first and main contribution of education given by Polo. Education derives from anthropology—now understood as a first philosophy— not from metaphysics and, on the other hand, the merely predicamental consideration—essential—is not enough to comprehend what education can cover if one ignores what it means to be a “personal being”.

---

94 Cfr. Ibid., 118.
95 Cfr. POLO, L., La libertad trascendental, 136-137.
96 Cfr. POLO, L., Antropología trascendental. Tomo I. La persona humana, 118.
97 Cfr. Ibid., 120.
Also notable is the priority of the person with respect to the species: the fact that the human being is not finalized by the species\textsuperscript{100} nor is it exhausted –“man is a personal being who does not exhaust his species”\textsuperscript{101}–. If the person is not finalized by the species, the end of education, properly stated, cannot be limited to the good of the species. Rather, it must be a good for each person. Education can be called personalized education only if it attends to the person, understanding that this differs from the essences of man. To speak of personalized education, therefore, demands a weighted understanding of what the human person is. Only in the case where the essence of man and the personal being are sufficiently distinguished, and education reaches both, does the notion of personalized education acquire meaning. Personalized does not mean individualized. Indeed, person cannot mean “lone person” since this would be absurd, nor is solipsism an adequate response to the specificity of the human existence –which is co-existence--\textsuperscript{102}.

Now, the greater part of Polian developments in regards to education and growth in general, appertains to human essence\textsuperscript{103} and only some statements allow us to believe that the person, by being personal, can also reach educational action. Stated as a first approximation: in virtue of the character of additionally, we can state that the person is not something static, but dynamic, and not mere spontaneity –as freedom itself is not. This situation opens the door to the possibility of an education which cannot only surpass the ends of efficiency-based mentality, such as those of aims, or even competencies, but also the growth of faculties in the form of habits.

\textbf{a) Essential growth}

Polo writes that, on thinking of Philosophy of Education, “the first thing to expose is the human meaning of education; that is, the reasons why man is susceptible to education, why there is no education, but rather formation; that is, help for the human being”\textsuperscript{104}. Evidently the proposal seeks a clear means of surpassing mere instruction, indicating

\textsuperscript{100} Cfr. POLO, L., Ética. Hacia una versión moderna de los temas clásicos, 57.
\textsuperscript{101} Cfr. Ibid. 75.
\textsuperscript{102} Cfr. POLO, L., Antropología Trascendental. Tomo I. La persona humana, 28-33.
\textsuperscript{103} “Para no suponer la vida se precisa no suponer al viviente, no la vida respecto de su aspirar a más vida, a crecer”. POLO, L., Antropología Trascendental. Tomo I. La persona humana, 17.
\textsuperscript{104} POLO, L., Ayudar a crecer, 41.
that the horizon of educational action is in the growth of the human being. In this way, we find the entry way to what should be dealt with: the conditions of possibility of education and that which is to be educated: the “formation” of the “being”.

The treatment of the conditions of possibility of education alludes to, on the character of the human being, on the one hand, filial and on the other, growing. That is, being a “child” demonstrates that no one owes everything to himself—one is originated- and Polo concludes that “if man owed everything to himself, education would lack meaning”\(^{105}\). On the other hand, the invalidity and premature with which man begins life\(^{106}\), obliges one to consider that nutrition alone is not enough for human growth. It requires as well help of another type— that of education— for the properly human growth to occur. Indeed, organic growth does not capture all that is growth in man, and much less, that which is the greatest growth.

As a continuation of procreation and nurture, education is a primary responsibility of the parents. They educate, also primarily “the affective normality of the child”. That is, the growth of the irascible and concupiscible appetites as the origin of emotional life. This growth is related to the development of two virtues: fortitude and temperance\(^{107}\). Affective normality is the necessary psychological base for the other virtues and habits. The help of school and teachers appears as an element of the second order—necessary, but not original-. Here, teaching is oriented toward the growth of the internal senses—especially imagination- and intelligence- beginning with analytical thought as a means of arousing “interest”—\(^{108}\). As the first learning, Polo mentions as key, the learning of language and of technique\(^{106}\), this oriented toward the development of virtues linked to industriousness, work, and discipline. In this way, we can say that “education essentially does not consist of offering rational content, nor in indoctrinating ways of behaving, but in arousing intellectual habits and virtues in the will”\(^{110}\).

---

\(^{105}\) *Ibid.*, 46.


\(^{107}\) Cfr. POLO, L., *Ayudar a crecer*, 87 y ss.


We have heretofore described what is specifically essential in human growth. However, in the same book, Ayudar a crecer [Helping to grow], the author takes a step which allows us to consider there is something more to education than the mere development of habits and virtues, all of them linked by freedom. Indeed, Polo establishes filiation as the most radical affirmation which can be said of a person – at least within the sphere of education-. Therefore, to educate, to form a human being, also implies the knowledge and acceptance of one’s own reality: the filial character, with the structure of “responsibility” or personal mission. What is remarkable is that Polo contrasts global orientation, which proceeds from this knowledge and acceptance of a vital responsibility, in such a way that freedom extends to the entire existence –origin and destiny- with “global affectivity” which can be seen, for instance, in authors such as Heidegger or Sartre. When the living lacks any sense of filiation, his existence has neither a “why” nor a “what for”. That is, he cannot freely face his entire reality; at the beginning and at the end there would be need. A person can only have, in this reality, an affective state, but not an orientation nor a sense.

Let us go on to a brief incursion into what is needed in essential education, the education of the personal being.

b) Growth of the personal being

We have said that education must impact all growth dimensions of the human being: his nature and his personal being, because the person is more than his nature and his essence. Now, once we have seen that Polo himself opens the door to the radical difference between “global orientation” and “global affectivity”, something beyond virtue is at play. Evidently, this is closely linked to personal freedom; this-freedom- is another indication of the possible ground for educational action. Thus, “to the extent that human life faces issues of little value, in this same measure, freedom is shortened, it loses radicality and horizon. I have called the first, native freedom; the second is the destination of freedom”. Native freedom and destination of freedom are something more than virtue; virtue refers to the living, not just to his life.

---

111 Cfr. POLO, L., Ayudar a crecer, 44; Quién es el hombre, 244-245.
112 POLO, L., Quien es el hombre, 244.
113 Cfr. POLO, L., Antropología trascendental. Tomo II. La esencia de la persona humana, 15.
In other words, “the ethics of virtues expands in native freedom”\textsuperscript{114}. Together with personal freedom, each one of the personal transcendental can be the object of attention of educational action: personal intimacy, personal freedom, personal knowledge and personal gift-love\textsuperscript{115}. Education must reflect on the proper way to offer the learner frameworks of reference on all of this, key to his own life.

Thus, human life takes on meaning insofar as it is fulfilled with others and definitely, with God. In virtue of freedom and its true extension, man can neither deny his origin nor his destination— that would be to deny co-existence—and that would mean that life is frustrated\textsuperscript{116}. That is, “man is not alone, precisely when he takes charge; he then encounters adversaries, but, especially when his charge is in favor of something outside of himself, and implies that someone has charged him with it”\textsuperscript{117}. In the beginning, there is co-existence (somebody charges), and in the end, there is co-existence (somebody receives).

Stated in other terms, to be a person is “to be a child”—originated and originally loved, fruit of love and not fruit of chance—\textsuperscript{118}. Indeed, each person is a child in the first place. This occurs in a biological manner: each person has parents. However, it is not enough to know it; one has to accept this reality. Finally, in order for this life to acquire meaning, one has to accept that one is a child, and that one’s existence is linked to both his progenitors and to God\textsuperscript{119}. That is, one does not owe everything to oneself. Evidently, the task of recognizing and accepting this radical truth of each person occurs thanks to the help received; that is, to education. In fact, the great problem of modernity is the Kantian concept of “emancipation” which carries with it man’s renunciation to his filial condition. Indeed, “the idea that man owes everything to himself is contrary to the notion of filiation, one who proceeds from does not owe everything to himself but to him from whom he proceeds”\textsuperscript{120}.

\textsuperscript{114} POLO, L., Quién es el hombre, 221.
\textsuperscript{115} Cfr. POLO, L., Antropología trascendental. Tomo I. La persona humana.
\textsuperscript{116} Cfr. POLO, L., Quién es el hombre, 224.
\textsuperscript{117} Cfr. Ibíd., 246.
\textsuperscript{118} Cfr. POLO, L., Ayudar a crecer, 219-223.
\textsuperscript{120} Cfr. POLO, L., Ayudar a crecer, 44.
Certainly, we owe to our parents what we have received naturally, but the most radical dimension of the person refers us to God. From our biological parents we receive the natural dimension (which potentially contains the essence); from God we receive the act of personal being. “Strictly speaking, parents do not beget the person of the child. With regards to it, they are not natural parents, but rather foster parents”\textsuperscript{\textit{121}}. It is obvious that the human person, the parents, cannot be the origin of the radical novelty which is each person. We can state, therefore, that the human being has, as his charge, the development of his nature. However, this is not the most radical part of said charge, that which is reckoned in his destination: the fulfillment of his mission. Within the personal dimension of education fits, without a doubt, the arousing of the \textit{freedom of destination} – the fruit of an encounter with the truth\textsuperscript{\textit{122}}. In education it is necessary to help the learner reflect on the meaning of his life, the personal meaning which is, thus, unique – in the sense that each one possesses his own. Education cannot be reduced to having students who are intellectually capable, or orderly, or who respond to the demands of a certain society. Having covered all the aims of education does not imply fulfillment, nor does being competent in such or other professional sphere. In a certain way, we can agree with Peters that “To be educated is not to have arrived at a destination; it is to travel with a different point of view”\textsuperscript{\textit{123}}.

It remains, however, to clarify how that personal growth is different from the growth of habits and virtues. Now, as Sellés has stated, “The person as such can also grow, though not by himself. It is not a question of a self-reward, because nothing is in his hands. Indeed, no one has self-invented as the person he is. However, nothing hinders the possibility of growing as a person, through Him who is capable of enriching life, since it depends on Him”\textsuperscript{\textit{124}}.

5. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS. IN CONCLUSION.

For decades, educational programs and resources have been proposed to face the great educational problem faced by the West. Indeed,


\textsuperscript{\textit{122}} Cfr. POLO, L., \textit{Quién es el hombre}, 249 y ss.


education requires renewed ways of working. However, the key to educational renovation must be sought in the roots. Thus, this paper has analyzed the relationship established between the anthropological proposal and the proposal with educational aims; these are determining in daily work.

Thus, if this thesis is well grounded, we can state that an anthropological proposal such as that of Leonardo Polo—transcendental anthropology—, by being distinct and by extending the preceding proposals, must, therefore, have an impact on the end, or more precisely, on the educational purpose which it proposes. Indeed, transcendental extension, the consideration of a human being as a personal being, distinguished in his essence, possessing a crescent nature, etc., can give light to the idea of an educational purpose.

It was convenient, previously, to clarify the educational ends which have been proposed, especially in the past few decades, and whether these achieve the education of the human being, concretely, whether they address the growth of the essence and of the human person. Thus, we have seen that education by aims is resolved in the valuation of partial ends, and more concretely, in the confusion between growth and “products of an activity”. Education by competencies, somewhat more complete in the consideration of the educational purpose, is also resolved in productive activity or in training in regards to productivity, not in regards to growth. A significant advance is education which seeks as its end the development of habits and virtues. In this case, we can state that what is being sought is the growth of man’s superior faculties; that is, the growth of the human essence. We have seen, in any case, that the ends are not compatible; what is relevant is to establish among them an order or a subordination, in such a way that some of them are oriented toward the development of others.

However, it was still necessary to face the question of the growth of the personal being, and with it, the possibility of proposing an education whose end went beyond habit. We have seen that Polo’s philosophy offers enough hints to state that this is both possible and necessary: from the distinction between global orientation and global affectivity to the extension of freedom and the possibility of personal frustration. It is clear that “what is to be educated” goes hand in hand with personal freedom, and with it, the other personal transcendentals. It also seems clear that knowledge of these realities is important, but, without a doubt, it is recognition and acceptance, existence woven with “charge”, that which can give meaning to one’s own existence. Definitely, it is
knowing oneself and living as a child. Transcendental anthropology is offered as an opportunity and opens up a horizon of hope.
El verdadero empresario antepone la oferta a la demanda

The true businessman puts supply over demand

_Filosofía y economía_

_Philosophy and Economy_
CONFERENCES & NOTES
An Introduction to Polo and Llano’s Anthropology of Leading

Gustavo González Couture
University of the Andes (Colombia)
gonzale@uniandes.edu.co

RECEIVED: December 16, 2015
ACCEPTED: May 8, 2016
DEFINITIVE VERSION: December 26, 2016
Anthropology of Leading (Antropología de la acción directiva) was written in collaboration with one of Polo’s fellow researchers, Carlos Llano—a philosopher, entrepreneur, and university founder (Panamerican University, Mexico). Unfortunately, this book has not yet been translated from Spanish.

Two propositions motivate their book. First, separating management from production gives rise to two separate social groups. Such segregation is an obstacle to improving organizations. Second, the highest form of bonding amongst humans is language—not exchange or money.

The authors’ purpose was not to write a book on business ethics but to break the ground upon which such ethics can flourish. They use the systems approach, since analysis, which is valid for experimental science, is insufficient to understand the complexity of human life. Furthermore, such an approach requires being open to new dimensions that are discovered in the course of inquiry.

Leading should be ranked differently than production—not doing so is what gives rise to annulling initiatives, to fear, and eventually, to totalitarian rule. Truth and fortitude are how people face these shortcomings.

Chapter One is about the importance of the systems approach in understanding humankind. The analytical method is acceptable for studying anything mechanical, where one part of the mechanism might not influence the whole. However, this is not true in the case of humans, who are organisms with many interrelated dimensions. What happens to our bodies when we take medication? It may cure the ailment, but with unforeseen consequences. This can happen in an organization when it is viewed analytically. A despotic management that does not allow its workers to complain or give suggestions can destroy any competitive advantage the company might have.

Another example of humans’ systemic nature is our hands, the use of which is related to language, which in turn is related to mind, which in turn is related to our condition as bipeds—a condition that allows for our faces to express their interior states, expression in which the

1Antropología de la acción directiva. Madrid: Unión Editorial. 1997. 200 pages. “Acción directiva” is translated as “leading” due to the authors’ insistent reference mainly to governing people, whereas “managing” can refer to doing so with people, animals, and things.

eyes play a fundamental role. Our posture, how we move our hands, the tone of our voice, and the expression in our eyes may reveal in an instant what a dozen pages written about the same moment cannot.

Hands and bodies are potential in humans—they are somehow unfinished. When compared to a claw or hoof, a hand is incomplete. It is our intelligence that gives our hands the possibility to create and use things. Such incompleteness of all human bodies is positive in the sense that it offers intelligence its purpose and mission. This is another example of why only a unified and systemic approach to humankind can provide some sense to its complexity that analysis by itself cannot offer.

Intelligence in humankind establishes a hiatus between intention and action, between what we desire to do and doing it. Animals might find a tool but lack the capacity to plan (design) and elaborate it. Intelligence means detaining any natural inclination and being able to deal with an idea, a plan, and making it real. Humans are not only homo faber but sapiens faber—two dimensions that many job designers forget.

Language is of a higher order than the signals that animals use to communicate danger and other states and events. Only humans have developed language, doing so in order to refer to reality in a conventional way—to dialogue and to influence each other’s behavior. Such influence fulfills its potentiality when both interlocutors can contribute to the conversation. A despotic treatment of the other annuls the other’s contribution.

The fact that humans build tools with other tools is usually referred to as a second-order technology (language can be thought of as such a technology) and proves our independence from our biological surroundings. This allows us to build a world of our own—a human world—where all things remit to each other by us giving them meaning. This configures a plexus.

To participate in the plexus is to give meaning to its constituent parts. But too, the plexus provides meaning and purpose to our actions—this is why no person should be left out of it. The plexus, the practical world we made, needs our constant care; otherwise, it withers and can even disappear. Such a plexus of things, and its increasing complexity, if not well understood and dealt with, can threaten our existence.

The building of a plexus is tied to a very peculiar social organization: the family. Our vulnerable condition of not being able to survive
biologically and socially until we reach young adulthood requires the family to function as our basic educational institution, which is complemented by schools and universities. These contribute to our ability to not only to live in society but to add to the plexus. A society in which the family is under siege endangers its own survival.

All of these propositions about humankind—a potential body, intelligence, language, a plexus, and the necessity of family to survive—exemplify our complexity and hopefully prove why such complexity can only be understood via the systems approach.

In Chapter Two, Polo and Llano approximate leadership from an event that denied it. They do not use a thought experiment; instead, they use a lived reality: communism and the communist regime in Poland as conceptualized by a handful of philosophers and social critics. Situation is the word they use to signify the condition of not knowing when it would be over, of being part of it—that is, not an external condition but an internal state of mind and existence; its despairing nature that had so penetrated each individual that the whole of society became part of it. Situation was not a circumstance, even when the Soviets left—many still lived it. It is the essence of totalitarianism.

While a dictatorship is over when it ends, totalitarianism, on the contrary, transforms us—fear and falsehood are incorporated into our existence and actions. We become fearsome: in the beginning, terror might be needed, but once fear extends throughout the population, less frightening actions take place.

Falsehood is also incorporated into our beings. Marxism claims that ideology is a product of the misery of humans and our economical actions. However, communist regimes need to instill such ideology—which they do via propaganda, distorted education, and initial terror. Finally, once a false view of humans becomes the mindset of the population, it becomes a “truth.” But the truth of an anthropological statement is only possible if in essence it does not depend on its acceptance.

Situation also affects “leaders” and managers—they grow fearsome and deceptive. Since everyone has a boss in the tight bureaucracy of any communist regime, they fear being deposed and sent to the Gulag. Trust completely withers in such a society. Thus, it is impossible to have leadership, because a fearsome person and a liar does not know what it is to lead (i.e., bringing out the best in those being lead), nor does a fearsome and deceptive population know how to be lead.
By conceptualizing freedom as a necessity, the Polish dictators fostered a desperate condition within the population, since nobody knew how to abandon the situation. Saint John Paul II’s call when taking office, “Don’t be afraid,” followed many times by “Only truth will make you free,” expressed by one whom had lived and mediated the situation, set the course to leave the situation: solidarity was the social movement that allowed Poles to do so. Solidarity, albeit a name taken by a union and a social movement, represented more than that: it signified a word that allowed for an understanding of a moment in history.

Solidarity meant abandoning fear and wanting to collaborate with others, to leave my own interest aside and worry about others—being fearless by not measuring the risks that might ensue and being truthful by serving others sincerely. The strike of one union in a town and factory was not intended for its own benefit, but was intended to support another strike in another town and factory. Solidarity was the means by which people got rid of situation—it did not become a permanent organization, nor did it become institutionalized, but it did contribute to changing the psychological state of Poland’s citizens.

Russia, Romania, and other post-Soviet states got rid of situation differently. In the case of Russia, it did so via cynicism about its past and scorn toward Marxism and the West. Romania did so by sheer implosion and, what was then common to all, not wanting to blindly follow the West.

Poles are proud of how they left situation, but they realize that since solidarity, that is, fearlessness and truthfulness in order to live pure generosity, was a transient state, they needed to find their own way—their new social and organizational arrangements. Normality is the name given to such a state of affairs. Poles are mature enough to know that this new state needs to take self-interest into consideration, but again, not simply follow the West.

Having lived situation, they know they can relapse at any time—they are vulnerable to fear and lying, so normality needs to be the most efficient social organization possible, but without forgetting such vulnerability.

The authors conclude Chapter Two by asking what lessons situation can teach to leaders wanting to lead in the West. It is a fact that fear and deception are inherent to capitalism. An example is in capital markets: their owners flee as soon as geopolitical conditions threaten
them. Another example is that of Stockholm Syndrome: the abductees eventually believe the lie that their kidnappers told them about why they kidnapped them.

The following questions give rise to Chapter Three: How compatible is entrepreneurship with fear? How should an entrepreneur deal with fear? Is an entrepreneur a capitalist? What is an entrepreneur’s relationship to falsehood and communication (since a firm cannot be organized from any other point than communication)?

Chapter Three is about leaders’ fears. One feature of the human condition is that of always having to face changing circumstances, some of which are extremely difficult and dangerous. In other words, humans are problem solvers. In particular, leaders, managers, and anyone in a governing role face difficulties that cannot always be dealt with successfully.

Aristotle observed that any human action whose purpose is valuable is faced with difficulties. This explains why fear is always present and has to be dealt with courageously. Not doing so makes one fearful, a trait that is unacceptable for those attempting to lead and govern others. Facing difficulty is necessary in order to develop the character strengths needed to lead.

Although young entrepreneurs, managers, and leaders now require knowledge in economics and sociology, something not required in previous generations, the fact is that this information is insufficient. Organizations are comprised of people grouped together and acting toward common goals; thus, over and above economic, sociological, and political examinations are anthropological (philosophical) considerations. The latter are necessary if the former are to avoid arriving at the wrong solutions.

Those conventional social sciences arrive at debatable solutions when they prescribe that humans are conditioned only by economic or sociological forces, the fact being that it is humans acting freely that gives rise to economic and sociological relations. Of course, we can decide whether or not we will be the product of such relations and whether or not we will fully develop our potentialities. This happens when we do not take ourselves seriously as people. Only when we decide to fully become people do we realize our potentialities. Society exists because we are social beings, and not the other way around: the a priori is humankind.
In order to advance a philosophy of leading, the spiritual dimension of the agent needs not only to be considered but to be granted supremacy. Such a dimension is effusive and fortifies itself by acting in society. Such action is truly human if in its constant feedback it perfects the agent and its surroundings.

People are problem solvers because they can face fearsome situations; otherwise, they are conditioned by the situation and, as illustrated above, become part of the situation. In order to avoid this, or to leap from the situation, they need to search for higher-order ends, not just surviving or simply being shrewd.

To fear is a human inclination to flee danger. It is not only a feeling of distress, dread, worry, or dismay, but it gives rise to an attitude and behavior: not to face danger, move to one side, or flee. Further, it is an inclination to avoid what is arduous—to avoid doing more than what one is willing to do.

If what is decided is to not escape, or it is believed that one is not conditioned by external forces, then three possible courses of action ensue. First, to attack by using whatever resources are available in order to solve the problem if and only if there is a degree of certainty that these resources are sufficient. Otherwise, one should resist by fleeing if the problem is going to erode one’s principles or if it is just a matter of a lack of resources. Third, one should rectify behavior, practices and norms, etc. in order to gain other resources with which to face the situation.

These ideas epitomize Aristotle’s observation on why, even if everything is lost, to resist is a gain. In the first place, one gains oneself, since resisting is not a passive attitude—it is not giving or resigning oneself in spite of the menace or the danger not disappearing. If I say no to bribery, I might even end up bankrupt, but I do not “bankrupt” my most inner self, my principles, or my values. On the contrary, I salvage myself. Running away is acceptable when my integrity is at stake. I cannot walk into martyrdom, but if my faith is at stake, I have to lay down my life for it. My body may be ruined, but my personhood is salvaged.

These considerations about leading and fear are related to responsibility. I am responsible for myself, I cannot fall prey to fear; I am responsible for my actions, for what I own. This is the nucleus of responsibility, and leading entails greater responsibilities: the good operation
and management of the organization and the development of its members, who should be treated first and foremost as collaborators rather than employees.

Leaders and managers should never stop at thinking that they have accomplished the right balance of their resources. If leaders can bring out very creative resources from within in the face of difficulty, surely their collaborators can do so too.

Chapter Four is the shortest of the book, but it is probably the most open to debate. It describes three mindsets that are present in economic organizations (not necessarily exclusive of each other): entrepreneur, employee, and owner. These relate to our capacity to react or attack in order to face fear, as described in Chapter Three.

The entrepreneur mindset is that of attacking, so when things become difficult, such a person becomes irresponsible by not facing them. This person’s ways of avoiding difficulties include not going to work, fleeing the country, going on a cruise, taking yoga seriously, etc. The most common avoidance method is blaming others. The entrepreneur mindset accepts difficulties and takes risks. Nobody can foresee the future, but such a mindset is alert to correcting the course, and so it is open to failures. It accepts other people’s timing and believes in their capacity to improve and face difficulties. It sets the pace in order to accomplish long-term goals.

The employee mentality is troubled by the thought of risk—it is cautious. Its long-term goals are few if not inexistent. What is important for such a mindset is to build a resume and try to limit any risks that could ruin it. Such a mindset can infiltrate the entrepreneur’s mindset when difficulties reach a point that extreme measures are needed, like having to close divisions or withdraw from markets, measures that, if not faced, can collapse the whole company.

The owner’s mindset is identified with the least important dimension of the human being: possessing external goods. A person can possess intellectual goods (ideas) or spiritual goods (virtues), but material possessions, although indispensable for survival, can be lost easily. Thus, this mindset is the most prone to fear. Owners of equity are evasive: political turmoil terrifies them.

Entrepreneurs need to know the right order of things: being supports doing and doing supports owning—not the other way around. In contrast to owners, entrepreneurs need resources to hire workers in order to produce more. Entrepreneurs are characterized by a certain
sobriety that allows them to be alert to any ensuing resources in order to create. In contrast, owners are worried about maintaining their equity.

We all have a share of these mindsets. And it is in each one’s being that determines what one is most prevalent: the employee is a person of status, a good manager; the owner is a good parent; while the entrepreneur is a person of action. In an entrepreneur, ownership is subjected to doing, and doing is subjected to principles and values of being. So, the entrepreneur needs to know what he or she stands for and what he or she wants to become first and foremost.

Chapter Five deals with leaders’ truthfulness. Humans are social beings, and so to communicate, to talk, and to debate are part of our essence. Before dealing with the four flaws against truthfulness that the classics always alert us to –error, lying, silence, and deception– the authors offer a handful of considerations about contemporary facts that characterize our present culture with respect to truth.

The classics stated that human society was impossible if lying was predominant. What was said above with respect to situation in Poland after the Soviet occupation exemplifies a feeble and disintegrated society that was able to restore itself via solidarity. There, it seems, silence, secrecy, and general uncommunicativeness were prevalent. All of these attitudes happen nowadays in business, especially when negotiations are taking place. This being the case, the authors inquire as to what is the right course of affairs in order to wisely manage silence.

In spite of democracy being associated with outspokenness and preventing secrecy, the fact is that in many issues concerning the common good, wisdom requires silence. Not all moments are propitious to hand out information –business knows this well, but what is lacking today is a good management of silence in order not to fall into one of the flaws of truthfulness described by the authors.

The best way to combat error is to cultivate objectivity and not to voice unfounded judgments. Against lying, only truthfulness can succeed; against silence, only sincerity and not concealing what is essential can succeed; finally, against deceiving, only integrity, keeping one’s word, and being loyal to others and to oneself can bring about truthfulness.

Error happens when information is lacking and one dares speak without knowledge. In the present culture, and especially in the business world, many decisions are made in haste and without sufficient
deliberation. To lead means to overcome the limits of specialization, the foremost approach to knowledge in a world where analysis is predominant. Leaders not only coordinate the work of others but offer a systemic view that goes beyond the partial view present in analysis and offered by experts.

Objectivity is indispensable for combating error, since our emotions should not cloud our thinking. But once a course of action is decided, having considered all of the possible alternatives and exhausted all available information, then emotions and passion (i.e., subjectivity) can be put to the service of the effort needed for carrying out the purpose. And the purpose or ends of the organizational effort are what moves human action in order to add value.

Adding value is related to hope. Hope in the possibility of surmounting restrictions and scarcity—the indispensable attitude of any entrepreneur.

Abundance does not usually foster creativity or the dynamic exercise of freedom. Freedom is measured by the reality it faces: to a feeble reality corresponds freedom scarcely exercised. Human action requires being lead only if it is aimed at the ends that surmount it; otherwise, it is not action in its strict sense, but it is just a remedy for boredom.

Leaders, then, have to be on guard in order to acknowledge error—a fact due to mankind’s complexity—learn from mistakes, acquire the most information possible, take time deliberating, hear experts objectively, set personal preferences aside, offer a unified and systemic view of what is at stake, execute with passion, and finally, set ends that increase the freedom of all involved in the organizational effort.

While error is unwitting, lying is voluntary. A lie entails something false and pretends deception in order to gain self-benefit. People lie thinking that it is more convenient than telling the truth—if this is not so, then lying is contradictory. Furthermore, lying is not a natural trait. What muddies today’s ideas about lying is consequentialism—an ethical theory that posits the rightness or wrongness of actions in their consequences. Here, the person’s intention (will) does not count, so right and wrong depend on chance. But the relation between acts and consequences is neither empirical nor temporal, since it is possible to show that telling the truth or lying conditions consequences from the start. In other words, falsehood threatens the conditions for rightness to be possible.
Falsehood erodes social life and organizations. Lying might benefit the liar temporarily, but the total outcome for the organization is negative, since it affects the added value mentioned above. Lying is then communicated to all members of the organization and so undermines trust—the bond of any organization. Two liars might not fool each other, but they definitely know they cannot trust each other.

A liar cannot lead, and to claim that it is acceptable for a “leader” to lie to the external world but not within the organization is naïve, to say the least. Those who lie become liars and are unable to communicate and establish dialogues amongst their collaborators. If people do talk within such a setting, it is because it is to the individual advantage of each person involved. The weakest unwillingly accepts the power of the strongest, but it is a situation where latent rebellion is present.

Leaders are such depending on their capacity to summons. The higher the goals and the truthfulness of the leaders are what summons collaborators with more intense character strengths. Higher goals are usually associated with riskier goals, so lazy collaborators are nuisances because they slow the accomplishment of those goals. Laziness, then, is a form of deception.

Deception is not complying with the word one has given, and until recently, business was performed grounded on the truthfulness of the word it gave. Trust was prevalent, especially in societies like North America. This is no longer true, so written contracts must be established. Such an erosion of trust is due to bad leadership, since it leaders, by the example they set, who coordinate the work of others and must be vigilant of people’s compliance with their obligations: “to walk their talk.”

In Chapter Six, the authors tackle the consequences that human action have on those who exercise such action: on the agents themselves. Management science focuses on what is needed in order to accomplish certain ends. Research on leadership investigates what is needed in terms of skills and conditions in order to attain previously given results.

Scarc thought is given to what happens to the agent. This is the contribution of classical thought. In Gorgias’ dialogue, Socrates asks what is worse: to inflict injustice or suffer it? He answers: to inflict it. Yes, suffering injustice can even cost one his or her life, but inflicting injustice turns the agent unjust.
It is the interior transformation of the organization’s members that is important and so qualifies leadership. Leaders can lead their followers to better or to worse outcomes—to become better people, better workers, better team members, etc., or the contrary. Situation was the negative outcome of communist leadership in Poland.

Polo and Llano are not reducing humans to their actions, which is what Marx claims; instead, they are saying that acting first and foremost affects the agent. Nor do they refer to only one act, but to several consecutive acts that build a habit. Acting unjustly facilitates more unjust acts—the contrary is also true.

Socrates’ insight signals humankind’s capacity to grow spiritually without restriction, but intellectually, we our limited by our desire to learn. The former refers to our ability to become better by way of practicing virtues (i.e., lived values), which in turn contributes to being able to act better as well as reducing uncertainty toward the future. On the other hand, the latter refers to our desire to learn—a learning that needs to be qualified. There is such a thing as negative learning: the type of learning that harms oneself and others.

Self-control is a must for spiritual growth. Virtue is about self-restraint and reduces the normal uncertainty about the future that all action entails opening courses for the exercise of freedom. Our behavior is then linked to a particular interpretation of time. Time can be “lost” or “gained”: good acts better our being, so we “gain time.” Wayward behavior worsens us, so we “lose time.” This requires viewing time as a dimension of life whose quality depends on our intelligent use of it.

Managing without taking these facts into consideration and reducing it to arranging material resources without looking at the intrinsic qualities of the people under the manager’s mandate is setting a course for something as real as situation.

This insight is what the authors develop in Chapter Seven. They begin by employing the conventional definition for leading: “to change a person’s behavior in order that he or she does what I want.” This, of course, can be accomplished in several ways, for example, by exploiting the other person’s needs of: making a living, bringing up a family, surviving. Leaders give orders and expect that the recipients will obey because the leaders pay the recipients a salary. This owner’s or manager’s attitude, successful in Taylor’s time, is no longer useful.
Such managing practice is similar to training a cockatoo: you withhold food until it performs a trick, at which point you reward it with food. But not so today: workers expect to be treated like people who think, have initiative, can be creative, and come up with solutions to problems. The Polish situation was accomplished using fear, so managing people like slaves was no challenge at all, except for ensuring that they did not “escape.” If leaders treat people like “things,” they must bear the consequences: upheavals, strikes, turnover, abduction.

Autocratic management is usually performed by immature personalities; such people act like teenagers and are incapable of sharing their interests, thinking that only they know what is best and that others are unable to understand what is at issue. From the start, this is a style of management that annuls any possible community of interests.

True leaders have the challenge of communicating their interests and motivations so that such sharing will bring out their workers’ interests and motivation. A higher-order challenge then takes place: to bring out the best in the leaders’ collaborators (workers)—to help them to realize their full potential. Polo and Llano offer their definition for leading: “to change another person’s behavior by causing him or her to want what you want”. Usually, people are willing to follow an order when the reasons for doing so are shared with them and they feel that the action expected from them has been delegated to them due to their ability and skill. Following an order is first and foremost an intellectual act before will comes into play.

Those who give orders need to communicate—to provide information so that different initiatives can find common ground. However, giving orders and following those orders is a two-way street. Aristotle intuited that the person giving orders must also obey them. For example, A orders B to follow X to accomplish O, but B interprets X and accomplishes O’. Independent of whether O’ is better or worse than O, A needs to understand B’s interpretation and correct him or herself so that A improves his or her way of giving orders; thus, A needs to obey B.

Giving an order and the execution following it are preceded by deciding, and in turn, decision is preceded by deliberation. If what is expected by A is an important change in behavior in B, then the information, which is the content of communication, needs to be ample enough to aid deliberation. B must be aware of the reasons and ends to
be accomplished; further, both A and B need to be constantly learning and correcting themselves to find the best way to accomplish O.

Leaders must increase the value of the organization by bettering the professional and human qualities of their collaborators. The authors insist that to accomplish the former, forgetting the latter betrays the purpose of any organization and manifests an autocratic leadership. The authors conclude Chapter Seven by highlighting the learning and self-correction required of both leaders and followers.

Chapter Eight is about the process of leading and the qualities that leaders should embody. First, the authors establish the importance of deliberation preceding action. Autocratic managers usually do away with deliberation and never share their reasons for a decision with their workers.

One of the advances of the systems movement in organizational theory was to criticize the ideal of “optimizing” as a criterion for deciding and to propose “satisficing” in its place. However, Polo and Llano advance the latter by observing that good leadership is never “satisfied.” On the contrary, leaders are always “on the go,” exploring new opportunities and ways to employ resources more efficiently. Leaders accept challenges, face them, and strive to solve difficulties. They understand the organization as a dynamic entity that does not allow for “satisfaction” to prevail.

Enduring is a quality that is indispensable to leadership. True leaders strive to be surrounded by different collaborators, hopefully differing in their stances, thoughts, attitudes, and perspectives. As mentioned above, leaders give orders but also receive orders. Such people bore critics, as they are probably not knowledgeable in all of the technicalities of the processes, but they are the savviest.

Leaders seek formal information—that acquired through the organizational hierarchy—but they also know the importance of “informal” information: serendipity, “elevator talk,” social media, etc. These are characteristics that contribute to the development of intuitions that cannot be influenced by the environment—rather, they influence the environment via wise decisions and actions.

Information is the foundation for good communication that, in turn, offers the moral grounds for the exercise of power within the organization. The aim of this exercise is to coordinate the interests, motivations, and actions of all those involved. The authors put forward
the following recommendations in order to advance dialogue and delegation that improve this coordination. First, to be informed as best as possible; then, to carefully weigh the sources and standpoint from whom and what the information originates; next, “putting oneself in the other’s shoes” (the systems approach); lastly, looking for the greatest array of stances and opinions –of people willing to listen to others’ viewpoints. The latter is very important to keep leaders from falling prey to flattery, which is the most dangerous temptation they have.

Leaders’ must solve problems in conjunction with those under their charge. Presently, a biological model of the firm is prevalent, which means that people—no matter the degree of their specialization—need to be informed of everything that is relevant to the task at hand. Leaders accomplish this coordination of information, inducing their team members to contribute their closest diagnosis of the problem and discover the most diverse alternative solutions.

When alternatives exclude themselves, they usually proceed from an analytical approach of the firm, in other words, by interpreting it with a mechanical model. The advantage of interpreting the organization using the biological model is that alternatives are systemically related, which in turn reduces decision risks.

In order for information to ensure the best operation of the organization, leaders must delegate not only information, but the formulation of purposes and ends. One can measure the effectiveness of an organization by the fact that most of its members agree to its purpose and can say “this is what we want here.”

Such agreement requires creative objectives—ends, goals— that together with leaders’ foresight contribute to developing their followers’ potentialities. In today’s organizations, these potentialities are solely dependent on the sharing and coordination of information. The mechanical model of organizations served its purpose by allowing specialization without much communication amongst workers, units, and divisions; the production line and assembly line arrangements enabled it. This is not so in the biological model, where a systems approach requires knowing the interrelation amongst all of the elements well. Of course, specialization is rampant here too, and special skills and capacities are its underpinning, but the authors insist that the sharing and coordination of information is absolutely imperative.
Chapter Nine delves into the notion of potentialities and their actualization (i.e., realization). Polo and Llano bring to the fore this classical notion of being and offer a novel way of viewing leadership. Leaders, then, are the people in the organization who see opportunities – potentialities – where others do not. Better still, leaders not only “bring them out to the open,” but they motivate others and coordinate their initiatives and work in order to realize such potentialities.

The authors consider several potentialities under the headings of external and internal. In the former category, they include anticipating the market (two decades ago, the growth that on-line sales were going to have); financial resources, where several alternatives complementing the traditional shareholders and banks are considered (furthermore, they believe that this is one of the potentialities in which the majority of innovation will happen); supply tasks, where they foresee the importance of techniques like “just in time”; the restructuring of businesses (they discuss takeovers, mergers, and joint ventures, cautioning the dangers that arise when these erase positive working cultures that can be saved); cooperation amongst firms and businesses in order to offset, thanks to their dynamism, the static and autocratic nature of the state and politics; and finally, care of customers, one of the most important external potentialities.

Before describing internal potentialities, the authors consider “human potentiality.” In one sense, they refer to the overseas hiring that has allowed for developed economies to hire abundant and cheap labor. In another sense, they refer to bringing out the best in all members of the organization.

There is a premise that makes this possible: viewing society’s main function as that of admitting and educating its new members. The family then plays a definite role: that of contributing to our affective integration. Parents must organize the divergent desires of their children. Their coherent behavior with respect to love, practices, attitudes, etc. is what instills trust in children’s minds and hearts and is instrumental to their maturing into trustworthy personalities.

Organizations’ training programs are conducive to improving skills and increasing their members’ knowledge, but they are limited in their ability to correct negative personality traits. This is why the authors call attention to the role of the family. This is especially true in an expanding culture where desires are captivated by the uncontrolled growth of means in the absence of a unifying end.
A further idea about contemporary culture having significant implications for the meaning of work is that of the acceptance or rejection of the filial condition. When it is accepted, work is related to realizing a commitment—when combined with a person’s knowledge of his or her origin and upbringing, it bestows identity. But when rejected, and being a son or daughter is thought of as an unbearable debt, then the stance toward work is that of fulfilling an interior emptiness where the person self-realizes and, furthermore, considers him or herself as only the result of such action. This attitude underpins the present individualism.

Internal potentialities are more commonly mentioned when discussing management issues: cutting costs, increasing knowledge, and restructuring units, divisions, and processes. The authors address all of these briefly.

Polo and Llano’s stance not only in this final chapter but throughout their book is that of viewing potentialities as manifesting the essence of the human world: “Such [a] world is not constraining, on the contrary, it offers a horizon of possibilities. Homo sapiens is not an individual in the service of the species, on the contrary, the personal being is of higher ranking than its species. This is why the correlate of the species in the case of humans is our “world,” our “human world” and society. Humans need to find potentialities within our social worlds. This is why a sociology of roles, functions, and status is obsolete—it cannot be accepted today (Parson was wrong, and Luhman’s systemic sociology is paralyzing, since neither considers the invention of potentialities)” (Polo & Llano 1997).

Written almost two decades ago, this book takes to task the unquestioned sole contribution of social sciences like economics, sociology, and psychology to the understanding of management, and especially, of leadership. The authors propose the need for anthropological philosophical knowledge and offer insights that demonstrate the complexity of leading. Furthermore, they anticipate some of the findings now recognized and proven by these social sciences, such as the crucial roles played by trust, truthfulness, cooperation, and communication.
JUAN FERNANDO SELLÉS, *Los tres agentes de la sociedad civil: familia, universidad y empresa* (*The Three Agents in Civil Society: Family, University and Business*)
Eiunsa, Madrid 2013, 344 pages.

Carolina Villegas  
University of Navarra (Spain)  
carolinavillegasg@gmail.com

In this book the author Juan Fernando Selles, following Leonardo Polo, seeks to think society from an anthropological point of view. Considering the transcendental anthropology Sellés explains, with an almost dialogic style, the three human manifestations that give the book its title: family, university and company. The author describes them as social agents, in order to understand them there is a need to resort to the person (in his being and essence) and the hierarchy between them (the company serving college and university in the service of family).

In his study (without bibliography and quotes without footnotes) Sellés tries to be 'comprehensive' and rejects the analytical study because of its reductive characteristics. For the author the book deals with the three most important human institutions, that are a condition of possibility of social development in history. These facets are considered by Leonardo Polo as the three agents of change in civil society.

The three institutions are currently experiencing an acute crisis, this is the crux of the study in this book. Family, for the current attack on the concept of it: the intend of delayed marriage, or how easy is to get a divorce, renunciation of the children among couples, etc. The company, by the global economic crisis. The university, for its transformation into 'pluriversity', that is, by forgetting the need for interdisciplinarity in the search for truth. According to Leonardo Polo the future is in these three institutions. And to get out of the current crisis, it is necessary that the three facets of man do not go each on its side, they need to go hand in hand and not each on their own. Moreover, in
its development there is a need to follow the light of the person, of what it truly means to be human.

In order to explain these institutions Sellés appeals to the union between family, university and company, its hierarchy and how each makes sense when it refer to the human person (being and essence). In addition, these institutions must ensure and serve the good of man in society and ultimately contribute to human transcendence. Man is a creature, and in its manifestations he must act according to his son- ship, appealing to his Creator. That is why the author refers to God in different occasions and the role of Him in human action in society.

The human person is the center from which society must be understood; it means, understand family according to parents and children (Sellés presents children as the center of family); understand the university according to what is being a professor (research) and a student (study); and understand the company according to the concept of employer and employee. On the other hand, the purpose of the company must be in people, so their primary purpose can not be external to these, i.e., it can not be production but the qualitative increase bonding and ultimately friendship.

The book is divided into twelve chapters: 1) Person, family and society; 2) Family and Solidarity; 3) Family and education; 4) Progressive education; 5) Friendship and Education; 6) University and truth; 7) Truth and friendship; 8) Friendship and individual knowledge; 9) Person and economy; 10) Person and Company; 11) Family and Company; and 12) University and Company.

It is important to emphasize the fact that the author has not taken separately, at any time of the book, none of the human manifestations studied. That is, only the concept of family, university or company. In this Sellés follows the polian thought handholding the three agents of change, always with reference to the person. The book is written to be read linearly, and affordable to every member of the three institutions of civil society, regardless of their domain of philosophical language. It is a book for people and not for institutions, as what it tries to proclaim.
NEW WORKS BY POLO

Complete Works of Leonardo Polo

Eunsa continues publishing the Complete Works of Leonardo Polo. Volumes currently available are:

Vol. I: Evidencia y realidad en Descartes
Vol. II: El acceso al ser
Vol. III: El ser I: La existencia extramental
Vol. IV: Curso de teoría del conocimiento I
Vol. V: Curso de teoría del conocimiento II
Vol. VI: Curso de teoría del conocimiento III
Vol. X: Quién es el hombre. Presente y futuro del hombre
Vol. XII: Introducción a la filosofía
Vol. XIII: La persona humana y su crecimiento. La originalidad de la concepción cristiana de la existencia
Vol. XIV: Nominalismo, idealismo y realismo
Vol. XV: Antropología trascendental
Vol. XX: El conocimiento del universo físico
Vol. XXII: Lecciones de psicología clásica
Vol. XXIII: La esencia del hombre
Vol. XXIV: Estudios de filosofía moderna y contemporánea
Vol. XXV: Filosofía y economía
Vol. XXVII: Epistemología, creación y divinidad

New volumes will appear soon. A list of the complete plan of publications can be found in the Eunsa Editorial webpage.

New edition of The University Professor

CONFERENCES & SEMINARS

International Conference Transcendence and Love for a New Global Society

The International Association for Philosophical Anthropology, the Leonardo Polo Institute of Philosophy (USA) and the Center of the Thought of John Paul II (Poland), organized a Conference in Warsaw, on August 1-2, 2016. There were given seven lectures on Polo’s thought. See the program here: http://www.centrumjp2.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/program_transcendence_and_love.pdf

Congress on the Theory of Knowledge of Leonardo Polo

The Department of Philosophy of the University of Navarra organized the International Congress The Theory of Knowledge of Leonardo Polo. Between Metaphysical Tradition and Contemporary Philosophy, on September 15-17, 2016.

Conference in The Philippines

Professor Aliza Racelis gave a conference in the Congress The language, culture and politics colloquium, in Manila, on December 7, 2016, titled Notions of gratuitousness and seli-gift in Leonardo Polo: implications for inclusiveness and cultural development.

Seminar on Polo’s Thought on Malaga (Spain)

The IEFLP organized a seminar in the University of Malaga on June 9, 2016.

Conference in Czech Republic

David González Ginocchio gave a lecture about Polo in the Conference Topics in Spanish Philosophy, in the University of Pardubice (Czech Republic), on May 30-31, 2016.

Presentation of the Complete Works in Malaga

The IEFLP organized a Workshop in Malaga, on May 30, to present the Complete Works of Leonardo Polo.

Workshop on the Theory of Knowledge of Leonardo Polo

Some PhD candidates, with the collaboration of the ICS Institute of the University of Navarra, organized a Workshop about the theory of
knowledge of Leonardo Polo, on May 25, 2016, in the University of Navarra.

**Seminar in Brazil**

Edson Gil organized a seminar on May 3, in the Brazilian Institute of Philosophy and Science Raimundo Lulio, about Polo’s book *Nietzsche as Thinker of Dualities*.

**Conference in Philippines**

Professor Aliza Racelis gave a conference in the Sustainable Shared Growth Seminar of the Ateneum of Manila University, on February 10, 2016.

**Workshop on family in Madrid (Spain)**

AEDOS (a Spanish Society for the Study of the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church) organized its 4th Workshop on the Philosophy of Leonardo Polo, this time about his Thought on Family topics, on December 5, 2015.

---

**STUDIES & ARTICLES**

**Studia Poliana nº 18 (2016)**

Studia Poliana has published its issue no. 18, which contains 7 studies on the second volume of the *Course on Theory of Knowledge* of Leonardo Polo, coordinated and presented by Juan A. García González as Associated Editor. The complete issue is available here: https://www.unav.edu/publicaciones/revistas/index.php/studia-poliana/issue/view/127.

**New Journal: Estudios Filosóficos Polianos**

The Centro de Estudios Raffaella Cimatti of Argentina has published in September the third and fourth issue of its Journal *Estudios Filosóficos Polianos*, and is available here: https://revistaestudiosfilosoficospolianos.wordpress.com/

**Miscelánea Poliana nº 53, 54 y 55 (2016)**

*Miscelánea Poliana*, the journal dedicated to Polo’s thought edited by the IEFLP in Malaga, has published three new issues in 2016. Issue no. 53 includes the lectures given in the AEDOS Workshop in Decem-
November 2015. Issue no. 54 includes Research Paper for obtaining the Philosophy Degree of Cristina Rodríguez Blanco, titled La propuesta metodológica de Hegel, Heidegger y Polo. Existencia y temporalidad. Issue no. 55 includes 6 lectures on Polo’s thought given in Malaga during 2016. All volumes are available here: http://www.leonardopolo.net/revista/revista.html.

**Book on freedom**

Ana Isabel Moscoso has published a book on her doctoral research on personal freedom according to Polo’s thought: *Una libertad creciente. La persona en la antropología trascendental de Polo*, Cuadernos de Pensamiento Español, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona 2016.

**New book of Juan Fernando Sellés o Polo’s Theory of Knowledge**

Professor Juan Fernando Sellés has published the book *Hallazgos y dificultades en la teoría del conocimiento de Polo*, Cuadernos de Pensamiento Español, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, Pamplona 2016.

**Book on Polo’s philosophy of biology**

Josemaría Torres López has published a book which treats exclusively and exhaustively the poliana proposals on biology: *Filosofía biológica de Leonardo Polo*, Eunsa, Pamplona 2016.

**Articles on Polo’s thought in different journals:**

During 2016, the following articles or book chapters inspired on Polo’s thought have been published:


RESEARCH WORKS ON POLO

Assirio, J.: *Paternidad y filiación según Leonardo Polo*, Doctoral Research paper for obtaining the PhD, University of Navarra, September 22th, 2016, directed by Juan Fernando Sellés.

- Branya, J.: *Synderesis according to Leonardo Polo*, Doctoral Research paper for obtaining the PhD, May 10th, 2016, Strathmore University (Kenya) co-directed by John M. Shaw y Juan F. Sellés.


- Baena Suárez, I.: Dos actitudes sobre el acceso del hombre a Dios: la filosofía del abandono del límite mental de Leonardo Polo frente a la vía de la religión de Xavier Zubiri, Research Paper for obtaining the Philosophy Degree, University of Malaga, July 6th, 2016.


**ONLINE DISCUSSIONS**

*Polianos Blog: Agnosticism*

The blog Polianos considers the function of the habit of grounding:

http://ieflp.blogspot.com.es/2016/10/el-habito-de-la-fundamentacion.html

*Preguntas Polianas Blog: Anthropological questions*

http://preguntaspolianas.blogspot.com.es/

*El hábito de sindéresis Blog: Transcendental Anthropology*

Guideline for the Transcendental Anthropology of Leonardo Polo

http://habitosindromeis.blogspot.com.es/

*Translating Polo Blog: Translator’s guide to polian terms*

The Translating Polo blog offers an extensive list of possible English translations of the most important philosophical terms used by Polo:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

1. The papers submitted for publication in the Journal of Polian Studies should take some aspect of the Leonardo Polo’s thought as a reference point to present, to compare with other authors or philosophical doctrines, to criticize, to expand their thinking with, etc.

2. The journal is directed to a specialized audience in philosophy.

3. All works submitted for publication, both articles and reviews, must be entirely unpublished, and must be original works of the submitting author. Submissions should be accompanied with a letter to ensure this.

4. While they are being evaluated for publication or undergoing editing, they must not be submitted to any other publication. Once an article has been published, authors retain the right to use it freely, provided that they cite its original publication in Journal of Polian Studies.

Norms for articles

5. Articles must be sent by email to one of the members of the Editorial Board: the editor, Alberto I. Vargas (avargas@leonardopoloinstitute.org) or the assistant editor, Gonzalo Alonso (gabastarrec@leonardopoloinstitute.org). The articles must be sent in a standard and easily editable format, such as Word but not OpenOffice, not PDF. Each author will submit two versions. In one of them, any reference, direct or indirect, to himself should be omitted. Articles should be submitted by February, in order to be published in April.

6. Articles will be submitted to a double anonymous revision by peer reviewers external to the Scientific Advisory Board. They will be evaluated according to the following general criteria: the interest of the topic; the knowledge displayed of the state of the question; dialogue with the most relevant and current bibliography; the unity, clarity, coherence, equity and rigor of the argumentation; the appropriateness of the title, abstract and keywords, as well as the correctness of the English version of each of these; the proportionate extension of the text and footnotes; and the formal and literary elegance of the writing.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS

The Editorial Board will communicate its acceptance or rejection of the submission within a period of three months. The article will be returned to the author together with the evaluations of the reviewers. Authors whose articles have been accepted for publication will receive a set of typeset proofs, which will require immediate correction.

7. Articles should not be longer than 15,000 words including footnotes (97,000 characters including spaces). The number of words or characters in a document can easily be calculated using the word count function of one’s word processor.

8. On the first page of submitted articles must be included, in addition to the name of the author, the academic institution at which he or she is employed and his or her email address. The whole article must be presented in English. Only the quotes of Polo in footnotes can be presented in their original language. The author must submit an abstract of up to 100 words and up to four keywords (also in English).

9. The section titles within the article should be formatted in SMALL CAPS available from the font format dialog box—and be numbered sequentially with Arabic numerals: 1. 2. 3., etc. Subsection titles should be in italics, and should be numbered alphabetically: a) b) c), etc.

For example:

4. THE LAST COMMENTARIES OF THOMAS AQUINAS ON ARISTOTLE

a) The commentary on the «De caelo»

Bold text should never be used in these subtitles.

10. Footnotes should be brief. Citations within the main text should be placed between double quotation marks (“like this”); they should also be brief. Square brackets can be used to clarify a given term within a quotation, e.g. “the link between this [special situation] and the agent’s end”.

11. Bibliographical references must always follow the MLA Citation Style. Synthetically, this means a reference like this between brackets in the text (Polo 2007, 45) which refers to a final bibliography in which the complete reference of the work cited is included. If a work must be cited more than once, follow the same way. A complete and simple guide to the MLA Citation Style is available here: https://library.concordia.ca/help/howto/mla.php

12. The reference to Polo’s texts must be always written in English in the body of the article, but can be in Spanish (or another language
where applicable) in the footnotes. A guide for the translation of Polo’s
terms can be found here: http://translatingpolo.blogspot.de/p/translation-guide-for-polian-terms.html.

13. In order to guarantee the correct transcription of text in Greek, all
such text much be formatted using the font Gentium, which is freely
availably for Windows, Mac and Linux (Debian/Ubuntu) from the fol-
lowing URL:

In the case that it is necessary to use characters of other languages that
are not included in this font, it will be obligatory to use a Unicode font.

Norms for book reviews

14. Book reviews must be between 600 and no more than 1200 words,
and must be completely original and unpublished elsewhere.

15. Except in exceptional cases, we will not accept reviews of books first
published more than three years previously. The works reviewed must
be first editions, or else posterior editions which have been substan-
tially modified.

16. If it is necessary to include citations from works other than the one
being reviewed, the citation must be placed in the body of the text, in
parentheses, following the formatting indicated in items 11 and 12,
above. If the citation is from the book being reviewed, it is sufficient to
include the page number, as shown: (p. 63), or (pp. 63-64). At the end
of book reviews, authors must include their name, their university or
institutional affiliation (without including the postal address), and an
email address that will remain valid for the foreseeable future.

17. Book reviews must be submitted to the Assistant Editor, Gonzalo
Alonso (gabastarrec@leonardopoloinstitute.org).
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS